Multimodal dynamics : self-supervised learning in perceptual and motor systems by Coen, Michael Harlan
Multimodal Dynamics:  
Self-Supervised Learning in Perceptual and Motor Systems 
 
by 
 
Michael Harlan Coen 
 
S.M. Computer Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1994) 
S.B. Computer Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1991) 
 
Submitted to the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science in partial 
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN COMPUTER SCIENCE 
at the 
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
 
May 2006 
 
‘ 2006 Massachusetts Institute of Technology.   
All rights reserved. 
 
 
 
 
Signature of Author 
 
 
 
 
Certified by 
 
 
 
 
 
Certified by  
 
 
 
 
 
Accepted by 
Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science 
May 25, 2006 
Whitman Richards 
Professor of Brain and Cognitive Sciences 
Thesis Supervisor 
Howard Shrobe 
Principal Research Scientist, Computer Science 
Thesis Supervisor 
Arthur Smith 
Chair, Committee on Graduate Students 
 2    
 3    
Multimodal Dynamics:  
Self-Supervised Learning in Perceptual and Motor Systems 
 
by 
 
Michael Harlan Coen 
 
 
Submitted to the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science on 
May 25, 2006 in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy in Computer Science 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis presents a self-supervised framework for perceptual and motor learning based upon 
correlations in different sensory modalities.  The brain and cognitive sciences have gathered an 
enormous body of neurological and phenomenological evidence in the past half century 
demonstrating the extraordinary degree of interaction between sensory modalities during the 
course of ordinary perception.  We develop a framework for creating artificial perceptual systems 
that draws on these findings, where the primary architectural motif is the cross-modal 
transmission of perceptual information to enhance each sensory channel individually.  We present 
self-supervised algorithms for learning perceptual grounding, intersensory influence, and sensory-
motor coordination, which derive training signals from internal cross-modal correlations rather 
than from external supervision.  Our goal is to create systems that develop by interacting with the 
world around them, inspired by development in animals. 
 
We demonstrate this framework with: (1) a system that learns the number and structure of vowels 
in American English by simultaneously watching and listening to someone speak.  The system 
then cross-modally clusters the correlated auditory and visual data.  It has no advance linguistic 
knowledge and receives no information outside of its sensory channels.  This work is the first 
unsupervised acquisition of phonetic structure of which we are aware, outside of that done by 
human infants.  (2) a system that learns to sing like a zebra finch, following the developmental 
stages of a juvenile zebra finch.  It first learns the song of an adult male and then listens to its own 
initially nascent attempts at mimicry through an articulatory synthesizer.  In acquiring the 
birdsong to which it was initially exposed, this system demonstrates self-supervised sensorimotor 
learning.  It also demonstrates afferent and efferent equivalence – the system learns motor maps 
with the same computational framework used for learning sensory maps.  
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We have sat around for hours and wondered how you look. If you have closed 
your senses upon silk, light, color, odor, character, temperament, you must be 
by now completely shriveled up. There are so many minor senses, all running 
like tributaries into the mainstream of love, nourishing it.   
The Diary of Anais Nin (1943) 
 
He plays by sense of smell. 
Tommy, The Who (1969) 
 
 
Chapter 1  
Introduction  
This thesis presents a unified framework for perceptual and motor learning based upon 
correlations in different sensory modalities.  The brain and cognitive sciences have 
gathered a large body of neurological and phenomenological evidence in the past half 
century demonstrating the extraordinary degree of interaction between sensory modalities 
during the course of ordinary perception.  We present a framework for artificial 
perceptual systems that draws on these findings, where the primary architectural motif is 
the cross-modal transmission of perceptual information to structure and enhance sensory 
channels individually.  We present self-supervised algorithms for learning perceptual 
grounding, intersensory influence, and sensorimotor coordination, which derive training 
signals from internal cross-modal correlations rather than from external supervision.  Our 
goal is to create perceptual and motor systems that develop by interacting with the world 
around them, inspired by development in animals. 
Our approach is to formalize mathematically an insight in Aristotle's De Anima (350 
B.C.E.), that differences in the world are only detectable because different senses 
perceive the same world events differently.  This implies both that sensory systems need 
                                                 
A glossary of technical terms is contained in Appendix 1. Our usage of the word "sense" is defined in §1.5. 
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some way to share their different perspectives on the world and that they need some way 
to incorporate these shared influences into their own internal workings.   
We begin with a computational methodology for perceptual grounding, which addresses 
the first question that any natural (or artificial) creature faces: what different things in the 
world am I capable of sensing?  This question is deceptively simple because a formal 
notion of what makes things different (or the same) is non-trivial and often elusive.   We 
will show that animals (and machines) can learn their perceptual repertoires by 
simultaneously correlating information from their different senses, even when they have 
no advance knowledge of what events these senses are individually capable of 
perceiving.  In essence, by cross-modally sharing information between different senses, 
we demonstrate that sensory systems can be perceptually grounded by mutually 
bootstrapping off each other.   As a demonstration of this, we present a system that learns 
the number (and formant structure) of vowels in American English, simply by watching 
and listening to someone speak and then cross-modally clustering the accumulated 
auditory and visual data.  The system has no advance knowledge of these vowels and 
receives no information outside of its sensory channels.  This work is the first 
unsupervised acquisition of phonetic structure of which we are aware, at least outside of 
that done by human infants, who solve this problem easily. 
The second component of this thesis naturally follows perceptual grounding.  Once an 
animal (or a machine) has learned the range of events it can detect in the world, how does 
it know what it's perceiving at any given moment?  We will refer to this as perceptual 
interpretation.  Note that grounding and interpretation are different things.  By way of 
analogy to reading, one might say that grounding provides the dictionary and 
interpretation explains how to disambiguate among possible word meanings.  More 
formally, grounding is an ontological process that defines what is perceptually knowable, 
and interpretation is an algorithmic process that describes how perceptions are 
categorized within a grounded system.  We will present a novel framework for perceptual 
interpretation called influence networks (unrelated to a formalism know as influence 
diagrams) that blurs the distinctions between different sensory channels and allows them 
to influence one another while they are in the midst of perceiving.  Biological perceptual 
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systems share cross-modal information routinely and opportunistically (Stein and 
Meredith 1993, Lewkowicz and Lickliter 1994, Rock 1997, Shimojo and Shams 2001, 
Calvert et al. 2004, Spence and Driver 2004); intersensory influence is an essential 
component of perception but one that most artificial perceptual systems lack in any 
meaningful way.  We argue that this is among the most serious shortcomings facing 
them, and an engineering goal of this thesis is to propose a workable solution to this 
problem.  
The third component of this thesis enables sensorimotor learning using the first two 
components, namely, perceptual grounding and interpretation.  This is surprising because 
one might suppose that motor activity is fundamentally different than perception.  
However, we take the perspective that motor control can be seen as perception 
backwards.  From this point of view, we imagine that – in a notion reminiscent of a 
Cartesian theater – an animal can "watch" the activity in its own motor cortex, as if it 
were a privileged form of internal perception.  Then for any motor act, there are two 
associated perceptions – the internal one describing the generation of the act and the 
external one describing the self-observation of the act.  The perceptual grounding 
framework described above can then cross-modally ground these internal and external 
perceptions with respect to one another.  The power of this mechanism is that it can learn 
mimicry, an essential form of behavioral learning (see the developmental sections of 
Meltzoff and Prinz 2002) where one animal acquires the ability to imitate some aspect of 
another's activity, constrained by the capabilities and dynamics of its own sensory and 
motor systems.  We will demonstrate sensorimotor learning in our framework with an 
artificial system that learns to sing like a zebra finch by first listening to a real bird sing 
and then by learning from its own initially uninformed attempts to mimic it. 
This thesis has been motivated by surprising results about how animals process sensory 
information.  These findings, gathered by the brain and cognitive sciences communities 
primarily over the past 50 years, have challenged century long held notions about how 
the brain works and how we experience the world in which we live.  We argue that 
current approaches to building computers that perceive and interact with the real, human 
world are largely based upon developmental and structural assumptions, tracing back 
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several hundred years, that are no longer thought to be descriptively or biologically 
accurate.  In particular, the notion that perceptual senses are in functional isolation – that 
they do not internally structure and influence each other – is no longer tenable, although 
we still build artificial perceptual systems as if it were.   
1.1 Computational Contributions 
This thesis introduces three new computational tools.  The first is a mathematical model 
of slices, which are a new type of data structure for representing sensory inputs.  Slices 
are topological manifolds that encode dynamic perceptual states and are inspired by 
surface models of cortical tissue (Dale et al. 1999, Fischl et al. 1999, Citti and Sarti 2003, 
Ratnanather et al. 2003).  They can represent both symbolic and numeric data and 
provide a natural foundation for aggregating and correlating information.  Slices 
represent the data in a perceptual system, but they are also amodal, in that they are not 
specific to any sensory representation.  For example, we may have slices containing 
visual information and other slices containing auditory information, but it may not be 
possible to distinguish them further without additional information.  In fact, we can 
equivalently represent either sensory or motor information within a slice.  This generality 
will allow us to easily incorporate the learning of motor control into what is initially a 
perceptual framework. 
The second tool is an algorithm for cross-modal clustering, which is an unsupervised 
technique for organizing slices based on their spatiotemporal correlations with other 
slices.  These correlations exist because an event in the world is simultaneously – but 
differently – perceived through multiple sensory channels in an observer.  The hypothesis 
underlying this approach is that the world has regularities – natural laws tend to correlate 
physical properties (Thompson 1917, Richards 1980, Mumford 2004) – and biological 
perceptory systems have evolved to take advantage of this.  One may contrast this with 
mathematical approaches to clustering where some knowledge of the clusters, e.g., how 
many there are or their distributions, must be known a priori in order to derive them.  
Without knowing these parameters in advance, many algorithmic clustering techniques 
may not be robust (Kleinberg 2002, Still and Bialek 2004).  Assuming that in many 
circumstances animals cannot know the parameters underlying their perceptual inputs, 
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how can they learn to organize their sensory perceptions?  Cross-modal clustering 
answers this question by exploiting naturally occurring intersensory correlations.   
The third tool in this thesis is a new family of models called influence networks      
(Figure 1.1).  Influence networks use slices to interconnect independent perceptual 
systems, such as those illustrated in the classical view in Figure 1.1a, so they can 
influence one another during perception, as proposed in Figure 1.1b.  Influence networks 
dynamically modify percepts within these systems to effect influence among their 
different components.   The influence is designed to increase perceptual accuracy within 
individual perceptual channels by incorporating information from other co-occurring 
senses.  More formally, influence networks are designed to move ambiguous perceptual 
inputs into easily recognized subsets of their representational spaces.  In contrast with 
approaches taken in engineering what are typically called multimodal systems, influence 
networks are not intended to create high-level joint perceptions.  Instead, they share 
sensory information across perceptual channels to increase local perceptual accuracy 
within the individual perceptual channels themselves.  As we discuss in Chapter 6, this 
type of cross-modal perceptual reinforcement is ubiquitous in the animal world. 
 
 
Figure 1.1– Adding an influence network to two preexisting systems.  We start in (a) with two pipelined 
networks that independently compute separate functions.  In (b), we compose on each function a 
corresponding influence function, which dynamically modifies its output based on activity at the other 
influence functions.  The interaction among these influence functions is described by an influence network, 
which is defined in Chapter 5.  The parameters describing this network can be found via unsupervised 
learning for a large class of perceptual systems, due to correspondences in the physical events that generate 
the signals they perceive and to the evolutionary incorporation of these regularities into the biological 
sensory systems that these computational systems model.   Note influence networks are distinct from an 
unrelated formalism called influence diagrams. 
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1.2 Theoretic Contributions 
The work presented here addresses several important problems.  From an engineering 
perspective, it provides a principled, neurologically informed approach to building 
complex, interactive systems that can learn through their own experiences.  In perceptual 
domains, it answers a fundamental question in mathematical clustering: how should an 
unknown dataset be clustered?  The connection between clustering and perceptual 
grounding follows from the observation that learning to perceive is learning to organize 
perceptions into meaningful categories.  From this perspective, asking what an animal 
can perceive is equivalent to asking how it should cluster its sensory inputs.  This thesis 
presents a self-supervised approach to this problem, meaning our sub-systems derive 
feedback from one another cross-modally rather than rely on an external tutor such as a 
parent (or a programmer).  Our approach is also highly nonparametric, in that it presumes 
neither that the number of clusters nor their distributions are known in advance, 
conditions which tend to defy other algorithmic techniques.  The benefits of self-
supervised learning in perceptual and motor domains are enormous because engineered 
approaches tend to be ad hoc and error prone; additionally, in sensorimotor learning we 
generally have no adequate models to specify the desired input/output behaviors for our 
systems.  The notion of programming by example is nowhere truer than in the 
developmental mimicry widespread in animal kingdom (Meltzoff and Prinz 2002), and 
this work is a step in that direction for artificial sensorimotor systems. 
Furthermore, this thesis suggests that not only do senses influence each other during 
perception, which is well established, it also proposes that perceptual channels 
cooperatively structure their internal representations.  This mutual structuring is a basic 
feature in our approach to perceptual grounding.  We argue, however, that it is not simply 
an epiphenomenon; rather, it is a fundamental component of perception itself, because it 
provides representational compatibility for sharing information cross-modally during 
higher-level perceptual processing.  The inability to share perceptual data is one of the 
major shortcomings in current engineered approaches to building interactive systems. 
Finally, within this framework, we will address three questions that are basic to 
developing a coherent understanding of cross-modal perception.  They concern both 
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process and representation and raise the possibility that unifying (i.e. meta-level) 
principles might govern intersensory function: 
1) Can the senses be perceptually grounded by bootstrapping off each other?  Is 
shared experience sufficient for learning how to categorize sensory inputs? 
2) How can seemingly different senses share information?  What representational 
and computational restrictions does this place upon them? 
3) Could the development of motor control use the same mechanism?  In other 
words, can there be afferent and efferent equivalence in learning? 
 
1.3 A Brief Motivation 
 
The goal of this thesis is to propose a design for artificial systems that more accurately 
reflects how animal brains appear to process sensory inputs.  In particular, we argue 
against post-perceptual integration, where the sensory inputs are separately processed in 
isolated, increasingly abstracted pipelines and then merged in a final integrative step as in 
Figure 1.2.  Instead, we argue for cross-modally integrated perception, where the senses 
share information during perception that synergistically enhances them individually, as in 
Figure 1.1b.  The main difficulty with the post-perceptual approach is that integration 
happens after the individual perceptions are generated.  Integration occurs after each 
perceptual subsystem has already “decided” what it has perceived, when it is too late for 
intersensory influence to affect the individual, concurrent perceptions.  This is due to 
information loss from both vector quantization and the explicit abstraction fundamental 
to the pipeline design.  Most importantly, these approaches also preclude cooperative 
perceptual grounding; the bootstrapping provided by cross-modal clustering cannot occur 
when sensory systems are independent.  These architectures are therefore also at odds 
with developmental approaches to building interactive systems.   
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Not only is the post-perceptual approach to integration biologically implausible from a 
scientific perspective, it is poor engineering as well.  The real world is inherently 
multimodal in a way that most modern artificial perceptual systems do not capture or take 
advantage of.  Isolating sensory inputs while they are being processed prevents the lateral 
sharing of information across perceptual channels, even though these sensory inputs are 
inherently linked by the physics of the world that generates them.  Furthermore, we will 
argue that the co-evolution of senses within an individual species provided evolutionary 
pressure towards representational and algorithmic compatibilities essentially unknown in 
modern artificial perception.  These issues are examined in detail in Chapters 6. 
Our work is computationally motivated by Gibson (1950, 1987), who viewed perception 
as an external as well as an internal event, by Brooks (1986, 1991), who elevated 
perception onto an equal footing with symbolic reasoning, and by Richards (1988), who 
described how to exploit regularities in the world to make learning easier.  The recursive 
use of a perceptual mechanism to enable sensorimotor learning in Chapter 4 is a result of 
our exposure to the ideas of Sussman and Abelson (1983).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2 – Classical approaches to post-perceptual integration in traditional multimodal systems.  Here, 
auditory (A) and visual (V) inputs pass through specialized unimodal processing pathways and are
combined via an integration mechanism, which creates multimodal perceptions by extracting and 
reconciling data from the individual channels.  Integration can happen earlier (a) or later (b).  Hybrid 
architectures are also common.  In (c), multiple pathways process the visual input and are pre-integrated 
before the final integration step; for example, the output of this preintegration step could be spatial 
localization derived solely through visual input.  This diagram is modeled after (Stork and Hennecke 1996).
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1.4 Demonstrations 
The framework and its instantiation will be evaluated by a set of experiments that explore 
perceptual grounding, perceptual interpretation, and sensorimotor learning.  These will 
be demonstrated with: 
 
1) Phonetic learning: We present a system that learns the number and formant 
structure of vowels (monophthongs) in American English, simply by watching 
and listening to someone speak and then cross-modally clustering the 
accumulated auditory and visual data.  The system has no advance knowledge of 
these vowels and receives no information outside of its sensory channels.  This 
work is the first unsupervised machine acquisition of phonetic structure of which 
we are aware. 
2) Speechreading: We incorporate an influence network into the cross-modally 
clustered slices obtained in Experiment 1 to increase the accuracy of perceptual 
classification within the slices individually.   In particular, we demonstrate the 
ability of influence networks to move ambiguous perceptual inputs to 
unambiguous regions of their perceptual representational spaces.  
3) Learning birdsong:  We will demonstrate self-supervised sensorimotor learning 
with a system that learns to mimic a Zebra Finch.  The system is directly modeled 
on the dynamics of how male baby finches learn birdsong from their fathers 
(Tchernichovski et al. 2004, Fee et al. 2004).  Our system first listens to an adult 
finch and uses cross-modal clustering to learn songemes, primitive units of bird 
song that we propose as an avian equivalent of phonemes.  It then uses a 
vocalization synthesizer to generate its own nascent birdsong, guided by random 
exploratory motor behavior.  By listening to itself sing, the system organizes the 
motor maps generating its vocalizations by cross-modally clustering them with 
respect to the previously learned songeme maps of its parent.  In this way, it 
learns to generate the same sounds to which it was previously exposed.  Finally, 
we incorporate a standard hidden Markov model into this system, to model the 
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temporal structure and thereby combine songemes into actual birdsong.  The 
Zebra Finch is a particularly suitable species to use for guiding this 
demonstration, as each bird essentially sings a single unique song accompanied 
by minor variations.   
We note that the above examples all use real data, gathered from a real person speaking 
and from a real bird singing.  We also present results on a number of synthetic datasets 
drawn from a variety of mixture distributions to provide basic insights into the algorithms 
and slice data structure work.  Finally, we believe it is possible to allow the 
computational side of this question to inform the biological one, and we will analyze the 
model, in its own right and in light of these results, to explore its algorithmic and 
representational implications for biological perceptual systems, particularly from the 
perspective of how sharing information restricts the modalities individually.   
 
1.5 What Is a "Sense?" 
 
Although Appendix 1 contains a glossary of technical terms, one clarification is so 
important that it deserves special mention.  We have repeatedly used the word sense, e.g., 
sense, sensory, intersensory, etc., without defining what a sense is.  One generally thinks 
of a sense as the perceptual capability associated with a distinct, usually external, sensory 
organ.  It seems quite natural to say vision is through the eyes, touch is through the skin, 
etc.  (Notable exceptions include proprioception – the body's sense of internal state – 
which is somewhat more difficult to localize and vestibular perception, which occurs 
mainly in the inner ear but is not necessarily experienced there.)  However, this coarse 
definition of sense is misleading. 
Each sensory organ provides an entire class of sensory capabilities, which we will 
individually call modes.  For example, we are familiar with the bitterness mode of taste, 
which is distinct from other taste modes such as sweetness.   In the visual system, object 
segmentation is a mode that is distinct from color perception, which is why we can 
appreciate black and white photography.  Most importantly, individuals may lack 
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particular modes without other modes in that sense being affected (e.g., Wolfe 1983), 
thus demonstrating they are phenomenologically independent.  For example, people who 
like broccoli are insensitive to the taste of the chemical phenylthiocarbamide (Drayna et 
al. 2003); however, we would not say these people are unable to taste – they are simply 
missing an individual taste mode.  There are a wide variety of visual agnosias that 
selectively affect visual experience, e.g., simultanagnosia is the inability to perform 
visual object segmentation, but we certainly would not consider a patient with this deficit 
to be blind, as it leaves the other visual processing modes intact.   
Considering these fine grained aspects of the senses, we allow intersensory influence to 
happen between modes even within the same sensory system, e.g., entirely within vision, 
or alternatively, between modes in different sensory systems, e.g., in vision and audition.  
Because the framework presented here is amodal, i.e., not specific to any sensory system 
or mode, it treats both of these cases equivalently. 
 
1.6 Roadmap 
Chapter 2 sets the stage for the rest of this thesis by visiting an example stemming from 
the 1939 World's Fair.  It intuitively makes clear what we mean by perceptual grounding 
and interpretation, which until now have remained somewhat abstract. 
Chapter 3 presents our approach to perceptual grounding by introducing slices, a data 
structure for representing sensory information.  We then define our algorithm for cross-
modal clustering, which autonomously learns perceptual categories within slices by 
considering how the data within them co-occur.  We demonstrate this approach in 
learning the vowel structure of American English by simultaneously watching and 
listening to a person speak.  Finally, we examine and contrast related work in 
unsupervised clustering with our approach. 
Chapter 4 builds upon the results in Chapter 3 to present our approach to perceptual 
interpretation.  We incorporate the temporal dynamics of sensory perception by treating 
slices as phase spaces through which sensory inputs move during the time windows 
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corresponding to percept formation.  We define a dynamic activation model on slices and 
interconnect them through an influence network, which allows different modes to 
influence each other's perceptions dynamically.   We then examine using this framework 
to disambiguate simultaneous audio-visual speech inputs.  Note that this mathematical 
chapter may be skipped on a cursory reading of this thesis. 
Chapter 5 builds upon the previous two chapters to define our architecture for 
sensorimotor learning, based on a Cartesian theater.  Our system simultaneously 
"watches" its internal motor activity while it observes the effects of its own actions 
externally.  Cross-modal clustering then allows it to ground its motor maps using 
previously clustered perceptual maps.  This is possible because slices can equivalently 
contain perceptual or motor data, and in fact, slices do not "know" what kind of data they 
contain.   The principle example in this chapter is the acquisition of species-specific 
birdsong. 
Chapter 6 connects the work in the computational framework presented in this thesis with 
a modern understanding of perception in biological systems.  Doing so motivates the 
approach taken here and allows us to suggest how this work may reciprocally contribute 
towards a better computational understanding biological perception.  We also examine 
related work in multimodal integration and examine the engineered system that motivated 
much of the work in this thesis.  Finally, we speculate on a number of theoretical issues 
in Intersensory perception and examine how the work in this thesis addresses them. 
Chapter 7 contains a brief summary of the contributions of this thesis and outlines future 
work. 
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Chapter 2  
 
Setting the Stage 
We begin with an example to illustrate the two fundamental problems of perception 
addressed in this thesis: 
1) Grounding –  how are sensory inputs categorized in a perceptual system? 
2) Interpretation – how should sensory inputs be classified once their possible 
categories are known? 
The example presented below concerns speechreading, but the techniques presented in 
later chapters for solving the problems raised here are not specific to any perceptual 
modality.  They can be applied to range of perceptual and motor learning problems, and 
we will examine some of their nonperceptual applications as well. 
2.1 Peterson and Barney at the World's Fair 
Our example begins with the 1939 World’s Fair in New York, where Gordon Peterson 
and Harold Barney (1952) collected samples of 76 speakers saying sustained American 
    
Figure 2.1— On the left is a spectrogram of the author saying, “Hello.”  The demarcated region (from 690-
710ms) marks the middle of phoneme /ow/, corresponding to the middle of the vowel "o" in “hello.”  The 
spectrum corresponding to this 20ms window is shown on the right.  A 12th order linear predictive coding 
(LPC) model is shown overlaid, from which the formants, i.e., the spectral peaks, are estimated.  In this 
example: F1 = 266Hz, F2 = 922Hz, and F3 = 2531Hz.  Formants above F3 are generally ignored for sound 
classification because they tend to be speaker dependent.  Notice that F2 is slightly underestimated in this 
example, a reflection of the heuristic nature of computational formant determination. 
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English vowels.  They measured the fundamental frequency and first three formants (see 
Figure 2.1) for each sample and noticed that when plotted in various ways (Figure 2.2), 
different vowels fell into different regions of the formant space.  This regularity gave 
hope that spoken language – at least vowels – could be understood through accurate 
estimation of formant frequencies.  This early hope was dashed in part because co-
articulation effects lead to considerable movement of the formants during speech 
(Holbrook and Fairbanks 1962).  Although formant-based classifications were largely 
abandoned in favor of the dynamic pattern matching techniques commonly used today 
(Jelinek 1997), the belief persists that formants are potentially useful in speech 
recognition, particularly for dimensional reduction of data. 
It has long been known that watching the movement of a speaker’s lips helps people 
understand what is being said (Bender 1981, p41).  The sight of someone’s moving lips 
in an environment with significant background noise makes it easier to understand what 
the speaker is saying; visual cues – e.g., the sight of lips – can alter the signal-to-noise 
ratio of an auditory stimulus by 15-20 decibels (Sumby and Pollack 1954).  The task of 
lip-reading has by far been the most studied problem in the computational multimodal 
 
                
Figure 2.2 – Peterson and Barney Data.  On the left is a scatterplot of the first two formants, with 
different regions labeled by their corresponding vowel categories. 
 31    
literature (e.g., Mase and Pentland 1990, Huang et al. 2003, Potamianos et al. 2004), due 
to the historic prominence of automatic speech recognition in computational perception.  
Although significant progress has been made in automatic speech recognition, state of the 
art performance has lagged human speech perception by up to an order of magnitude, 
even in highly controlled environments (Lippmann 1997).  In response to this, there has 
been increasing interest in non-acoustic sources of speech information, of which vision 
has received the most attention.  Information about articulator position is of particular 
interest, because in human speech, acoustically ambiguous sounds tend to have visually 
unambiguous features (Massaro and Stork 1998).  For example, visual observation of 
tongue position and lip contours can help disambiguate unvoiced velar consonants /p/ and 
/k/, voiced consonants /b/ and /d/, and nasals /m/ and /n/, all of which can be difficult to 
distinguish on the basis of acoustic data alone. 
Articulation data can also help to disambiguate vowels.  Figure 2.3 contains images of a 
speaker voicing different sustained vowels, corresponding to those in Figure 2.2.  These 
images are the unmodified output of a mouth tracking system written by the author, 
where the estimated lip contour is displayed as an ellipse and overlaid on top of the 
speaker’s mouth.  The scatterplot in Figure 2.4 shows how a speaker’s mouth is 
represented in this way, with contour data normalized such that a resting mouth 
 
Figure 2.3 – Automatically tracking mouth positions of test subject in a video stream.  Lip positions are 
found via a deformable template and fit to an ellipse using least squares.  The upper images contains 
excerpts from speech segments, corresponding left to right with phonemes: /eh/, /ae/, /uw/, /ah/, and /iy/. 
The bottom row contains non-speech mouth positions.  Notice that fitting the mouth to an ellipse can be 
non-optimal, as is the case with the two left-most images; independently fitting the upper and lower lip 
curves to low-order polynomials would yield a better fit.  For the purposes of this example, however, 
ellipses provide an adequate, distance invariant, and low-dimensional model.  The author is indebted to his 
wife for having lips that were computationally easy to detect. 
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configuration (referred to as null in the figure) corresponds with the origin, and other 
mouth positions are viewed as offsets from this position.  For example, when the subject 
makes an /iy/ sound, the ellipse is elongated along its major axis, as reflected in the 
scatterplot.   
Suppose we now consider the formant and lip contour data simultaneously, as in Figure 
2.5.  Because the data are conveniently labeled, the clusters within and the 
correspondences between the two scatterplots are obvious.  We notice that the two 
domains can mutually disambiguate one another.  For example, /er/ and /uh/ are difficult 
to separate acoustically with formants but are easy to distinguish visually.  Conversely, 
/ae/ and /eh/ are visually similar but acoustically distinct.  Using these complementary 
representations, one could imagine combining the auditory and visual information to 
create a simple speechreading system for vowels. 
2.2 Nature Does Not Label Its Data 
Given this example, it may be surprising that our interest here is not in building a 
speechreading system.  Rather, we are concerned with a more fundamental problem: how 
do sensory systems learn to segment their inputs to begin with?  In the color-coded plots 
 
Figure 2.4 -- Modeling lip contours with an ellipse.  The scatterplot shows normalized major (x) and minor 
(y) axes for ellipses corresponding to the same vowels as those in Figure 2.2.  In this space, a closed mouth 
corresponds to a point labeled null.  Other lip contours can be viewed as offsets from the null configuration 
and are shown here segmented by color.  These data points were collected from video of this woman 
speaking. 
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in Figure 2.5, it is easy to see the different represented categories.  However, perceptual 
events in the world are generally not accompanied with explicit category labels.  Instead, 
animals are faced with data like those in Figure 2.6 and must somehow learn to make 
sense of them.  We want to know how the categories are learned in the first place.  We 
note this learning process is not confined to development, as perceptual correspondences 
are plastic and can change over time. 
We would therefore like to have a general purpose way of taking data (such as shown in 
Figure 2.6) and deriving the kinds of correspondences and segmentations (as shown in 
Figure 2.5) without external supervision.  This is what we mean by perceptual grounding 
Figure 2.5 – Labeled scatterplots side-by-side.  Formant data (from Peterson Barney 1952) is displayed on 
the left and lip contour data (from the author’s wife) is show on the right.  Each plot contains data 
corresponding to the ten listed vowels in American English.   
  
 
Figure 2.6 – Unlabeled data.  These are the same data shown above in Figure 2.5, with the labels removed. 
This picture is closer to what animals actually encounter in Nature.  As above, formants are displayed on 
the left and lip contours are on the right.  Our goal is to learn the categories present in these data without 
supervision, so that we can automatically derive the categories and clusters such as those show above. 
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and our perspective here is that it is a clustering problem: animals must learn to organize 
their perceptions into meaningful categories.  We examine below why this is a 
challenging problem. 
 
2.3 Why Is This Difficult? 
As we have noted above, Nature does not label its data.  By this, we mean that the 
perceptual inputs animals receive are not generally accompanied by any meta-level data 
explaining what they represent.  Our framework must therefore assume the learning is 
unsupervised, in that there are no data outside of the perceptual inputs themselves 
available to the learner. 
From a clustering perspective, perceptual data is highly non-parametric in that both the 
number of clusters and their underlying distributions may be unknown.  Clustering 
algorithms generally make strong assumptions about one or both of these.  For example, 
the Expectation Maximization algorithm (Dempster et al. 1977) is frequently used a basis 
for clustering mixtures of distributions whose maximum likelihood estimation is easy to 
compute.  This algorithm is therefore popular for clustering known finite numbers of 
Gaussian mixture models (e.g., Nabney 2002, Witten and Frank 2005).  However, if the 
number of clusters is unknown, the algorithm tends to converge to a local minimum with 
the wrong number of clusters.  Also, if the data deviate from a mixture of Gaussian (or 
some expected) distributions, the assignment of clusters degrades accordingly.  More 
generally, when faced with nonparametric, distribution-free data, algorithmic clustering 
techniques tend not be robust (Fraley and Raftery 2002, Still and Bialek 2004).   
Perceptual data are also noisy.  This is due both to the enormous amount of variability in 
the world and to the probabilistic nature of the neuronal firings that are responsible for 
the perception (and sometimes the generation) of perceivable events.  The brain itself 
introduces a great deal of uncertainty into many perceptual processes. In fact, one may 
perhaps view the need for high precision as the exception rather than the rule.  For 
example, during auditory localization based on interaural time delays, highly specialized 
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neurons known as the end-bulbs of Held – among the largest neuronal structures in the 
brain – provide the requisite accuracy by making neuronal firings in this section of 
auditory cortex highly deterministic (Trussell 1999).  It appears that the need for 
mathematical precision during perceptual processing can require extraordinary 
neuroanatomical specialization. 
Perhaps most importantly, perceptual grounding is difficult because there is no objective 
mathematical definition of "coherence" or "similarity."  In many approaches to clustering, 
each cluster is represented by a prototype that, according to some well-defined measure, 
is an exemplar for all other data it represents.  However, in the absence of fairly strong 
assumptions about the data being clustered, there may be no obvious way to select this 
measure.  In other words, it is not clear how to formally define what it means for data to 
be objectively similar or dissimilar.  In perceptual and cognitive domains, it may also 
depend on why the question of similarity is being asked.  Consider a classic AI 
conundrum, "what constitutes a chair?" (Winston 1970, Minsky 1974, Brooks 1987).  
For many purposes, it may be sufficient to respond, "anything upon which one can sit."  
However, when decorating a home, we may prefer a slightly more sophisticated answer.  
Although this is a higher level distinction than the ones we examine in this thesis, the 
principle remains the same and reminds us why similarity can be such a difficult notion 
to pin down. 
Finally, even if we were to formulate a satisfactory measure of similarity for static data, 
one might then ask how this measure would behave in a dynamic system.  Many 
perceptual (and motor) systems are inherently dynamic – they involve processes with 
complex, non-linear temporal behavior (Thelen and Smith 1994), as can been seen during 
perceptual bistability, cross-modal influence, habituation, and priming.  Thus, one may 
ask whether a similarity metric captures a system's temporal dynamics; in a clustering 
domain, the question might be posed: do points that start out in the same cluster end up 
in the same cluster?  We know from Lorentz (1964) that it is possible for arbitrarily small 
differences to be amplified in a non-linear system.  It is quite plausible that a static 
similarity metric might be oblivious to a system's temporal dynamics, and therefore, 
sensory inputs that initially seem almost identical could lead to entirely different percepts 
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being generated.  This issue will be raised in more detail in Chapter 4, where we will 
view clusters as fixed points in representational phase spaces in which perceptual inputs 
follow trajectories between different clusters.   
In Chapter 3, we will present a framework for perceptual grounding that addresses many 
of the issues raised here.  We show that animals (and machines) can learn how to cluster 
their perceptual inputs by simultaneously correlating information from their different 
senses, even when they have no advance knowledge of what events these senses are 
individually capable of perceiving.  By cross-modally sharing information between 
different senses, we will demonstrate that sensory systems can be perceptually grounded 
by bootstrapping off each other.    
 
2.4 Perceptual Interpretation 
The previous section outlined some of the difficulties in unsupervised clustering of 
nonparametric sensory data.  However, even if the data came already labeled and 
clustered, it would still be challenging to classify new data points using this information.  
Determining how to assign a new data point to a preexisting cluster (or category) is what 
we mean by perceptual interpretation.  It is the process of deciding what a new input 
Figure 2.7 – On the left is a scatterplot of the first two formants, with different regions labeled by their 
corresponding vowel categories.  The output of a backpropagation neural network trained on this data is 
shown on the right and displays decision boundaries and misclassified points.  The misclassification error 
in this case is 19.7%.  Other learning algorithms, e.g., AdaBoost using C4.5, Boosted stumps with 
LogitBoost, and SVM with a 5th order polynomial kernel, have all shown similarly lackluster performance, 
even when additional dimensions (corresponding to F0 and F3) are included (Klautau 2002).  (Figure on 
right is derived from ibid. and used with permission.) 
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actually represents.  In the example here, the difficultly is due to the complexity of 
partitioning formant space to separate the different vowels.  This 50 year old 
classification problem still receives attention today (e.g., Jacobs et al. 1991, de Sa and 
Ballard 1998, Clarkson and Moreno 1999) and Klautau (2002) has surveyed modern 
machine learning algorithms applied to it, an example of which is shown on the right in 
Figure 2.7. 
A common way to distinguish classification algorithms is by visualizing the different 
spaces of possible decision boundaries they are capable of learning.  If one closely 
examines the Peterson and Barney dataset (Figure 2.8), there are many pairs of points that 
are nearly identical in any formant space but correspond to different vowels in the actual 
data, at least according to the speaker’s intention.  It is difficult to imagine any accurate 
partitioning that would simultaneously avoid overfitting.  There are many factors that 
contribute to this, including the information loss of formant analysis (i.e., incomplete data 
is being classified), computational errors in estimating the formants, lack of 
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Figure 2.8 – Focusing on one of many ambiguous regions in the Peterson-Barney dataset.  Due to a 
confluence of factors described in the text, the data in these regions are not obviously separable.  
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differentiation in vowel pronunciation in different dialects of American English, 
variations in prosody, and individual anatomical differences in the speakers’ vocal tracts.  
It is worth pointing out the latter three of these for the most part exist independently of 
how data is extracted from the speech signal and may present difficulties regardless of 
how the signal is processed.   
The curse of dimensionality (Bellman 1961) is a statement about exponential growth in 
hypervolume as a function of a space’s dimension.  Of its many ramifications, the most 
important here is that many low dimensional phenomena that we are intuitively familiar 
with do not exist in higher dimensions.  For example, the natural clustering of uniformly 
distributed random points in a two dimensional space becomes extremely unlikely in 
higher dimensions; in other words, random points are relatively far apart in high 
dimensions.  In fact, transforming nonseparable samples into higher dimensions is a 
general heuristic for improving separation with many classification schemes.  There is a 
flip-side to this high dimensional curse for us: low dimensional spaces are crowded.  It 
can be difficult to separate classes in these spaces because of their tendency to overlap.  
However, blaming low dimensionality for this problem is like the proverbial cursing of 
darkness.  Cortical architectures make extensive use of low dimensional spaces, e.g., 
throughout visual, auditory, and somatosensory processing (Amari 1980, Swindale 1996, 
Dale et al. 1999, Fischl et al. 1999, Kaas and Hackett 2000, Kardar and Zee 2002, Bednar 
et al. 2004), and this was a primary motivating factor in the development of Self 
Organizing Maps (Kohonen 1984).  In these crowded low-dimensional spaces, 
approaches that try to implicitly or explicitly refine decision boundaries such as those in 
Figure 2.8 (e.g., de Sa 1994) are likely to meet with limited success because there may be 
no good decision boundaries to find; perhaps in these domains, decision boundaries are 
the wrong way to think about the problem. 
Rather than trying to improve classification boundaries directly, one could instead look 
for a way to move ambiguous inputs into easily classified subsets of their representational 
spaces.  This is the essence of the influence network approach presented in Chapter 4 and 
is our proposed solution to the problem of perceptual interpretation.  The goal is to use 
cross-modal information to "move" sensory inputs within their own state spaces to make 
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them easier to classify.  Thus, we take the view that perceptual interpretation is inherently 
a dynamic – rather than static – process that occurs during some window of time.  This 
approach relaxes the requirement that the training data be separable in the traditional 
machine learning sense; unclassifiable subspaces are not a problem if we can determine 
how to move out of them by relying on other modalities, which are experiencing the same 
sensory events from their unique perspectives.  We will show that this approach is not 
only biologically plausible, it is also computationally efficient in that it allows us to use 
lower dimensional representations for modeling sensory and motor data. 
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It might be asked why we have more senses than one. [Had it been otherwise],… 
everything would have merged for us into an indistinguishable identity. 
Aristotle, De Anima (350 B.C.E) 
 
Chapter 3  
Perceptual Grounding 
Most of the enormous variability in the world around us is unimportant.  Variations in our 
sensory perceptions are not only tolerated, they generally pass unnoticed.  Of course, 
some distinctions are of paramount importance and learning which are meaningful as 
opposed to which can be safely ignored is a fundamental problem of cognitive 
development.  This process is a component of perceptual grounding, where a perceiver 
learns to make sense of its sensory inputs.  The perspective taken here is that this is a 
clustering problem, in that each sense must learn to organize its perceptions into 
meaningful categories.  That animals do this so readily belies its complexity.  For 
example, people learn phonetic structures for languages simply by listening to them; the 
phonemes are somehow extracted and clustered from auditory inputs even though the 
listener does not know in advance how many unique phonemes are present in the signal. 
Contrast this with a standard mathematical approach to clustering, where some 
knowledge of the clusters, e.g., how many there are or their distributions, must be known 
a priori in order to derive them.  Without knowing these parameters in advance, 
algorithmic clustering techniques may not be robust (Fraley and Raftery 2002, Kleinberg 
2002, Still and Bialek 2004).  Assuming that in many circumstances animals cannot 
know the parameters underlying their perceptual inputs, how then do they learn to 
organize their sensory perceptions reliably? 
This chapter presents an approach to clustering based on observed correlations between 
different sensory modalities.  These cross-modal correlations exist because perceptions 
are created through physical processes governed by natural laws (Thompson 1917, 
Richards 1980, Mumford 2004).  An event in the world is simultaneously perceived 
through multiple sensory pathways in a single observer; while each pathway may have a 
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unique perspective on the event, their perspectives tend to be correlated by regularities in 
the physical world (Richards and Bobick 1988).  We propose here that these 
correspondences play a primary role in organizing the sensory channels individually.  
Based on this hypothesis, we develop a new framework for grounding artificial 
perceptual systems.   
Towards this, we will introduce a mathematical model of slices, which are topological 
manifolds that encode dynamic perceptual states and are inspired by surface models of 
cortical tissue (Dale et al. 1999, Fischl et al. 1999, Citti and Sarti 2003, Ratnanather et al. 
2003).  Slices partition perceptual spaces into large numbers of small regions 
(hyperclusters) and then reassemble them to construct clusters corresponding to the actual 
sensory events being perceived.  This reassembly is performed by cross-modal 
clustering, which uses temporal correlations between slices to determine which 
hyperclusters within a slice correspond to the same sensory events.   The cross-modal 
clustering algorithm does not presume that either the number of clusters in the data or 
their distributions is known beforehand.  We examine the outputs and behavior of this 
algorithm on simulated datasets, drawn from a variety of mixture distributions, and on 
real data gathered in computational experiments.   Some of the work in this chapter has 
appeared in (Coen 2005, Coen 2006). 
 
3.1 The Simplest Complex Example 
As in Chapter 2, we proceed here by first considering an example.  We will return to 
using real datasets towards the end of this chapter, but for the moment, it is helpful to 
pare down the subject matter to its bare essentials.   
Let us consider two hypothetical sensory modes, each of which is capable of sensing the 
same two events in the world, which we call the red and blue events.  These two modes 
are illustrated below in Figure 3.1, where the dots within each mode represent its 
perceptual inputs and the blue and red ellipses delineate the two events.  For example, if a 
"red" event takes place in the world, each mode would receive sensory input that 
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(probabilistically) falls within its red ellipse.  Notice that events within each mode 
overlap, and they are in fact represented by a mixture of two overlapping Gaussian 
distributions.  We have chosen this example because it is simple – each mode perceives 
only two events – but it has the added complexity that the events overlap – meaning there 
is likely to be some ambiguity in interpreting the perceptual inputs.   
Keep in mind that while we know there are only two events (red and blue) in this 
hypothetical world, the modes themselves do not "know" anything at all about what they 
can perceive.  The colorful ellipses are solely for the reader's benefit; the only thing the 
modes receive is their raw input data.  Our goal then is to learn the perceptual categories 
in each mode – e.g., to learn that each mode in this example senses these two overlapping 
events – by exploiting the temporal correlations between them.   
 
3.2 Generating Codebooks 
We are going to proceed by hyperclustering each perceptual space into a codebook.  This 
simply means that we are going to generate far more clusters than are necessary for 
representing the actual number of perceptual events in the data.  In this case, that would 
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Figure 3.1 – Two hypothetical co-occurring perceptual modes.   Each mode, unbeknownst to itself, 
receives inputs generated by a simple, overlapping Gaussian mixture model.   To make matters more 
concrete, we might imagine Mode A is a simple auditory system that hears two different events in the 
world and Mode B is a simple visual system sees those same two events, which are indicated by the red and 
blue ellipses. 
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be two, but instead, we will employ a (much) larger number.  For the rest of this 
discussion, we will refer to two different types of clusters: 
1) codebook clusters (or hyperclusters) are generated by hyperclustering and are 
illustrated by the Voronoi regions show in Figure 3.2 on the right. 
2) perceptual clusters refer to actual sensory events and are outlined with the colored 
ellipses in Figure 3.1. 
Our goal will be to combine the codebook clusters to "assemble" the perceptual clusters.  
We note that while perceptual clustering is quite difficult, for reasons outlined in the 
previous chapter, hyperclustering is quite easy because there is no notion of perceptual 
correctness associated with it.  Although we must determine how many codebook clusters 
to generate, we will show this number influences the amount of training data necessary 
rather than the correctness of the derived perceptual clusters.  In other words, this 
approach is not overly sensitive to the hyperclustering: generating too many hyperclusters 
simply means learning takes longer, not that the end results are incorrect.  Generating too 
few hyperclusters tends not to happen because of the density normalization described 
below.  It is also sometimes possible to detect that too few clusters have been generated 
by using cross-modal information, a technique we examine later in this chapter.  
To generate the codebooks, we will use a variant of the Generalized Lloyd Algorithm 
(GLA) (Lloyd 1982).  We modify the algorithm to normalize the point densities within 
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Figure 3.2 – Hyperclustering Mode B with the algorithm given below.  Mode B is shown hyperclustered 
on the right.  Here, we specified k=30 and the algorithm ended up generating 53 clusters after normalizing 
their densities. 
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the hyperclusters, which otherwise can vary enormously.  Many clustering algorithms, 
including GLA, optimize initially random codebooks by minimizing a strongly Euclidean 
distance metric between cluster centroids and their members.  A cluster with a large 
numbers of nearby points may be viewed as equivalent to (from the perspective of the 
optimization) a cluster with a small number of distant points.  It is therefore possible to 
have substantial variance in the number of points assigned to each codebook cluster.  
This is problematic because our approach will require that each perceptual cluster be 
represented by multiple codebook clusters, from which it is "assembled."  The Euclidean 
bias introduced by the distance metric used for codebook optimization means that "small" 
perceptual events may be relegated to a single codebook cluster.  This would prevent 
them from ever being detected. 
There are many ways one could imagine achieving this density normalization.  For 
example, we could explicitly add inverse cluster size to the minimization calculation 
performed during codebook refinement.  This would leave the number of codebook 
clusters constant overall but introduce pressure against wide variation in the number of 
points assigned to each one.  Rather than take an approach that preserves the overall 
number of clusters, we will instead modify the algorithm to recluster codebook regions 
that have been assigned "too many" points.  This benefit of this is that we leave the GLA 
algorithm intact but now invoke it recursively on subregions where its performance is 
unsatisfactory.  By keeping the basic structure of GLA, many of the mathematic 
properties of the generated codebooks remain unchanged.  The downside of this approach 
is that the recursive reclustering increases the total number of generated hyperclusters.   
Thus, the algorithm generates at least as many codebook clusters as we specify and 
sometimes many more.  This increase in codebook size can affect the computational 
complexity of algorithms operating over these codebooks, which we investigate later in 
this chapter.  We note, however, that adding these additional clusters does not tend to 
require gathering more training data, an issue raised above.  This is because the extra 
clusters are generated in regions that already have high point densities. 
Our hyperclustering algorithm for generating (at least) k codebook regions over dataset 
ND ⊆ \  is: 
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1) Let s = /D k .  This is our goal size for the number of data points per cluster. 
2) Let { }1 2, ,..., ,  Nk iP P P P P= ⊂ \  be a Lloyd partitioning of D over k clusters.  This is 
the output of the Generalized Lloyd Algorithm. 
3) For each cluster iP P∈ :  
If iP s>  (the cluster has too many points), then recursively partition iP : 
a. Let { }1 2, ,  NiQ P P P= ⊂ \  be a Lloyd partitioning of iP  over 2 clusters. 
b. Set ( ) / iP P Q P= ∪ .  Add the two new partitions and remove the old one. 
End if statement 
4) Repeat step 3 until no new partitions are added.  Then, return the centroids of the sets 
in P as the final hyperclustering.  Empirically, we find that 2k P k< < . 
The output of this algorithm on the data in Mode B is shown above in Figure 3.3.  Notice 
how the number of clusters increases in the region corresponding to the overlap of the 
two Gaussian distributions, which is due to the density normalization.  We note that any 
number of variations on this algorithm is possible.  For example, in the reclustering step 
                      
Figure 3.3 – The hyperclusters generated for the data in Mode B, with the data removed.  The number 
identifying each cluster is located at its centroid.  Notice how the number of clusters increases in the region
corresponding to the overlap of the two Gaussian distributions, where the overall point density is highest. 
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in (3), we might recursively generate /iP s  rather than 2 clusters.  We could also modify 
the goal size s to change the degree of density normalization.  In any event, we have 
found that our approach is not particularly sensitive to the precise details of the 
codebook's generation; we confirm this statement later in this chapter, when we consider 
hyperclustering other mixture distributions.  At present, the most important consideration 
is that the cluster densities are normalized, which minimizes the Euclidean bias inherent 
in the centroid optimization performed by the Lloyd algorithm. 
 
3.3 Generating Slices 
We now introduce a new data structure called slices that are constructed using the 
codebooks defined in the previous section.  Figure 3.4 illustrates slices constructed for 
Modes A and B from our example above.  Slices are topological manifolds that encode 
dynamic perceptual states and are inspired by surface models of cortical tissue (Citti and 
Sarti 2003, Ratnanather et al. 2003).  They are able to represent both symbolic and 
numeric data and provide a natural foundation for aggregating and correlating 
information.  Intuitively, a slice is a codebook with a non-Euclidean distance metric 
defined between its cluster centroids.  In other words, distances within each cluster are 
Euclidean, whereas distances between clusters are not.  A topological manifold is simply 
a manifold "glued" together from Euclidean spaces, and that is exactly what a slice is.   
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Figure 3.4 – Slices generated for Modes A and B using the hyperclustering algorithm in the previous 
section.  Our goal is to combine the codebook clusters to reconstruct the actual sensory events perceived 
within the slices.   
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Our goal is to combine the codebook regions to "reconstruct" the larger perceptual 
regions within a slice.  To do this, we will define a non-Euclidean distance metric 
between codebook regions that reflects how much we think they are part of the same 
perceptual event.  In this metric, codebook regions corresponding to the same perceptual 
event will be closer together and those corresponding to different events will be further 
apart.  Towards defining this metric, we first collect co-occurrence data between the 
codebook regions in different modes.  We want to know how each codebook region in a 
mode temporally co-occurs with the codebook regions in other modes. 
This data can be easily gathered with the classical sense of Hebbian learning (Hebb 
1949), where connections between regions are strengthened as they are simultaneously 
active.  The result of this process is illustrated in Figure 3.5, where the modes are 
vertically stacked to make the correspondences clearer.  We will exploit the spatial 
structure of this Hebbian co-occurrence data to define the distance metric within each 
mode.   
Mode A
Mode B
 
Figure 3.5 – Viewing Hebbian linkages between two different slices.  The modes have been vertically 
stacked here to make the correspondences clearer.  The blue lines indicate that two codebook regions 
temporally co-occur with each other.  Note that these connections are weighted based on their strengths, 
which is not visually represented here, and that these weights are additionally asymmetric between each 
pair of connected regions.  
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3.4 Hebbian Projections 
In this section, we define the notion of a Hebbian projection.  These are spatial 
probability distributions that provide an intuitive way to view co-occurrence relations 
between different slices.  We first give a formal definition and then illustrate the concept 
visually. 
Consider two slices , nA BM M ⊆ \ , with associated codebooks { }1 2, ,...,A aC p p p=  and 
{ }1 2, ,...,B bC q q q= , where cluster centroids , Ni jp q ∈\ . 
For some event x, we define ( )h x = # of times event x occurs.   Similarly, for events x and 
y, we define ( , )h x y =  # of times events x and y co-occur.  For example, 1( )h p  is the 
number of times inputs that belong to cluster 1p  were seen during some time period of 
interest.  So, we see that Pr( | ) ( , ) / ( ).x y h p q h p=  
We define the Hebbian projection of a codebook cluster i Ap C∈  onto mode BM : 
 [ ]1 2( ) Pr( | ),Pr( | ),..., Pr( | )BA i i i b iH p q p q p q p=G  (3.1) 
When the modes are clear from context, we will simply refer to the projection by ( )iH p
G
.  
A Hebbian projection is simply a conditional spatial probability distribution that lets us 
know what mode BM  probabilistically "looks" like when a region ip  is active in co-
occurring mode AM .   This is visualized in Figure 3.6. 
We can equivalently define a Hebbian projection for a region Ar M⊆  constructed out of 
a subset of its codebook clusters { }1 2, ,...,r r r rk AC p p p C= ⊆ : 
 [ ]1 2( ) Pr( | ),Pr( | ),..., Pr( | )BA bH r q r q r q r=G  (3.2) 
We will also define the notion of a reverse Hebbian projection, which projects a Hebbian 
projection back onto its source mode.  It lets us measure – from the perspective of 
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another modality – which other codebook regions in a slice appear similar to a reference 
region. 
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Figure 3.6 – A visualization of two Hebbian projections.  On the top, we project from a cluster pi in Mode 
A onto Mode B.  The dotted lines correspond to Hebbian linkages and the blue shading in each cluster qj in 
Mode B is proportional to Pr(qj|pi).   A Hebbian projection lets us know what Mode B probabilistically 
"looks" like when some prototype in Mode A is active.  On the bottom, we see a projection from a cluster
in Mode B onto Mode A.   
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To do this, we first define weighted versions of the functions defined above for a set of 
weights ω .  Consider a region r, r k= , where each cluster is assigned some weight iω .  
We assume that 1iω =∑ .   
 
[ ]1 2
( ) ( ),  where  is a codebook cluster in region 
Pr ( , ) ( , ) / ( ) ( , ) ( )
( ) Pr ( | ),Pr ( | ),...,Pr ( | )
p
p r
p p
p r p r
n
h r h p p r
q r h r q h r h p q h p
H r q r q r q r
ω
ω ω ω
ω ω ω ω
ω
ω ω
∈
∈ ∈
=
= =
=
∑
∑ ∑
G
 
 
The reverse Hebbian projection ( )BAH r

 of a region Ar M⊆  onto mode BM  is then 
defined: 
( )( )  ( )
B
A BH rH r H M= G
G
  (3.3)
( ) 1 ( ) 2 ( ) Pr ( | ),Pr ( | ),..., Pr ( | )H r B H r B H r m Bp M p M p M⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦  (3.4)
Again, when the modes are clear from context, we will simply refer to this as ( )H r

.  
 
This distribution has a simple interpretation: the reverse Hebbian projection from mode 
AM  onto mode BM  for some region Ar M⊆  is the Hebbian projection of all of mode 
BM  onto mode AM , weighted by the forward Hebbian projection of region r, as shown 
in equation (3.3).  This process is visualized in Figure 3.7.  Note that we are projecting an 
entire mode BM  here.  This might seem initially surprising, but it simply corresponds to 
a projection of a region that contains all the codebook clusters for a given slice. 
The reverse Hebbian projection ( )H r

 answers the question: what other regions does 
mode BM  think region r is similar to in mode AM ?  It can therefore be viewed as a 
distribution that measures cross-modal confusion.  For this reason, it provides a useful 
optimization tool, because we will only need to disambiguate regions that appear in each 
other's reverse Hebbian projections, i.e., they have a non-zero (or above some threshold) 
probability of being confused for one another by other modalities. 
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3.5 Measuring Distance in a Slice 
Let us briefly review where we stand at this point.  We have introduced the idea of a 
slice, which breaks up a representational space into many smaller pieces that are 
generated by hyperclustering it.  We would like to assemble these small hyperclusters 
into larger regions that represent actual perceptual categories present in the input data.  In 
this section, we define the non-Euclidean distance metric between the hyperclusters that 
helps make this possible.   
Consider the colored regions in Figure 3.8.  We would like to determine that the blue and 
red regions are part of their respective blue and red events, indicated by the colored 
ellipses.  It is important to recall that the colors here are simply for the reader's benefit.  
There is no labeling of regions or perceptual events within the slice itself.  We will 
proceed by formulating a distance metric that minimizes the distance between codebook 
regions that are actually within the same perceptual region and maximizes the distance 
Mode A
Mode B
 
Figure 3.7 – Visualizing a reverse Hebbian projection.  We first generate the Hebbian projection of the 
green cluster pi in Mode A onto Mode B.  This projection is represented by the shading of each region qj in 
Mode B, corresponding to Pr(qj|pi).  We then project all of Mode B back onto Mode A, weighting the 
contributions of each cluster qi by Pr(qj|pi).  This generates the reverse Hebbian projection, which is 
indicated by the shading of regions in Mode A. 
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between codebook regions that are in different regions.  That this metric must be non-
Euclidean is clear from looking at the figure.  Each highlighted region is closer to one of 
a different color than it is to its matching partner.    
We are going to use the Hebbian projections defined in the previous section to formulate 
this similarity metric for codebook regions.  This will make the metric  inherently cross-
modal because we will rely on co-occurring modalities to determine how similar two 
regions within a slice are.  Our approach is to compare codebook regions by comparing 
their Hebbian projections onto co-occurring slices.  This process is illustrated in Figure 9. 
The problem of measuring distances between prototypes is thereby transformed into a 
problem of measuring similarity between spatial probability distributions.  The 
distributions are spatial because the codebook regions have definite locations within a 
slice, which are subspaces of n\ .  Hebbian projections are thus spatial distributions on n-
dimensional data.  It is therefore not possible to use one dimensional metrics, e.g., 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov distance, to compare them because doing so would throw away the 
essential spatial information within each slice. 
 
               
Mode B
 
 
Figure 3.8 – Combining codebook regions to construct perceptual regions.  We would like to determine 
that regions within each ellipse are all part of the same perceptual event.  Here, for example, the two blue 
codebook regions (probabilistically) correspond the blue event and the red regions correspond to the red
event. 
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Figure 3.9 – Our approach to computing distances cross-modally.  To determine the distance between 
codebook regions 1 2 and r r  in Mode B on top, we project them onto a co-occurring modality (Mode A) as 
shown in the middle.  We then ask: how similar are their Hebbian projections onto Mode A?, as shown on 
the bottom.  We have thereby transformed a question about distance between regions into a question of 
similarity between the spatial probability distributions provided by their Hebbian projections. 
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3.6 Defining Similarity 
What does it mean for two things to be similar?  This deceptively difficult question is at 
the heart of mathematical clustering and perceptual categorization and is common to a 
number of fields, including computer vision, statistical physics, and information and 
probability theory.  The goal of measuring similarity between different things is often 
cast as a problem of measuring distances between multidimensional distributions on 
descriptive features.  For example, in computer vision, finding minimum matchings 
between image feature distributions is a common approach to object recognition 
(Belongie et al. 2002). 
In this section, we present a new metric for measuring similarity between spatial 
probability distributions, i.e., distributions on multidimensional metric spaces.   We will 
use this metric to compute distances between codebook regions by comparing their 
Hebbian projections onto co-occurring modalities, as shown above in Figure 3.9.  Our 
approach is therefore inherently multimodal – although we may be unable to determine a 
priori how similar two codebook regions are in isolation (i.e., unimodally), we can 
measure their similarity by examining how they are viewed from the perspectives of 
other co-occurring sensory channels.  We therefore want to formulate a similarity metric 
on Hebbian projections that tells us not how far apart they are but rather, how similar 
they are to one another.  This will enable perceptual bootstrapping by allowing us to 
answer a fundamental question:  
Can any other modality distinguish between two regions in the same 
codebook?  If not, then they represent the same percept. 
3.6.1 Introduction 
 
There are a wide variety of metrics available to quantify distances between probability 
distributions (see the surveys in Rachev 1991, Gibbs and Su 2002).  We may contrast 
these in many ways, including whether they are actually metrics (i.e., symmetric and 
satisfy the triangle inequality), the properties of their state spaces, their computational 
complexity, whether they admit practical bounding techniques, etc.  For example, the 
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common 2χ  distance is not a metric because it is asymmetric.  In contrast, Kolmogorov-
Smirnov distance is a metric but is defined only over 1\ .  Choosing an appropriate 
metric for a given problem is a fundamental step towards solving it and can yield 
important insights into its internal structure. 
In discussions of probability metrics, the notion of similarity generally follows directly 
from the definition of distance.  Two distributions are deemed similar if the distance 
between them is small according to some metric; conversely, they are deemed dissimilar 
when the metric determines they are far apart.  In our approach, we will reverse this 
dependency.  We first intuitively describe our notion of similarity and then formulate a 
metric that computes it in a well-defined way.  We call this metric the Similarity distance 
and it is the primary contribution of this section.  Our approach is applicable to 
comparing distributions over any metric space and has a number of interesting properties, 
such as scale invariance, that make it additionally useful for work beyond the scope of 
this thesis.  
 
3.6.2 Intuition 
 
We begin by first examining similarity informally.  Consider the two simple examples 
shown in Figure 3.10.  Each shows two overlapping Gaussian distributions, whose 
similarity we would like to compare.  Intuitively, we would say the distributions in 
Example A (on the left) are more similar to one another than those in Example B (on the 
right), because we will think of similarity as a measure of the overlap or proximity of 
spatial density.  We are not yet concerned with formally defining similarity, but the 
intuition in these examples is exactly what we are trying to capture.  Notice that the 
distributions in Example A cover roughly two orders of magnitude more area than those 
in Example B.  Therefore, if we were to derive similarity from distance, the strong 
Euclidean bias incorporated into a wide variety of probability metrics would lead us to 
the opposite of our desired result.  Namely, because the examples in B are much closer 
than those in A, we would therefore deem them more similar, thereby contradicting our 
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desired meaning.  Because we are looking for a distance measure based on similarity – 
and not a direct similarity measure – it should smaller for things that are more similar 
and larger for things that are less similar.   This is the opposite of what one would expect 
were we directly formulating a measure of similarity, which presumably would be higher 
for more similar distributions. 
Note that we cannot simply normalize pairs of distributions before computing some 
metric on them because our results would be highly sensitive to outliers.  Doing so would 
also make common comparisons difficult, which is particularly important when 
demonstrating convergence in a sequence of probability measures.  Finally, we want our 
similarity metric to be distribution-free and make no assumptions about the underlying 
data, which would make generalizing a simple normalization schema difficult. 
 
3.6.3 Probabilistic Framework 
We begin with some formal definitions.  Our approach will be to define Similarity 
distance SD  as the ratio between two other metrics.  These are the Kantorovich-
Wasserstein distance and a new metric we introduce called the one-to-many distance.  For 
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Figure 3.10 – Intuitively defining similarity. We consider the two distributions illustrated in Example A to 
be far more similar to one another than those in Example B, even though many metrics would deem them
further apart due to inherent Euclidean biases.  Notice that the distributions in Example A cover roughly 
two orders of magnitude more area than those in Example B.  Note that simply normalizing the 
distributions before computing some metric on them would be ad hoc, very sensitive to outliers, and make 
common comparisons difficult. 
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each of these, we will provide a definition over continuous distributions and then present 
equivalent formulations for discrete weighted point sets.  These are more computationally 
efficient for computing Similarity distance on the slice data structures introduced earlier.  
After this formal exposition, we intuitively explain and motivate these metrics in Section 
3.6.4 and then show how Similarity distance is derived from them. 
3.6.3.1 Kantorovich-Wasserstein Distance 
Let μ  and ν  and be distributions on state space nΩ = \ .  The Kantorovich-Wasserstein 
distance WD  (Kantorovich 1942, Gibbs and Su 2002) between μ  and ν  may be defined: 
 ( ) { }, inf ( , ) :  ( ) ,  ( )W JD D x y L x L yμ ν μ ν= = =  (3.5) 
where the infimum is taken over all joint distributions J on x and y with marginals 
( )L x μ=  and ( )L y ν=  respectively.  For brevity, we will refer to WD  simply as the 
Wasserstein distance.  Notice that in order to compute the Wasserstein distance, we 
already need to have a distance metric D defined to calculate the infimum.  Where does D 
come from?  In fact, in the approach described above, isn't D supposed to be the 
Similarity distance SD , because we are proposing to use Similarity distance to measure 
distances within slices?  Thus, we seem to have a “chicken and egg” problem from the 
start.  We will sidestep this by defining D recursively through an iterative function 
system on SD .  This will allow us to compute Similarity distance by incrementally 
refining our calculation of it.   
The definition in (3.5) assumes the distributions are continuous.  Hebbian projections, 
however, are discrete distributions (i.e., weighted point sets) because they are over the 
codebooks within a slice.  We may therefore simplify our computation by carrying it out 
directly over these codebooks.  To do so, we define the Wasserstein distance on weighted 
point sets corresponding to discrete probability distributions.  Consider finite sets 
1 2,r r ⊂ Ω  with point densities 1 2,ϕ ϕ  respectively.  Then we have: 
( ) { }1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2, , , inf ( , ) :  ( ) , ,  ( ) ,W JD r r D x y L x r L y rϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ= = =  
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which by (Levina and Bickel 2001) is equal to: 
 ( ) ( )
1
1/ 22
1
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2,.., 1
, , , min , , ,
im
m
W m i jj j i
D r r D r rϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ
=
⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑  (3.6) 
where m is the maximum of the sizes of 1r  and 2r , the minimum is taken over all 
permutations of { }1,...,m , and ,a a ir ϕ  is the ith element of set ,a ar ϕ .  We note that 
(ibid.) has shown this is equivalent to the Earth Mover's distance (Rubner et al. 1998), a 
popular empirical measure used primarily in the machine vision community, when they 
are both computed over probability distributions. 
We can now define the Wasserstein distance between Hebbian projections of 1 2, Ar r M⊆  
onto BM  as: 
 ( ) { }1 2 1 2( ), ( ) inf ( , ) :  ( ) ( ),  ( ) ( )W JD H r H r D x y L x H r L y H r= = =G G G G  (3.7) 
where the infimum is taken over all joint distributions J on x and y with marginals 
1 2( ) and ( )H r H r
G G
.  By (3.6), we have this is equal to: 
 ( ) ( )
1
1/ 22
1
1 2 1 2,.., 1
( ), ( ) min ( ) , ( )
i
m
m
W i jm j j i
D H r H r D H r H r
=
⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑
G G G G
 (3.8) 
where m is the number of codebook regions in BM , the minimum is taken over all 
permutations of { }1,...,m ,  and ( )  component of ( )thiH r i H r=G G . 
We note that the Wasserstein distance presented above is not a candidate for measuring 
similarity.  In fact, referring back to Figure 3.10, the red and blue distributions in 
Example A here are further apart as determined by the Wasserstein distance than those in 
Example B, i.e., (Example A)  (Example B)W WD D> , which does not capture our intended 
meaning of similarity.  The additional measure needed will be described shortly, 
following a brief discussion of how WD  can be computed efficiently. 
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3.6.3.2 Computational Complexity 
The optimization problem in (3.6) was first proposed by Monge (1781) and is known as 
the Transportation Problem.  It involves combinatorial optimization because the 
minimum is taken over (2 )mO  different permutations and can be solved by Kuhn's 
Hungarian method (1955, see also Frank 2004).  However, by treating it as a flow 
problem, we instead use the Transportation Simplex method introduced by Dantzig 
(1951) and subsequently enhanced upon by Munkres (1957), which has worst case 
exponential time but in practice is quite efficient (Klee and Minty 1972). 
To get some insight into the structure of this problem, we take a moment to examine the 
complexity of determining exact solutions to it according to (3.8).  Although this is not 
necessary in practice, it is instructive to see how the choice of mixture distributions 
influences the complexity of the problem and the implications this has for selecting 
perceptual features.  Notice that in the minimization in equation (3.8), the vast majority 
of permutations can be ignored because we only need examine regions that have non-zero 
probabilities in the Hebbian projections.  In other words, we could choose to ignore any 
region i Bq M⊆  where 1 2max( ( ) , ( ) )i iH r H r ε≤
G G
 for some small ε .  A conservative 
approach would set 0ε = , however, one can certainly imagine using a slightly higher 
threshold to simultaneously reduce noise and computational complexity. 
We may estimate the running time of calculating WD  exactly by asking how many non-
zeros values we expect to find in the Hebbian projections onto mode BM  of two regions 
in mode AM .  Let us suppose that mode BM  actually has d events (of equal likelihood) 
distributed over m codebook regions.  How many codebook regions are there within each 
event?  If the events do not overlap, then we expect that each perceptual event is covered 
by m/d codebook regions, due to the density normalization performed during codebook 
generation.  In this case, the minimization must be performed over 1 /(2 )m dO +  
permutations.  Alternatively, it is possible for all of the sensory events to overlap, giving 
an upper bound, worst case of m regions per event and (2 )mO  running time.   Thus, the 
running time is a function of the event mixture distributions as much as it is the number 
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of codebooks.  When Hebbian distributions are "localized," in the sense they are confined 
to subsets of the codebook regions, the worst-case running time is closer to 1 /(2 )m dO + .   
We can optimize the computation by taking advantage of the fact that the projections are 
over identical codebooks, i.e., their spatial distributions are over the same set of points 
generated by the hyperclustering of BM .  In the general statement of the Transportation 
Problem, this need not be the case.  We can therefore reduce the number of codebook 
regions involved by removing the intersection of the projections from the calculation.  
Where they overlap, namely, the distribution described by a normalized 
( )1 2min ( ), ( )H r H rG G , we know the Wasserstein distance between them is 0.   Therefore, 
let: 
 ( )1 1 1 2( ) ( ) min ( ), ( )H r H r H r H r′ = −G G G G  (3.9) 
 ( )2 2 1 2( ) ( ) min ( ), ( )H r H r H r H r′ = −G G G G  (3.10) 
 ( )1 21 min ( ), ( )H r H rΔ = − ∑ G G  (3.11) 
 We then have: 
 ( ) ( )1 2 1 2( ), ( )  ( ), ( )W WD H r H r D H r H r′ ′= ΔG G G G  (3.12) 
In other words, the Wasserstein distance computed over a common codebook (3.12) is 
equal to the distance computed on the distributions ((3.9) and (3.10)) over their non-
intersecting mass (3.11).  (Note that we must normalize (3.9) and (3.10) to insure they 
remain probability distributions, but the reader may assume this normalization step is 
always implied when necessary.)  When the distributions overlap strongly, which we 
previously identified as the worst case scenario, we can typically use this optimization to 
cut the number of involved codebooks regions in half.  When the distributions do not 
overlap, this optimization provides no benefit, but as we have already noted, this is a best 
case scenario and optimization is less necessary.  As a further enhancement, we could 
also establish thresholds for Δ  to avoid calculating WD  altogether.  For example, in the 
case where their non-intersecting mass is extremely small, we might chose to define 
0 or some other approximationWD = . 
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In summary then, the computational complexity of exactly computing the Wasserstein 
distance very much rests on the selection of mixture distributions over which it is 
computed.  These in turn depend upon the feature selection used in our perceptual 
algorithms, which directly determine the distributions of sensory data within a slice.  We 
say that "good" features are ones that tend to restrict Hebbian projections to smaller 
subsets of slices and to reduce the amount of overlap among detectable perceptual events.  
(We suspect one can directly formulate a measure of the entropy in features based on 
these criteria but have not done so here.)  Empirically, "good" features for computing the 
Wasserstein distance tend to be similar to the ones we naturally select when creating 
artificial perceptual systems.  "Bad" features provide little information because their 
values are difficult to separate, i.e., they have high entropy.  Later in the thesis, we will 
draw biological evidence for these theses idea from (Ernst and Banks 2002) . 
 
3.6.3.3 The One-to-Many Distance 
We now introduce a new distance metric called the one-to-many distance.  Afterwards, 
we examine this metric intuitively and show how it naturally complements the 
Wasserstein distance.  We will use these metrics together to formalize our intuitive notion 
of similarity. 
Let f and g be the respective density functions of distributions μ  and ν  on state space 
nΩ = \ .  Then the one-to-many distance ( OTMD ) between μ  and ν  is: 
( , ) ( ) ( , ) 
( ) ( ) ( , )  
( ) ( , ) ( , )
OTM W
W OTM
D f x D x dx
f x g y d x y dxdy
g y D y dy D
μ
μ ν
ν
μ ν ν
μ ν μ
= ⋅
= ⋅ ⋅
= ⋅ =
∫
∫ ∫
∫
 
 
We define this over weighted pointed sets as: 
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The one-to-many distance is the weighted sum of the Wasserstein distances between each 
individual point within a distribution and the entirety of another distribution.  It is 
straightforward to directly calculate WD  between a point and a distribution and 
computing OTMD  requires 
2( )O m  time, where m is the maximum number of weighted 
points in the distributions.   Also, we note from these definitions that OTMD  is symmetric.  
From this definition, we can now formulate OTMD  between Hebbian projections of 
1 2, Ar r M⊆  onto BM : 
 ( ) ( )
1
1 2 2
( )
( ), ( )  , ( )OTM i W
i H r
D H r H r D i H rω
∈
= ∑GG G G  (3.13) 
 
1 2( ) ( )
( , )i j
i H r j H r
D i jω ω
∈ ∈
= ∑ ∑G G  (3.14) 
where 1 2( )  and ( )i i j jH r H rω ω= =
G G
.  Recall that ( )  component of ( )thiH r i H r=
G G
. 
 
We see this is symmetric: 
 ( ) ( )1 2 2 1( ), ( ) ( ), ( )OTM OTMD H r H r D H r H r=G G G G  
 
The one-to-many distance is a weighted sum of the Wasserstein distances between each 
individual region in a projection and the other projection in its entirety.  The weights are 
taken directly from the original Hebbian projections.  This is represented by the term 
( )2 , ( )i WD i H rω G  in (3.13).   We note that the Wasserstein distance between a single region 
and a distribution is trivial to compute directly, as shown in (3.14), and it can be 
calculated in ( )O m  time, where m is the number of codebooks in Mode B.  Therefore, 
OTMD  can be computed in 
2( )O m  time. 
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Mode A
Mode B
 
Figure 3.11 –   A simpler example.  Mode B is the same as in previous examples but the events in Mode A 
have been separated  so they do not overlap.  The colored ellipses show how the external red and blue
events probabilistically appear within each mode. 
 
 
 
      
Mode A
Mode B
 
Figure 3.12 – Hebbian projections from regions in Mode B onto Mode A.   Notice that the Hebbian 
projections have no overlap, which simplifies the visualization and discussion in the text.  However, this 
does not affect the generality of the results. 
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3.6.4 Visualizing the Metrics: A Simpler Example 
 
Consider the example in Figure 3.11.  We have modified Mode A, on the bottom, so that 
its events no longer overlap.  (Mode B on top remains unchanged.)  This will simplify the 
presentation but does not affect the generality of the results presented here.  As before, 
the two world events perceived by each mode are delineated with colored ellipses for the 
benefit of the reader but the modes themselves have no knowledge of them.  The Hebbian 
projections from two codebook regions in Mode B are shown in Figure 3.12.  We see this 
example was designed so that the projections have no overlap, making it easy to view 
them independently. 
We now give an intuitive interpretation of the two distance metrics, WD  and OTMD , based 
on the classic statement of the Transportation Problem (Monge 1781).  This problem is 
more naturally viewed with discrete distributions, but the presentation generalizes readily 
to continuous distributions.  Consider the Hebbian projections from our example in 
isolation, as show in Figure 3.13.  On the left, 1( )H r
G
 is shown in red, and 2( )H r
G
 is shown 
in blue on the right.  The shading within each Voronoi region is proportional to its weight 
(i.e., point density) within its respective distribution.   
In the Transportation Problem, we imagine the red regions (on the left) need to deliver 
supplies to the blue regions (on the right).  Each red region contains a mass of supplies 
proportional to its shading and each blue region is expecting a mass of supplies 
proportional to its shading.  (We know that mass being "shipped" is equal to the mass 
being "received" because they are described by probability distributions.)  The one-to-
many distance is how much work would be necessary to deliver all the material from the 
red to blue regions, if each region had to independently deliver its mass proportionally to 
all regions in the other distribution.  Work here is defined as mass×distance . 
The Wasserstein distance computes the minimum amount of work that would be 
necessary if the regions cooperate with one another.  Namely, red regions could deliver 
material to nearby blue regions on behalf of other red regions, and blue regions could 
receive material from nearly red regions on behalf of other blue regions.  Nonetheless, we 
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maintain the restriction that each region has a maximum amount it can send or receive, 
corresponding to its point density.  This is why the Wasserstein distance computes the 
solution to the Transportation Problem, which is directly concerned with this type of 
delivery optimization. 
 Thus, we may summarize that OTMD  computes an unoptimized Transportation 
Problem, where cooperation is forbidden, and that WD  computes the optimized 
Transportation Problem, where cooperation is required.   
                   
G
1( )H r
G
2( )H rMode A  
 
Figure 3.13 – Visualizing WD  and OTMD through the Transportation Problem.  We examine the Hebbian 
projections onto Mode A shown in Figure 3.12.  1( )H r
G
 is shown in red on the left and 2( )H r
G
 is shown in 
blue on the right.  Each region is shaded according to its point density.  In the Transportation Problem, we 
want to move the "mass" from one distribution onto the other.  If we define work = mass× distance , then 
OTMD  computes the work required if each codebook region must distribute its mass proportionally to all 
regions in the other distribution. WD  computes the work required if the regions cooperatively distribute 
their masses, to minimize the total amount of work required. 
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3.6.5 Defining Similarity 
We are now in a position to formalize the intuitive notion of similarity presented above.   
We define a new metric called the Similarity distance ( SD ) between continuous 
distributions μ  and ν : 
( , )( , )
( , )
W
S
OTM
DD
D
μ νμ ν μ ν=  
and over weighted point sets: 
( )
( )1 1 2 21 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
, , ,
( , , , )
, , ,
W
S
OTM
D r r
D r r
D r r
ϕ ϕϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ=  
We thereby define the Similarity distance between Hebbian projections of 1 2, Ar r M⊆  
onto BM : 
 ( ) ( )( )
1 2
1 2
1 2
( ), ( )
( ), ( )
( ), ( )
W
S
OTM
D H r H r
D H r H r
D H r H r
=
G GG G G G  (3.15) 
The Similarity distance is the ratio of the Wasserstein to the one-to-many distance.  It 
measures the optimization gained when transferring the mass between two spatial 
probability distributions if cooperation is allowed.  Intuitively, it normalizes the 
Wasserstein distance.  It is scale invariant (see Figure 3.14) and captures our desired 
notion of similarity.   
An important note to avoid confusion: Because SD  is a distance measure based on 
similarity – and not a similarity measure – it is smaller for things that are more similar 
and larger for things that are less similar.  So, for any distribution ν , ( ), 0SD ν ν = , 
expressing the notion that anything is (extremely) similar to itself. 
We briefly examine the behavior of SD  at and in between its limits.  Let 1 2( ) and ( )H r H r
G G
 
be identical Hebbian projections separated by some distance Δ .  Then we have the 
following properties: 
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1) We see that as the distributions are increasingly separated, the optimization provided 
in the Wasserstein calculation disappears: 
( ) ( )1 2 1 2lim  ( ), ( ) ( ), ( )W OTMD H r H r D H r H rΔ→∞ =G G G G  
 and therefore: 
( )1 2lim  1( ), ( )SD H r H rΔ→∞ =G G  
2) As the distributions are brought closer together, the Wasserstein distance decreases 
much faster than the One-To-Many distance: 
( ) ( )1 2 1 2( ), ( ) ( ), ( )W OTMD H r H r D H r H r∂ ∂>∂Δ ∂Δ
G G G G
  
3) As they approach, it eventually dominates the calculation: 
1 20
lim  ( ( ), ( )) 0WD H r H rΔ→ =
G G
 and therefore, 1 20lim  ( ( ), ( )) 0SD H r H rΔ→ =
G G
 
4) So, we see that 1 20 ( )  1 ( ), ( )SD H r H r≤ ≤
G G
and SD  varies non-linearly between these 
limits.   
On the next two pages, we visualize the dependence of SD  on the distance Δ  and the 
angle θ  between pairs of samples drawn from different distributions.  We examine 
samples drawn from Gaussian and Beta distributions in Figure 3.15 and Figure 3.16 
respectively. 
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Figure 3.14– Examining Similarity distance.   Comparing the distributions in the two examples, we have 
(Example A)  (Example B)S SD D  , which captures our intuitive notion of similarity. 
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Figure 3.15 – Effects on SD  as functions of the distance ED  and angle θ  between Gaussian distributions. 
As the distance ED  or angle between θ two Gaussian distributions decreases, we see how their 
corresponding similarity distance SD  decreases non-linearly in the graph on the bottom.  ED  is shown in 
red and θ  is shown in blue. 
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Figure 3.16 –Effects on SD  as functions of the distance ED  and angle θ  between Beta distributions.  As 
the distance ED  or angle between θ  the two Beta distributions decreases, we see how their corresponding 
similarity distance SD  decreases non-linearly in the graph on the bottom.  ED  is shown in red and θ is 
shown in blue. 
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3.6.5.1 A Word about Generality 
We can use Similarity distance to compare arbitrary discrete spatial probability 
distributions.   Several such comparisons are illustrated in Figure 3.17.  These examples 
are important, because our being able to compute Similarity distances between these 
distributions means that we will be able to perceptually ground events drawn from their 
mixtures.  That all our examples have so far involved mixtures of Gaussians has simply 
been for convenience.  We will demonstrate later in this chapter that we can separate 
events corresponding to a wide assortment of mixture distributions such as the ones 
shown here.   
Figure 3.17 – Comparing spatial probability distributions.  In each slice, the green and blue points 
represent samples drawn from equivalent but rotated 2-dimensional distributions.  For each example, we 
identify the source distribution and the Similarity distance between the green and blue points.  (A)  A 2-D 
beta distributions with a, b = 4.  Note the low density of points in the center of the distributions and the 
corresponding sizes of the codebook regions.  DS = 0.22.  (B) A 2-D uniform distribution.  DS = 0.11.  (C) 
A 2-D Gaussian distribution with σ = (.15, .04).  DS = 0.67.  (D) A 2-D Poisson distribution, with λ = 
(50,30) and scaled by (.8, .3).  DS = .55. 
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We can also apply the Similarity distance to non-parametric distributions.  For example, 
consider the familiar distributions shown in Figure 3.18.  We have examined using SD  
for handwriting recognition, and one can notice some of the well known properties of 
codebooks constructed on contours in the above images, for example, how they capture 
the medial axes. 
 
3.7 Defining the Distance between Regions 
We now use Similarity distance to define the Cross-Modal distance ( CMD ) between two 
regions 1 2, Ar r M∈  with respect to mode BM : 
 [ ] 1 2221 2 1 2 1 2( , ) (1 ) ( , )    2  ( ( ), ( ))CM E SD r r D r r D H r H rλ λ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤= − + ⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
G G
 (3.16) 
 [ ] ( )( )
1/ 22
1 22
1 2
1 2
( ), ( )
(1 ) ( , ) 2  
( ), ( )
W
E
OTM
D H r H r
D r r
D H r H r
λ λ
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟= − +⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
G G
G G  (3.17) 
     
Figure 3.18 – Some familiar non-parametric probability distributions within codebooks.   
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where ED  is Euclidean distance and λ is the relative importance of cross-modal to 
Euclidean distance.   Thus the distance between two regions within a slice is defined to 
have some component (1 )λ−  of their Euclidean distance and some component ( )λ  of 
the Similarity distance between their Hebbian projections.  This is illustrated in Figure 
3.19. 
In almost all uses of cross-modal distance in this thesis, we set 1λ =  and ignore 
Euclidean distance entirely.  However, in some applications, e.g., hand-writing or 
drawing recognition, spatial locality within a slice is important because it is a 
fundamental component of the phenomenon being recognized.  If so, we can use a lower 
of λ .   Determining the proper balance between Euclidean and Similarity distances is an 
empirical process for such applications.    
So far, we have only considered two co-occurring modes simultaneously to keep the 
examples simple.  However, it is straightforward to generalize the definition to 
incorporate additional modalities, and the calculation scales linearly with the number of 
modalities involved.  To define the cross-modal distance ( CMD ) between two regions 
1 2, Ar r M∈  with respect to a set of co-occurring modes IM ∈Μ , we define: 
 [ ]
1 2
22
1 2 1 2 1 2( , ) (1 ) ( , )   2   ( ( ), ( ))
I
I I
CM E E I S A A
M
D r r D r r D H r H rλ λ
∈Μ
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤= − +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦∑
G G
 (3.18) 
where the contributions of each mode IM  is weighted by Iλ  and we set 1E Iλ λ+ =∑ .   
For guidance in setting the values of the Iλ , we can turn to (Ernst and Banks 2002), who 
found that in intersensory influence, people give preference to senses which minimize the 
variance in joint perceptual interpretations, confirming an earlier prediction by (Welch 
and Warren 1986) about sensory dominance during multimodal interactions.   This lends 
credence to our hypothesis in section 3.6.3.2 regarding the computational value of 
entropy minimization in the selection of perceptual features.  We reexamine these issues 
in the dynamic model presented in Chapter 4. 
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Figure 3.19 – Calculating the cross-modal distance between codebook regions in a slice.   The distance is a 
function of their local Euclidean distance and the how similar they appear from the perspective of a co-
occurring modality.  To determine this for regions 1 2and r r in Mode B on top, we project them onto 
Mode A, as shown in the middle.  We then compute the Similarity distance of their Hebbian projections, as 
shown on the bottom. 
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3.7.1 Defining a Mutually Iterative System 
 
In this section, we show how to use the cross-modal distance function defined above to 
calculate the distances between regions within a slice.  This statement may seem 
surprising. Why is any elaboration required to use CMD , which we just defined?  There 
are two remaining issues we must address: 
1) We have yet to specify the distance function D used to define the Wasserstein 
distance in equations (3.7) and (3.8), which was also "inherited" in our definition 
of the one-to-many distance in equation (3.14).   
2) By defining distances cross-modally, we have created a mutually recursive system 
of functions.  Consider any two regions 1 2,r r  in mode AM .  When we 
calculate 1 2( , )CMD r r , we are relying on knowing the distances between regions 
within another mode BM , which are used to calculate ( )1 2( ), ( )SD H r H rG G .  
However, the distances between regions in BM  are calculated exactly the same 
way but with respect to AM .  So, every time we calculate distances in a mode, we 
are implicitly changing the distances within every other mode that relies upon it.   
And of course, this means its own inter-region distances may change as a result!  
How do we account for this and how do we know such a system is stable? 
 
We will approach both of these issues simultaneously.  Suppose we parameterize the 
distance function D in all of our definitions: 
( ) ( )
1
1/ 22
1
1 2 1 2,.., 1
( ), ( ),   min ( ) , ( )
i
m
m
W i jm j j i
D H r H r D D H r H r
=
⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑
G G G G
(3.19)
( ) ( )
1
1 2 2
( )
( ), ( ),    , ( ),OTM i W
i H r
D H r H r D D i H r Dω
∈
= ∑GG G G  (3.20)
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 ( ) [ ] 1 2221 2 1 2 1 2, , (1 ) ( , )   2   ( ( ), ( ), )CM E SD r r D D r r D H r H r Dλ λ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤= − + ⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
G G
  (3.22)
We now define an iterative function system on modes and A BM M  that mutually 
calculates CMD  over their regions: 
Let Xt CMDΔ =  in mode XM  at time t.  Recall that ED  is Euclidean distance. 
For all pairs of regions ,i j Ar r M∈  and ,i j Bq q M∈ , we define: 
0 ( , )  ( , )
A
i j E i jr r D r rΔ =   (3.23)
0 ( , )  ( , )
B
i j E i jq q D q qΔ =  (3.24)
( )1( , )  , ,A Bt i j CM i j tr r D r r −Δ = Δ  (3.25)
( )1( , )  , ,B At i j CM i j tq q D r r −Δ = Δ  (3.26)
Thus, we are start by assuming in (3.23) and (3.24) that the distances between regions in 
a slice are Euclidean, in the absence of any other information.  (We later eliminate this 
assumption in the intermediate steps of cross-modal clustering, where we have good 
estimates on which to base the iteration.)  The iterative steps are shown in (3.25) and 
(3.26) , where at time t, we recalculate the distances within each slice based upon the 
distances in the other slice at time 1t − .  For example, notice how the definition of 
( , )At i jr rΔ  calculates CMD  using 1Bt−Δ  in (3.25).  After all pairs of distances have been 
computed at time t, we can then proceed to compute them for time 1t + .  As we did in 
equation (3.18), we can easily generalize this system to include any number of mutually 
recursive modalities.  The complexity again scales linearly with the number of modalities 
involved. 
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We stop the iteration when AtΔ  and BtΔ  begin to converge, which empirically tends to 
happen very quickly.  Thus, we stop iterating on mode XM  at time t when: 
 1
,
( , ) ( , )
max ,  for .9,  we typically have 4.
( , )i j X
X X
t i j t i j
Xr r M
t i j
r r r r
t
r r
κ κ−
∈
Δ − Δ < = ≤Δ  
 
We will refer to this final value of XtΔ  for any regions ,i j Xr r M∈  as ( ),CM i jD r r .   
 
With this, we complete our formal definition of the slice data structure.  The final 
component necessary for specifying the topological manifold defined by a slice was the 
non-Euclidean distance metric between the hyperclustered regions.  We now define this 
distance to be CMD . 
 
 79    
3.8 Cross-Modal Clustering 
 
Recall that our goal has been to combine codebook regions to "reconstruct" the larger 
perceptual regions within a slice.  The definition of the iterated cross-modal distance 
CMD  in the previous section allows us to proceed, because it suggests how to answer the 
following fundamental question:  
Can any other modality distinguish between two regions in the same 
codebook?  If not, then they represent the same percept. 
Because CMD  represents the distance between two regions from the perspective of other 
modalities, we will use it to define a metric that determines whether to combine them or 
not.  If ( ),CM i jD r r  is sufficiently small for two regions 1 2, Ar r M⊆ , then we will say they 
are indistinguishable and therefore part of the same perceptual event.  If ( ),CM i jD r r  
between two regions is large, we will say they are distinguishable and therefore, cannot 
be part of the same perceptual event.  These criteria suggest the general structure of our 
cross-modal clustering algorithm.  One important detail remains: how small must 
( ),CM i jD r r  be for us to say it is "sufficiently" small?  How do we define the threshold for 
merging two regions?   An earlier version of this work appeared in (Coen 2005). 
3.8.1 Defining Self-Distance 
We define the notion of self-distance, which measures the internal value of CMD  within 
an individual region.  Thus, rather than measure the distance between two different 
regions, which has been our focus so far, self-distance measures the internal cross-modal 
distance between points within a single region.  It is a measure of internal coherence and 
will allow us to determine whether two different regions are sufficiently similar to merge.   
Suppose we are considering merging two regions ir  and jr  within some slice M, where 
we have already determined their cross-modal distance ( ),CM i jD r r .  For example, on the 
left in Figure 3.20 we are considering merging the green and blue regions.  Let us 
hypothetically assume that we did merge them to create a new region 'r .  We will now 
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immediately split this new region into two pieces, r+  and r− , as show on the right in 
Figure 3.20.   We now ask: what is the cross-modal distance ( ),CMD r r+ −  between these 
new regions?  The intuition here is that if 1r  and 2r  really are part of the same region, 
then if we split 'r  differently, we should find the two new regions have approximately 
the same cross-modal distance ( ),CM i jD r r .   In other words, the Hebbian projections of the 
new regions r+  and r−  should be roughly as similar as the Hebbian projections of the 
original regions 1r  and 2r  we are considering merging, because they should co-occur in 
the same way with other modalities.  If the distance ( ),CMD r r+ −  is much less than 
( ),CM i jD r r , then we have merged two regions that are actually different from one 
another.  Why?   Because we would now be averaging the Hebbian projections of two 
genuinely different regions, which would drastically increase their similarity and 
therefore make ( ),CMD r r+ −  much smaller than ( ),CM i jD r r  .  The question remains then, 
how do we divide 'r ? 
We will partition 'r  by fitting a linear orthogonal regression onto it.  For a slice 
NM ⊆ \ , this will generate an ( 1)N − -dimensional hyperplane that divides 'r  into two 
sets, r+  and r− , minimizing the perpendicular distances from them to the hyperplane.  
1r
2r
r+
r−
r+
r−
 
Figure 3.20 -- Determining when to merge two regions.  On the left, we are considering merging the green 
and blue regions  1r  and 2r .  To determine whether or not to proceed, we divide the candidate resulting 
region using a hyperplane generated by its principal components, as shown on the right.   This generates 
two new regions r+  and r− .   If ( ),CMD r r+ −  << ( ),CM i jD r r , then we determine the regions should not be 
merged.  See the accompanying text for details. 
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Note that because the data are drawn from independent distributions, there is no error-
free predictor dimension that generates the other dimensions according to some function.  
This is equivalent to the case where all variables are measured with error, and standard 
least squares techniques do not work in this circumstance.  We therefore perform 
principal components analysis on the points in region 'r  and generate the hyperplane by 
retaining its 1N −  principal components.  This computes what is known as the 
orthogonal regression and works even in cases where all the data in 'r  are independent. 
We use this hyperplane to partition 'r  into r+  and r− , as shown in Figure 3.20.  We 
define the self-distance ( )selfD  of region 'r : 
 
( )
( )1 2
,
( ')
,
CM
self
CM
D r r
D r
D r r
+ −
=

  (3.27) 
 
If ( ')selfD r  < ½, then we do not combine 1r  and 2r , because this indicates we would be 
averaging two dissimilar Hebbian projections were the merger to occur.  At the moment, 
this remains an empirical statement, but we note that this threshold is not a parameter of 
the cross-modal clustering algorithm and it is fixed throughout the results in this thesis.  
In practice, the self-distance value ( )selfD  tends towards either zero or one, which 
motivated our selection of ½ as the merger threshold.  A more theoretical investigation of 
this empirical criterion is among our future work. 
 
3.8.2 A Cross-Modal Clustering Algorithm 
We now present an algorithm for combining codebook clusters into regions that represent 
the sensory events within a slice.  This is done in a greedy fashion, by combining the 
closest regions according to CMD  within each slice.  We use the definition of self-
distance to derive a threshold for insuring regions are sufficiently close to merge.  
Afterwards, we examine the algorithm and some examples of its output. 
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Cross-Modal Clustering: 
 
Given: A set of slices M and λ , the parameter for weighting Euclidean to Similarity 
distances.  For each slice iM M∈ , we will call its codebook { }1,..., ii kC p p= . 
 
Initialization:  For each slice iM M∈ , initialize a set of regions i iR C= .  Each slice 
will begin with a set of regions based on its codebook.  We will merge these regions 
together in the algorithm below. 
 
Algorithm:  
Calculate CMD  over the slices in set M. 
 
While (true) do: 
  
Calculate CMD  over the slices in set M.  Use current CMD  as t=0 value 
For each slice iM M∈ : 
Sort the pairs of regions in iM , ,a b ir r R∈ , by ( ),CM a bD r r  
  For each pair ,a b ir r R∈ , in sorted order: 
   If   ( )' .5,  where 'self a bD r r r r≥ = ∪ : 
    Merge( ,a br r ) 
    Exit inner for loop. 
    
 
   For each codebook cluster ip  in iC : 
    Let r = ( )min arg ,
i
CM i
r R
D p r
∈
⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  
    Move ip  into region r 
 
 
 
         If no regions were merged in any slice 
      Either wait for new data or stop 
     
 
 
Procedure Merge( ,a br r ): 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
.
/ .
For all regions ,  set , min , , , .
a a b
i i b
c i CM a c CM a c CM b c
r r r
R R r
r R D r r D r r D r r
= ∪
=
∈ =  
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The cross-modal clustering algorithm initially creates a set of regions in each slice 
corresponding to its codebook.  The goal is to merge these regions based on their cross-
modal distances.  The algorithm proceeds in a two-step greedy fashion: 
1) For each slice, consider its regions in pairs, sorted by CMD .  If we find two 
regions ar  and br  satisfying ( )' .5,  where 'self a bD r r r r≥ = ∪ , we merge them and 
move onto the next step.   
2) If as a result of this merger, some codebook cluster ip  is now closer to another 
region, we simply move it there.   
When we merge two regions, we set the pairwise distances to other regions to be the 
minimum of the distances to the original regions, because we now view them as all part 
of the same underlying perceptual event and therefore equivalent to one another.  At the 
end of each loop, we recompute CMD  using the current value as the starting point in the 
iteration, which propagates the effects of mergers to the other slices in M.  In the event no 
mergers are made in any slices, we can choose to either wait for new data, which will 
update the Hebbian linkages, or we can terminate the algorithm, if we assume sufficient 
training data has already been collected. 
Most clustering techniques work by iteratively refining a model subject to an 
optimization constraint.  The iterative refinement in our algorithm occurs in the 
recalculation of CMD , which is updated after each round of mergers within the slices.  
This spreads the effect of a merger within a slice by changing the Similarity distances 
between Hebbian projections onto it.  This in turn changes the distances between regions 
in other slices and so forth, as discussed in section 3.7.1.  The optimization constraint is 
that we do not create regions whose internal self-distances violate the above constraint, 
where a drastic decrease in self-distance would indicate the regions under consideration 
are viewed differently by other co-occurring modalities. 
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Figure 3.21 – The progression of the cross-modal clustering algorithm.  (A) shows the initial codebook 
creation in each slice.  (B) and (C) show intermediate region formation.  (D) shows the correctly clustered 
outputs, with the confusion region between the categories indicated by the yellow region in the center. 
Note in this example, we set .7λ =  to make region formation easier to see by favoring spatial locality.  The 
final clustering was obtained by setting 1.λ =    
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Figure 3.22 – The output of cross-modally clustering four overlapping Gaussian distributions in each slice.  
The confusion region between them is indicated in the center of the clusters. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.23 – Finding one cluster embedded in another.   In mode B, cross-modal clustering is able both to 
detect the small cluster embedded in the larger one and to use this separation of clusters to detect those in 
mode A.  This is due to the non-Euclidean scale invariance of Similarity distance, which is used for 
determining the cross-modal distance between regions.  Thus, region size is unimportant in this framework, 
and "small" regions are as effective in disambiguating other modes as are "large" regions. 
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Figure 3.24 – Self-supervised acquisition of vowels (monophthongs) in American English.  This work is 
the  first unsupervised acquisition of human phonetic data of which we are aware.  The identifying labels 
were manually added for reference and ellipses were fit onto the regions to aid visualization.  All data have 
been normalized.  Note the correspondence between this and the Peterson-Barney data show below. 
 
    
Figure 3.25—The Peterson-Barney dataset.  Note the correspondence between this and Figure 3.24. 
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The progression of the algorithm starting with the initial codebook is shown in Figure 
3.21.  Setting 1λ <  includes Euclidean distances in the calculation of CMD .  This favors 
mergers between adjacent regions, which makes the algorithm easier to visualize.  At the 
final step, setting 1λ =  and thereby ignoring Euclidean distance allows the remaining 
spatially disjoint regions to merge.  Had we been uninterested in visualizing the 
intermediate clusterings, we would have set 1λ =  at the beginning.  Doing so yields an 
identical result with this dataset, but the regions merge in a different, disjoint order.  Note 
in general, however, it is not the case that different values of λ  yield identical 
clusterings.  All other examples in this thesis use 1λ =  exclusively. 
Figure 3.22 demonstrates that the algorithm is able to resolve multiple overlapping 
clusters, in this case, two mixtures of four Gaussian distributions.  Figure 3.23 show an 
important property of the Similarity distance, namely, it is scale invariant.  The smaller 
cluster in Mode B is just as "distinct" as the larger one in which it is embedded.  It is both 
detected and used to help cluster the regions in Mode A.   
 
3.9 Clustering Phonetic Data 
In Chapter 2, we asked the basic question of how categories are learned from unlabelled 
perceptual data.  In this section, we provide an answer to this question using cross-modal 
clustering.  We present a system that learns the number (and formant structure) of vowels 
(monophthongs) in American English, simply by watching and listening to someone 
speak and then cross-modally clustering the accumulated auditory and visual data.  The 
system has no advance knowledge of these vowels and receives no information outside of 
its sensory channels.  This work is the first unsupervised machine acquisition of phonetic 
structure of which we are aware.   
For this experiment, data was gathered using the same pronunciation protocol employed 
by (Peterson and Barney 1952).  Each vowel was spoken within the context of an English 
word beginning with [h] and ending with [d]; for example, /ae/ was pronounced in the 
context of "had."   Each vowel was spoken by an adult female approximately 90-140 
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times.  The speaker was videotaped and we note that during the recording session, a small 
number of extraneous comments were included and analyzed with the data.  The auditory 
and video streams were then extracted and processed.   
Formant analysis was done with the Praat system (Goedemans 2001, Boersma and 
Weenink 2005), using a 30ms FFT window and a 14th order LPC model.  Lip contours 
were extracted using a system written by the author described in Chapter 2.  Time-
stamped formant and lip contour data were fed into slices in an implementation of the 
work in this thesis written by the author in Matlab and C.  This implementation is able to 
visually animate many of the computational processes described here.  This capability 
was used to generate most of the figures in this thesis, which represent actual system 
outputs. 
Figure 3.24 shows the result of cross-modally clustering formant data with respect to lip 
contour data.  Notice the close correspondence between the formant clusterings in 
Figures 22 and 23, which displays the Peterson-Barney dataset introduced earlier.  We 
see the cross-modal clustering algorithm was able to derive the same clusters with the 
same spatial topology, without knowing either the number of clusters or their 
distributions. 
The formant and lip slices are shown together in Figure 3.26, where the colors show 
region correspondences between the slices.  This picture exactly captures what we mean 
by mutual bootstrapping.  Initially, the slices "knew" nothing about the events they 
perceive.  Cross-modal clustering lets them mutually structure their perceptual 
representations and thereby learn the event categories that generated their sensory inputs.  
The black lines in the figure connect neighboring regions within each slice and the red 
lines connect corresponding regions in different slices.  They show a graph view of the 
clustering within each slice and illustrate how a higher-dimensional manifold may be 
constructed out of lower-dimensional slices.  This proposes an alternative view of the 
structures created by cross-modal clustering, which we hope to explore in future work. 
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3.10 Related Work 
There is a vast literature on unsupervised clustering techniques.  However, these 
generally make strong assumptions about the data being clustered, have no corresponding 
notion of correctness associated with their results, or employ arbitrary threshold values.  
The intersensory approach taken here is entirely non-parametric and makes no a priori 
assumptions about the underlying distributions or the number of clusters being 
represented.  We examine several of the main avenues of related work below. 
3.10.1 Language Acquisition 
De Sa (1994) and de Sa and Ballard (1997) have taken a similar approach to the work 
presented here.  Namely, they are interested in unsupervised learning of linguistic 
 
Figure 3.26 – Mutual bootstrapping through cross-modal clustering.  This displays the formant and lip 
slices together, where the colors show the region correspondences that are obtained from cross-modal 
clustering.  Initially, the slices "knew" nothing about the events they perceive.  Cross-modal clustering lets 
them mutually structure their perceptual representations and thereby learn the event categories that 
generated their sensory inputs.  The black lines in the figure connect neighboring regions within each slice 
and the red lines connect corresponding regions in different slices.  The identifying labels were manually 
added for reference and ellipses were fit onto the regions to aid visualization.  All data have been 
normalized. 
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category boundaries based on cross-modal co-occurrences.  However, their approach 
requires that the number of categories be known beforehand.  For example, to separate 
the vowels in the English, they would need to know in advance that ten such vowels 
exist.  Thus, their approach cannot solve the perceptual grounding problem presented in 
this chapter.  However, their work is capable of refining boundaries once the categories 
have been learned, which would be a useful addition to our framework.  Thus, one can 
easily imagine combining the two approaches to yield something more powerful than 
either of them alone. 
De Marcken (1996) has studied the unsupervised acquisition of English from audio 
streams.  However, he uses the phonetic model of Young and Woodland (1993) 
implemented in the HTK HMM toolkit to perform phonetic segmentation, which has 
already been trained to segregate phonemes.  Thus, this aspect of his work is heavily 
supervised. 
Other unsupervised linguistic learning systems (e.g., McCallum and Nigam 1998) are 
built around the Expectation Maximization algorithm (Dempster et al. 1977), which we 
discuss below.  These approaches make very strong assumptions about the parametric 
nature of the data being clustering. 
 
3.10.2 Machine Vision 
The vast majority of research in the machine vision has employed supervised learning 
techniques.  Some notable unsupervised approaches include Bartlett’s (2001) work on 
using independent component analysis for face recognition, based upon assumed 
statistical dependencies among image features.  Although there are no obvious metrics 
for correctness associated with the clustering itself, her selection of features has yielded 
performance comparable to that of humans in face recognition.  One may therefore view 
her approach and ours as complementary.  Her work would be an ideal basis for guiding 
the feature selection that generates inputs into slices in our approach. 
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Stauffer (2002) has studied using multiple sensors to learn object and event segmentation.   
The unsupervised learning component of his system assumes that the data are represented 
by mixtures of Gaussians, which is quite reasonable given the enormous amount of data 
collected by his sensor networks and their intended applications.  In this, his framework 
makes strong parametric assumptions.  It is also difficult to gauge the absolute 
correctness of his results in that it does not seem to have been applied to problems that 
have well-defined metrics.  As this is not the goal of his framework, this comment should 
be viewed more as a differing characteristic than a criticism of his work. 
 
3.10.3 Statistical Clustering 
There is an enormous body of literature on statistical clustering techniques, which used 
assumed properties of the data being clustering to guide the segmentation process.  For 
example, the Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm (Dempster et al. 1977) is widely 
used a basis for clustering mixtures of distributions whose maximum likelihood 
estimation is easy to compute.  This algorithm is therefore popular for clustering known 
finite numbers of Gaussian mixture models (e.g., Nabney 2002, Witten and Frank 2005).  
However, if the number of clusters is unknown, the algorithm tends to converge to a local 
minimum with the wrong number of clusters.  Also, if the data deviate from a mixture of 
Gaussian (or some expected) distributions, the assignment of clusters degrades 
accordingly.   
Wide ranges of clustering techniques (e.g., Cadez and Smyth 1999, Taskar et al. 2001) 
base their category assignment upon the EM algorithm.  As such, they tend to require 
large amounts of data corresponding to presumed distributions, and they generally require 
the number of expected clusters be known in advance.  While these assumptions may be 
reasonable for a wide range of applications, they violate the clustering requirements 
stated here. 
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3.10.4 Blind Signal Separation 
Separating a set of independent signals from a mixture is a classic problem in clustering.  
For example, from a recording of an orchestra, we might like to isolate the sounds 
contributed by each individual instrument.  This is an extraordinarily difficult problem in 
its general form.  However, the assumption that the signals are mutually independent, 
which is not always realistic, supports a number of approaches.  Principal components 
analysis (PCA) is a frequent tool used for separating signals, and while it is useful for 
reducing the dimensionality of a dataset, it does not necessarily provide a notion of 
correct clustering.   
A number of interesting results have been found using PCA for data mining, for example, 
Honkela and Hyvärinen’s (2004) work on linguistic data extraction, but our approach is 
founded on the notion that our cross-modal signals are mutually dependent, not 
independent.  In that sense, our work makes a very different set of assumptions than most 
efforts in signal separation.  Instead of looking for principal components in a high 
dimensional space, which for example might correspond to the vowels in the example in 
this chapter, we use a larger number of low dimensional spaces (i.e., slices) in parallel.  
Thus, we approach the problem from an entirely different angle, and as such, our 
framework appears to be more biologically realistic in that it is dimensionally compact. 
 
3.10.5 Neuroscientific Models 
The neuroscience community has proposed a number of approaches to unsupervised 
clustering (e.g., Becker and Hinton 1995, Rodriguez et al. 2004, Becker 2005).  These are 
frequently based upon standard statistical approaches and often involve threshold values 
that are difficult to justify independently.  Most problematically, they generally have no 
measure of absolute correctness.  So, for example, the work of (Aleksandrovsky et al. 
1996) learns multiple phonetic representations of audio signals without actually knowing 
how many unique phonemes are represented.  Although one may argue that each 
phoneme is represented by multiple phones in practice, there is a clear consensus that it is 
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meaningful to speak about the number of actual number of phonemes within in a 
language, which these techniques do not capture. 
 
3.10.6 Minimally Supervised Methods 
Blum and Mitchell (1988) have proposed using small amount of supervision to help 
bootstrap unsupervised learning systems.  Although their approach is clearly supervised, 
one may argue that this supervision could come from phylogenetic development 
(Tinbergen 1951) and thereby provide support for innate models.  We return to this 
discussion in Chapter 5, and note that it is entirely complementary to our approach.  By 
pre-partitioning slices, we can easily incorporate varying amounts of supervision into our 
framework. 
3.11 Summary 
This chapter introduced slices, a neurologically inspired data structure for representing 
sensory information.  Slices partition perceptual spaces into codebooks and then 
reassemble them to construct clusters corresponding to the actual sensory events being 
perceived.  To enable this, we defined a new metric for comparing spatial probability 
distributions called Similarity distance; this allows us to measure distances within slices 
through cross-modal Hebbian projections onto other slices.   
We then presented an algorithm for cross-modal clustering, which uses temporal 
correlations between slices to determine which hyperclusters within a slice correspond to 
the same sensory events.  The cross-modal clustering algorithm does not presume that 
either the number of clusters in the data or their distributions is known beforehand and 
has no arbitrary thresholds. 
We also examined the outputs and behavior of this algorithm on simulated datasets and 
on real data gathered in computational experiments.  Finally, using cross-modal 
clustering, we learned the ten vowels in American English without supervision by 
watching and listening to someone speak.  In this, we have shown that sensory systems 
can be perceptually grounded by bootstrapping off each other. 
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Chapter 4  
Perceptual Interpretation 
We saw in Chapter 3 that sensory systems can mutually structure one another by 
exploiting their temporal co-occurrences.  We called this process of discovering shared 
sensory categories perceptual grounding and suggested that it is a fundamental 
component of cognitive development in animals; it answers the first question that any 
natural (or artificial) creature faces: what different events in the world can I detect?   
The subject of this chapter follows naturally from this question.  Once an animal (or a 
machine) has learned the set of events it can detect in the world, how does it know what it 
is perceiving at any given moment?  We refer to this as perceptual interpretation.  We 
will take the view that perceptual interpretation is inherently a dynamic – rather than 
static – process that occurs during some window of time.  This approach relaxes the 
requirement that our perceptual categories be separable in the traditional machine 
learning sense; unclassifiable subspaces are not a problem if we can determine how to 
move out of them by relying on other modalities.  We will argue that this approach is not 
only biologically plausible, it is also computationally efficient in that it allows us to use 
lower dimensional representations for modeling sensory and motor data. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we introduce a new family of models called influence networks, which 
incorporate temporal dynamics into our framework.  Influence networks connect cross-
modally clustered slices and modify their sensory inputs to reflect the perceptual states 
within other slices.  This cross-modal influence is designed to increase perceptual 
accuracy by fusing together information from co-occurring senses, which are all 
experiencing the same sensory events from their unique perspectives.  This type of cross-
modal perceptual reinforcement is commonplace in the animal world, as we discuss in 
Chapter 6. 
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Our approach will be to formulate a dynamic system in which slices are viewed as 
coupled perceptual state spaces.  In these state spaces, sensory inputs move along 
trajectories determined both locally – due a slice's internal structure – and cross-modally 
– due to the influence of other co-occurring slices.  This addition of temporal dynamics 
will allow us to define our notion of perceptual interpretation, which is the goal of this 
chapter.    
The model presented here is inspired by sensory dynamics in animals, but it does not 
approach the richness or complexity inherent in biological perception.  Our intent, 
however, is to work toward creating better artificial perceptual systems by providing 
them with a more realistic sensorial framework. 
4.2 The Simplest Complex Example 
We will proceed by considering an example.  We turn to the hypothetical perceptual 
modes introduced in Chapter 3, as shown in Figure 4.1.  Recall that each mode here is 
capable of sensing the same two events in the world, which we have called the red and 
blue events.  The cross-modal clustering of these modes in shown in Figure 4.2.  We see 
that the larger perceptual regions have been assembled out of the codebook clusters, 
shaded red or blue to indicate their corresponding sensory category.  Our interest here, 
however, is not in these large perceptual regions but rather in the small yellow regions at 
their intersections.  Sensory inputs within the yellow regions are ambiguous – these are 
the inputs that we cannot classify, at least not without further information.   
Although this example was selected for its simplicity, it worthwhile pointing out some of 
the complexity it presents, and thereby examine some of the assumptions in our 
framework before we proceed.  Notice that because the mixtures of Gaussians here 
intersect near their means, the "small" yellow regions will receive almost as many 
sensory inputs as either of the "large" blue and red ones.  Estimating from the limits of 
the density normalization performed during codebook generation, we expect at least 1/4 
of the inputs in this example to be unclassifiable because they will fall into these yellow 
confusion zones.  If our goal is to categorize sensory inputs, these yellow regions will 
prove quite troublesome; we need to find some way of avoiding them. 
  97 
-0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
-0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
 
Figure 4.1 -- Two hypothetical co-occurring perceptual modes.   Each mode, unbeknownst to itself,  
receives inputs generated by a simple, overlapping Gaussian mixture model.   For example, if a "red" event 
takes place in the world, each mode would receive sensory input that probabilistically falls within its red 
ellipse.  To make matters more concrete, we might imagine Mode A is a simple auditory system that hears 
two different events in the world and Mode B is a simple visual system sees those same two events, which 
are indicated by the red and blue ellipses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mode A Mode B
Figure 4.2 – The output of cross-modally clustering the modes in Figure 4.1.  The perceptual regions have 
been constructed out of the codebook clusters and are indicated respectively by the blue and red shading. 
The confusion region between them is indicated at their intersection in yellow.  To assist with visualization, 
ellipses have been fit using least squares onto the data points within each sensory region, as determined by 
cross-modal clustering.  Note that approximately ¼ of the inputs within each mode fall into the confusion 
region and are therefore ambiguous. 
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In fact, as things stand at the moment, we expect the overall classification error rate 
would be somewhat higher than this.  Sensory events are only probabilistically described 
by the derived perceptual regions.  Thus, inputs will not always fall into the "right" area, 
at least according to the output of cross-modal clustering.  We also assume that the 
feature extraction (e.g., formant estimation) generating the sensory inputs to slices 
introduces some degree of error; this may be due to noise, heuristic estimation, 
instability, incorrect or incomplete modeling, limitations from perceptual thresholds, etc.  
We elaborate on this point in Chapter 6, but it is reasonable to expect these types of 
processing errors occur in both biological and artificial systems.  Although, not a source 
of error, an additional complexity is that we generally expect many more than two modes 
will be active simultaneously, corresponding to the fine-grained model of perception we 
adopted in Chapter 1.  
 
4.2.1 Visualizing an Influence Network 
Our goal is to "move" sensory inputs within slices to make them easier to classify.  In 
doing so, we seek to avoid perceptual ambiguity when possible and to recover from 
errors introduced during perceptual processing.   
We have so far considered slices through their codebooks or through the entire perceptual 
(e.g., red and blue) regions found within them by cross-modal clustering.  We now 
instead look at the local neighboring (connected) components within each of these larger 
regions; we are going to call these local regions nodes (Figure 4.3); to be clear, the nodes 
partition the modes (i.e., slices) into locally connected regions.  Nodes correspond to the 
representational areas that are easy to classify, and therefore, they will help us 
disambiguate perceptual inputs.  We note that the lines between nodes represent 
perceptual equivalence as determined by cross-modal clustering.  Although they are 
derived from Hebbian data, the lines do not represent the Hebbian linkages described 
earlier because they are restricted to regions corresponding to the same perceptual 
categories.    
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We would like to use cross-modal correspondences, as indicated by these lines of 
perceptual equivalence, to define a framework where slices can mutually disambiguate 
one another.  For example, suppose Mode B on top sees an input in a blue node.  One 
could certainly imagine that knowing this might help resolve a simultaneous ambiguous 
input in Mode A.  In a static framework, we could for example implement a 
disambiguation strategy using posterior probabilities (e.g., Wu et al. 1999).  This would 
be relatively straightforward, at least for a small number of co-occurring modes. 
The problem with this solution, however, is that perception in animals has complex 
temporal dynamics – generating percepts does not correspond to an instantaneous 
decision process.  This is evidenced during cross-modal influence (Calvert et al. 2004), 
perceptual warping (Beale and Keil 1995), interpretative bistability (Blake et al. 2003), 
habituation (Grunfeld et al. 2000), and priming (Wiggs and Martin 1998), and these 
effects are particularly prominent during development (Thelen and Smith 1994).  We will 
examine these phenomena in detail in Chapter 6.  For the moment, we further note that 
                 
Mode A
Mode B
 
 
Figure 4.3 – Viewing the nodes within the modes.  Nodes are the locally connected components in each 
perceptual region; they are indicated here by color and with ellipses, fit on their inputs after cross-modal 
clustering.  In this example, each mode has 5 nodes: 2 blue, 2 red, and 1 yellow.  The colored lines indicate 
perceptual equivalence between nodes in different slices. 
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even unimodal percept generation has complex sensory and temporal threshold dynamics 
(Nakayama et al. 1986); in fact, different features may have different thresholds, which 
themselves change dynamically (e.g.. Hamill et al. 1989, Wang et al. 2002).    
Most importantly, these phenomena are not simply biological "implementation" details; 
they are not epiphenomena.  Rather, they are fundamental components of perceptual 
activity and are a large part of why animal perception is so robust.  Because the 
perceptual phenomena we are interested in modeling correspond to temporal processes, 
we will argue that our models should be similarly dynamic.  In particular, static 
techniques seem poor approaches for understanding the intersensory and temporal 
complexities of biological interpretative mechanisms.    
4.2.2 Towards a Dynamic Model 
Instead, our approach will be to view slices as perceptual state spaces, where the nodes 
correspond to fixed points.  Ambiguous nodes, like the yellow ones in our example, will 
be treated as repellers in this space, and unambiguous nodes, such as the red and blue 
ones, will be treated as attractors.  Perceptual inputs will travel along trajectories defined 
by these fixed points. 
We visualize this state space view of slices on page 101.  The repellers (ambiguous 
nodes) correspond to maxima; the attractors (unambiguous nodes) are the minima and 
surrounded by their basins of attraction.  In this framework, perceptual interpretation will 
loosely correspond to energy minimization; that is, we would like move sensory inputs 
into the basins that represent their correct classifications.  In this way, the dynamics of 
the system will perform the sensory classification for us.   
Intersensory influence – the ability of one slice to modify perceptions in another – will be 
realized by having slices induce vector fields upon one another, thereby cross-modally 
modifying their temporal dynamics.  This in turn can modify perceptual classifications by 
leading sensory inputs into different basins of attraction (or perhaps by even introducing 
bistability). 
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Figure 4.4  -- Visualizing slices as state spaces where the nodes are the fixed points.  Repellers, 
corresponding to ambiguous nodes,  are maxima and shown in the center; attractors, corresponding to 
unambiguous nodes, are minima and are outlined by their basins of attraction.   It may be helpful to 
compare this view to the one in Figure 4.3.       
 
 
     
Figure 4.5 -- A view of the basins of attraction from below.  This is a rotation of Figure 4.4 into the page to 
help visualize the basins, which are partially occluded above.  The basins here correspond to the blue and 
red nodes in Figure 4.3. 
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To formulate a dynamic model, the first step is to incorporate some model of time into 
our framework.  We start by assuming that any perceivable event in the world persists for 
some (perhaps variable) temporal duration, e.g., 10 – 1000 milliseconds.  During this 
interval, the event will be perceptually sampled, i.e., some finite number of sensory 
inputs will be generated describing it.  This assumption is quite reasonable from a 
biological perspective.  For example, this could correspond to a series of neuronal firings 
in the striate cortex, during the period of time an object is visually observed (Hubel and 
Wiesel 1962).  Alternatively, in an artificial system, a stream of sensory inputs might be 
generated by sliding a fast Fourier transform window over an auditory signal.  Regardless 
of how the features are selected and extracted, the important consideration here is that an 
event in the world generates a stream of perceptual inputs, rather than a unitary data 
point.  We will use the time this provides to effect intersensory influence. 
We also need to define the state within a slice, namely, the quantity that will be changing 
during the lifetime of an individual perception.  In our model, each slice will receive a 
stream of sensory inputs when it is stimulated, as described above.  After receiving some 
number of inputs, a slice may eventually "decide" that a recognizable perceptual event 
has occurred.  In the interim, however, a slice maintains an estimate of what it might be 
perceiving.  The estimate corresponds to a point in N\  that moves through the slice's 
state space.  At any given moment, three factors influence the trajectory of this point 
through state space. 
1) The current perceptual input.  An estimate tends to move towards the current 
input.   
2) A gradient defined by the fixed points within a slice.  An estimate moves towards 
the attractors, which are the unambiguous nodes in a slice.  The gradients for the 
two slices we have been examining are displayed in Figure 4.6 . 
3) Any induced vector fields from co-occurring slices.  This is visualized in Figure 
4.7 for the ambiguous scenario described above.  We discuss this in more detail 
below. 
  103 
    
Mode A
Mode B
 
Figure 4.6 – Viewing innate state space dynamics.  The nodes define a gradient in the state space.  In the 
absence of other influences, points move towards attractors (unambiguous nodes) and away from repellers 
(ambiguous nodes).  The generation of these gradients is discussed in § 4.3.1.1. 
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4.2.3 Intersensory Influence 
Biological perceptual systems share cross-modal information routinely and 
opportunistically (Stein and Meredith 1993, Lewkowicz and Lickliter 1994, Rock 1997, 
Shimojo and Shams 2001, Calvert et al. 2004, Spence and Driver 2004); we have 
suggested that intersensory influence is an essential component of perception but one that 
most artificial perceptual systems lack in any meaningful way.  In our framework, cross-
modal influence is realized by having modes bias the temporal dynamics of other modes, 
thereby sharing their views of the world. 
Recall the ambiguous scenario described on page 99.  We imagined that in Figure 4.3, 
Mode B saw an input corresponding to blue node.  We asked how this might help 
disambiguate a simultaneous event in Mode A.  Our solution to this problem is illustrated 
       
 
Figure 4.7 – Visualizing cross-modal influence through a vector field induced on Mode A by Mode B. 
This field modifies the dynamic behavior in Mode A to favor Mode B's perceptual interpretation.  This 
"pulls" the estimate in Mode A towards the blue attractors, corresponding in this case to Mode B's 
assessment of the world.  We have added light red and blue shading in the background to recall the 
perceptual categories contained in this slice. 
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in Figure 4.7.  We allow Mode B to induce a vector field on Mode A, thereby modifying 
its dynamic behavior.  This vector field incorporates Mode B's perceptual perspective 
into Mode A.  This "pulls" the estimate in Mode A towards the blue attractors, 
corresponding to Mode B's assessment of what is being perceived.   The "interlingua" 
that makes this influence possible is their shared perceptual categories, which are 
obtained through cross-modal clustering and provide a common frame of sensorial 
reference. 
Therefore, we see that the movement of the estimate within a slice is governed: 
(1) externally, by events happening in the world; (2) innately, by the previously learned 
structure of events with the slice; and (3) cross-modally, from the perspectives of other 
perceptual channels viewing the same external events.  We can in fact adjust the 
influences of these individual contributions dynamically.  For example, in noisy 
conditions, an auditory slice may prefer to discount perceptual inputs and rely more 
heavily on cross-modal inputs.  These kinds of tradeoffs are common in biological 
perception (Cherry 1953, Sumby and Pollack 1954).  We discuss this further below. 
 
4.3 Influence Networks 
In our model of perception, an event in the world corresponds to a path taken through a 
slice.  In this section, we define both the rules that govern this path and how a slice 
decides something has been perceived, a concept we have not encountered so far in this 
chapter. 
By formulating this problem dynamically, we lose one of the primary attractions of a 
static framework – that we know with certainty something has "actually" occurred.  In 
static frameworks, this decision is usually made independently by some precursor to the 
interpretative mechanism; in other words, the decision must be made but it is done 
somewhere else.  This usually corresponds to fixed sets of determination criteria within 
the  independent perceptual components. 
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In our framework, how far down its path must an input travel for a slice to know that an 
event is actually occurring?  Presumably, a single sampled input is insufficient.  
Generally, both natural and artificial perceptual systems have thresholds – they require 
some minimum amount of stimulation to register an event in the world (Hughes 1946, 
Fitzpatrick and McCloskey 1994).  Rather than assume this happens externally, a slice 
must make this determination itself, but it is not necessarily doing so alone.  This 
decision itself is now a dynamic process open to intersensory influence – consistent 
interpretations among slices will lower their sensory and temporal thresholds, whereas 
inconsistent interpretations will raise them.  Cross-modal perception is known to 
significantly improve upon unimodal response times in humans (Hershenson 1962, Frens 
1995, Calvert et al. 2000), a phenomenon that is captured by our model. 
We now proceed by defining the state-space view of slices that has been motivated 
informally so far.  State within each slice has two distinct components: 
1) The position of its estimate.  This is what the slice "thinks" it might be perceiving. 
2) The activation potential of its nodes.  Nodes have internal potentials, which are 
increased whenever the perceptual estimate falls within them. 
Below, we define the state space equations that govern how these quantities change 
during the lifetime of a perception.  Towards this, we begin with some preliminary 
definitions covering the concepts raised earlier in this chapter.    
Note that we will limit some our of presentation to 2-dimensional slices, because 2\  is 
easy to describe and a reasonable model for cortical representations.  3\  is the largest 
space in which we have constructed slices.  Higher dimensional spaces may generalize 
from these aspects of the presentation but that is an unexamined hypothesis.  Also, 
because cross-modal clustering connects regions in different slices, it lets us approximate 
higher-dimensional manifolds.  This may reduce the need for directly implementing 
higher dimensional perceptual representations. 
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We note that the dynamic framework below is implemented in the examples in this thesis 
by a discrete simulation that uses a 10 millisecond time step. 
 
4.3.1 Preliminary Concepts 
Consider a slice nAM ⊆ \  with associated codebook { }1 2, ,...,A aC p p p= .   Suppose AM  
is cross-modally clustered with respect to slice BM  into k perceptual categories.  We call 
the set of perceptual categories 1{ ,..., }kC c c= .  To represent the assignment of codebooks 
to categories, we define a multi-partitioning MP  of AM  as a mapping 
{ }1,2,...,: 2 kAMP C → .  This assigns each codebook cluster to a subset of integers from 1 to 
k, representing the k different perceptual categories discovered during cross-modal 
clustering.  If a codebook cluster is in more than one category, then it is deemed 
ambiguous, as shown in (4.1).   
We define a node  Au C⊆ as a locally connected set of codebook clusters that are 
members of the same perceptual categories; for any two clusters bp  and cp  in u, 
( ) ( )b cMP p MP p= .  We say iu c∈  if node u is in category ic .  We define the nodebook 
AN  as the set of all nodes in slice AM .  Nodebooks are used to represent the connected 
components in the output of cross-modal clustering.  The density of node u is the 
percentage of sensory inputs falling within it over some assumed time window. 
For node iu , we define 
 
if ( ) 1    (attractor)  1,
sign( )    
if ( ) 1    (repeller)-1,
i
i
i
MP u
u
MP u
=⎧= ⎨ >⎩  (4.1) 
which indicates whether iu  will be an attractor or a repeller in the state space, determined 
by whether it is or is not ambiguous.  Let 1 2[sign( ),  sign(u ),...,sign( )]A aS u u=  be a vector 
containing all signs within a slice, which captures the ambiguity within it.   
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4.3.1.1 Defining a Surface 
Towards defining a surface on slice 2AM ⊆ \ , we first define a reference surface from 
which it will be piecewise constructed.  Let ( , ) sin( ) sin( )Z x y x yπ π= ⋅ , corresponding to 
the shape of our fixed points. 
We will fit copies of Z onto 'sAM  nodebook, towards building a surface over the entire 
slice.  For each node i Au N∈ , let 0 0, , , , ia b x y θ  be an ellipse fit onto the node's sensory 
inputs via (Fitzgibbon et al. 1999).  We then define a surface on node iu , 
( )0 0sign( ) density( ) , , , ,i i i iZ u u Z a b x y θ= ⋅ ⋅ , where we stretch, translate, and rotate the 
reference shape Z onto the node's descriptive ellipse.  The term sign( )iu  determines 
whether a node is a local maxima or minima. 
We define the innate surface AZ  over the entire slice by piecewise summing the 
contributions of the individual nodes, A iZ Z= ∑ .  Although this surface is constructed 
piecewise, we know it is smooth due to the reference surface Z  being sine-based, and 
therefore, it is continuously differentiable within the boundaries of the slice.  This surface 
is illustrated in Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5, where the repellers correspond to local maxima 
and the attractors correspond to local minima. 
The gradient of this surface 
 A AA
Z ZZ
x y
∂ ∂∇ = +∂ ∂  (4.2) 
captures the innate dynamic behavior of the slice due to cross-modal clustering.   Two 
examples of this are illustrated in Figure 4.6.  We can view the effect of this gradient as 
the slice trying to classify inputs to match its learned events.  In other words, perceptual 
grounding biases slices in favor of particular interpretations, namely, the ones derived 
from cross-modal clustering.  This may correspond with the "perceptual magnet effect," 
which reduces detectable differences between sensory inputs near previously acquired 
categories (Kuhl 1991). 
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An inefficiency introduced by representing data in Euclidean Voronoi regions is that 
sometimes space is "wasted," particularly around the boundaries.  We can see this in 
Figure 4.2, where the data points are fairly sparse.  We note this is a synthetic data set 
with only two events, so the sparsity is exaggerated here.  Nonetheless, we would prefer a 
"warped" representation, where unused areas of the map are reduced in favor of 
expanding or stretching the areas that are more perceptually prominent.  It is clear that 
cortical maps are continuously modified in animals, where regions are allocated 
proportionally with their use (Buonomano and Merzenich 1998, Kaas 2000).  For 
example, it has been found that the fingers of the left hand in right-handed violinists have 
increased cortical representation (Elbert et al 1995), corresponding to their development 
of fine motor control during fingering. 
Because our implementation does not support spatial plasticity, there may be sections of 
Voronoi regions which are generally devoid of inputs.  However, over time, we expect 
that inputs will fall within them, albeit somewhat infrequently.  To account for these stray 
inputs, we induce a weak, constant magnitude vector field over the surface of each slice, 
specifically for the benefit of these "empty" regions.  The field within each node iu  
points towards or away from its fixed point, depending upon sign( )iu .  This reflects each 
node's innate perceptual bias throughout its entire Voronoi region. 
 
4.3.1.2 Hebbian Gradients 
Towards defining cross-modal influence, we parameterize the approach above.  Consider 
a slice nAM ⊆ \  with associated codebook { }1 2, ,...,A aN u u u= .  Let { }1 2, ,..., aS s s s= , 
where each [ 1, 1]is ∈ −  .  We call S a sign set and use it to provide signs for each node in 
AN , i.e., whether it attracts or repels.  Although signs were previously restricted to be 
either -1 or 1, a continuous range here reflects confidence in the assignments.   
We define: 
( )iZ S  ( )0 0  ( ) density( ) , , , ,i i iS u u Z a b x y θ= ⋅ ⋅  (4.3)
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( ) AZ S    ( )iZ S= ∑  (4.4)
( )H S∇  ( ) ( )  A AZ S Z S
x y
∂ ∂= +∂ ∂  
(4.5)
We call ( )H S∇  the Hebbian gradient induced on AM  by sign set S.  Slices will induce 
vector fields derived from Hebbian gradients on one another to create cross-modal 
influence.  The influence is effected by assigning values in sign set S that correspond to 
their perceptual outlooks.  This is possible because cross-modal clustering provides slices 
with a common frame of reference for making these assignments.  Figure 4.7 contains an 
example of such a field.   
 
4.3.1.3 Activation Sets 
Finally, we define the notion of an activation set 1 2{ , ,..., }je e e , where 0 1ie≤ ≤ .  
Activation sets will be used to represent activation potentials in our state space models, 
when we define leaky integrate and fire networks.  The activation potential for each node 
corresponds to a temporal-integration of its inputs over some time period, as detailed in 
section 4.3.3.  In anticipation of applying Hebbian gradients in the next section, we show 
here how to project the activation potentials in one mode onto another, by using their 
shared categories as a common frame of reference. 
For mode AM , let { }1 2, ,...,A aN v v v=  be its nodebook and let AN  contain k distinct 
categories, as determined by cross-modal clustering with some mode BM .  We call this 
set of perceptual categories 1{ ,..., }kC c c= . 
Let 1 2{ , ,..., }A aE e e e=  be an activation set on AM .  We define the activation set on C 
derived from AE  as 1 2{ , ,..., }kφ φ φΦ = , where iφ  is simply the sum of the activation 
potentials of the individual nodes within category i :  
 
i
i v
v c
eφ
∈
= ∑  (4.6) 
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We will refer to the mapping in (4.6) as ( )AEΦ , which projects nodebook activations 
onto category activations. 
Let 1 2{ , ,..., }kφ φ φΦ =  be an activation set on the categories in C.  We define an activation 
set 1 2{ , ,..., }A aE e e e=  on a node AM  derived from Φ  by reversing the above process: 
 
( )j
i j
c MP a
e φ
∈
= ∑  (4.7) 
We will refer to the mapping in (4.7) as ( )AE Φ , which projects category activations  onto 
nodebook activations. 
 
Being able to move back and forth between activations in nodebooks and categories is 
quite useful.  It allows us to share state between two different slices, using their 
categories as an interlingua, and thereby define the Hebbian gradients used in 
intersensory influence. 
 
4.3.2 Perceptual Trajectories 
During the time window corresponding to a sensory event, a slice NAM ⊆ \  integrates its 
sensory inputs into a single estimate Nh R∈  that models what it is in the midst of 
perceiving.  This estimate changes over time, and its movement is governed: 
(1) externally, by events happening in the world; (2) innately, by the previously learned 
structure of events with the slice; and (3) cross-modally, from the perspectives of other 
perceptual channels viewing the same external events. 
We now define the state space dynamics due to each of these components. 
(1)  Events in the world reach the slice through a stream of sensory inputs.  (We discuss 
integration of slices into perceptual pipelines later in this chapter.)   We call this input 
stream 1 1 2 2 < , , , ,..., ,k kI d t d t d t= > < > < > , where input Nid R∈  arrives at time it . 
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Let 1( )i i iI d d −Δ = − , which is a vector measuring the difference between successive 
inputs.  Let ( )AW itδ  be a unit impulse function that is nonzero if an input arrives at AM  at 
time it . 
We define the change in the estimate due to events in the world as: 
 ( ) ( )AW i iW t t Iδ= ⋅Δ  (4.8) 
( )W t  provides the gradient of the input change at time t, assuming an input occurred.  
Otherwise, it is zero.  The "W" in this function reminds us it due to changes in the world.  
In the absence of other factors, ( ) W t dt∫  tracks the inputs exactly. 
(2)   The learned category structure within each slice also influences its perceptual inputs.  
In equation (4.4), we defined a parameterized surface ( )AZ S  constructed over slice AM .  
The sign values in set S determine the heights of the fixed points corresponding to the 
nodes; these range from -1 to 1, corresponding to repellers or attractors respectively.  
Values within this range reduce the strength of the corresponding gradient. 
Recall vector { }1 2sign( ),  sign(u ),..., sign( )A aS u u= , which captures the ambiguity of AM  
and is used to define the innate surface AZ .   
Let ( )t AA M  be a vector of activation potentials for AM  at time t, 1 2( ) [ , ,..., ]t A aA M e e e= , 
where 0 1ie≤ ≤ .  (This was defined above in § 4.3.1.3 and receives a more detailed 
treatment in  § 4.3.4.) 
We are going to scale AS  by ( )t AA M  to generate a gradient corresponding to the innate 
dynamics of slice AM .  Let { }1 1 2 2( ) sign( ), sign( ),..., sign( )A a aS t e u e u e u= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ . 
We define:  
 ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )A AI t Z S t h= ∇  (4.9) 
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This is the component of the estimate's change that is due to a slice's preference to favor 
previously learned categories.  This influence increases as the activation potentials in the 
nodes increase; the intuition here is that the nodes become increasingly "sticky" as they 
grow closer to generating a perception.  We call this refer to this influence as the slice's 
innate dynamics, and the "I" in this function is a mnemonic for "innate." 
(3)  To define the component of state space dynamics due to intersensory influence, let 
BM  be a slice that has been cross-modally clustered with AM . 
We are going to use BM  to construct a Hebbian gradient ( )H S∇  on AM .  To do this, we 
need to determine a sign set S that reflects BM 's perceptual preferences.  As we touched 
upon at the beginning of this section, we will be defining an activation potential model on 
the nodebooks in each slice.  We are going to use this model to determine the sign set for 
calculating ( )H S∇ . 
Let ( )t BA M  be the set of activation potentials for BM .  Defining the sign set S is a two 
step process.  First, we use ( )t BA M  to determine the potentials Φ  of the mutual 
categories C between AM  and BM .  Then, we use Φ  to determine signs for the nodes in 
AM .   
The simplest definition of 1 2{ , ,..., }aS e e e=  is: 
 ( )( )( )A t BS E A M= Φ  (4.10) 
This projects the activation potentials in BM  directly onto AM , by using C as a common 
reference.  Because 0ie ≥ , this means BM  can only induce a vector field corresponding 
to attractors on AM , per equation (4.1).  Thus, it can encourage the recognition of certain 
categories but it cannot discourage the recognition of others. 
We can imagine a less permissive strategy, where some nodes are encouraged and some 
discouraged, as in: 
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 ( )( )( )12 tan ( ( )) mean( ( ( )) / ,  2A t B t BS E A M A Mα π α−= ⋅ Φ − Φ ≥  (4.11) 
Here, nodes corresponding to categories with above mean potentials are treated as 
attractors and those with below mean potentials are treated as repellers.  
Finally, let us consider the scenario where BM  determines what it is perceiving before 
AM  does.  In the model defined below, this will correspond to max( ) 1 εΦ ≥ − .  Namely, 
the activation potential of some category reaches a threshold value, at least from BM 's 
perspective, which "resets" the potentials in all other categories.  Perhaps in this case we 
would like to discourage all of the non-recognized categories in AM .  We can do that by 
substituting: 
 ( )( )( )12 tan ( ) / ,  for some large A t BS E A Mα π α−= ⋅Φ  (4.12) 
In practice, we use (4.11) and dynamically substitute in (4.12) when a co-occurring node 
fires. 
We can now define the change in the estimate due to intersensory influence as: 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( )C t H S h= ∇  (4.13) 
The "C" here is a reminder this represents cross-modal influence. 
 
4.3.3 Perceptual Dynamics 
We can now define the state space equation for estimate h: 
 
( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )AW i i A A
dh W t I t C t
dt
dh t I h Z S t h H S h
dt
α β γ
α δ β γ
= ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
= ⋅ ⋅ Δ + ⋅ ∇ + ⋅ ∇
 (4.14) 
which combines the dynamic effects from the world (W), its innate structure (I), and 
cross-modal influence (C), where S is defined as above.  We define 1h d=  at time 1t . 
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How do we set the constants ,  , and ?α β γ   By default, we set 1α =  so that each slice 
"receives" its full inputs stream.  We also set 1β γ+ =  so that by the time each slice is 
ready to generate its input, its innate structure and cross-modal influences are as 
important as its inputs in determining which category is recognized.  In particular, we set 
γ β> , so that intersensory influences dominate innate ones.  The reason for this is that 
we suppose the world is already enforcing the innate structure of events in generating 
them.  From the outlooks of both Gibson (1950) and Brooks (1987), dynamically 
reinforcing the world's structure within a slice is redundant.  Nonetheless, we view it is as 
an important component of interpretative stability.  While it may not be necessary from a 
theoretical Gibsonian perspective, incorporating innate perceptual dynamics seems to 
have clear computational advantages in real world conditions.  It stabilizes sensory inputs 
by biasing perceptual interpretation to favor events the slice has previously learned. 
Ideally, it would be optimal to adjust these parameters dynamically.  For example, in 
noisy conditions, an auditory slice may prefer to discount its perceptual inputs in favor of 
visual cross-modal one, realizing what is known as the cocktail party effect (Cherry 1953, 
Sumby and Pollack 1954); raising γ  and lowering α  in (4.14) would have this effect.  
This condition is likely detectable, particularly where we suppose one slice is not 
registering events and another co-occurring one is.  Although we have not implemented 
an automatic mechanism for dynamically balancing these parameters, doing so does not 
seem implausible (e.g., according to maximum-likelihood estimation approach of Ernst 
and Banks, 2002). 
 
4.3.4 An Activation Potential Model 
Let us examine where we stand at this point.  We have defined how to calculate the path 
of a slice's perceptual estimate within its state space.  However, we have not yet specified 
how this path dynamic generates a percept.  We now return to the question posed earlier: 
how far down its path must an input travel for a slice to know that an event has occurred?   
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There is a vast body of literature on perceptual thresholds tracing back to the seminal 
work of Weber and Fechner in the 19th century.  Of particular interest here are the notion  
of temporal thresholds – that sensory stimuli are temporally integrated to generate 
perceptions (Hughes 1946, Green 1960, Watson 1986, Sussman et al. 1999).   We will 
use this to motivate a leaky integrate and fire network (Gerstner and Kistler 2002) over 
the nodes within a slice.  Each node is modeled as a leaky integrator; when it fires, a 
perception corresponding to its category is generated. 
For each node iu  in the nodebook of slice AM , we refer to its activation potential at time 
t as ( )t iA u , which ranges between 0 and 1.   If ( ) 1t iA u ε≥ − , we say the node fires, and 
the quantity 1 ε−  is called its firing threshold. 
We define a mapping function : N AV R N→ , which assigns a point to its nearest node in  
nodebook AN .  Namely, V describes the Voronoi regions over the nodebook.  For each 
node iu , we associate a function ( )iu p  where ( ) 1iu p =  if and only if ( ) iV p u= .  
Otherwise, it is equal to zero.  When ( ) 1iu p = , we say ( )iu p  is active. 
A node's activation increases when the perceptual estimate falls within it.  We define the 
change in potential due to direct activation:  
 ( )1( ) ( ) ( )AW iD t t u h tδη= ⋅  (4.15) 
The variable η  determines the temporal threshold for the category represented by iu . It 
answers the question: how many times must the nodes in a single category be active for 
that category to be perceived?  Although much has been written documenting temporal 
thresholds, it is not always clear how (or if) they are acquired.  In our framework, we 
make the following fairly weak assumption: during development, a sufficient number of 
unambiguous sensory inputs are observed such that we can derive (e.g., 90%) confidence 
intervals on their lengths.  Then for some confidence interval, [ , ]min maxt t , we take the 
lower bound mint  as the temporal threshold.  If the inputs are sampled at λ Hz, then we 
define mintη λ= ⋅ .  We note there is some evidence for simplified (unambiguous) inputs 
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during development in people, where parents exaggerate inflection and pitch in speech 
(in what is traditionally known as "motherese"), presumably to help infants analyze 
sounds (Garnicia 1977). 
To this, we also add a leakage term.  Leakage provides that in the absence of stimulation, 
each node drifts to its rest value, which we uniformly define as zero in this model.  This 
is necessary to counter the effect of noise in the perceptual inputs and of spurious 
intersensory activations.  We define the leakage at time t: 
 ( )0L( ) exp ( ) /t t t τ= − −  (4.16) 
where time constant τ  is equal to maxt  in the confidence interval above and 0t  is the most 
recent time the node was active. 
Therefore, for each node iu , we have: 
 
( ) ( )0
( )   ( ) ( )
( ) 1 1  ( ) ( ) exp ( ) /
t i
At i
W i
dA u D t L t
dt
dA u t u h t t t
dt
δ τη τ
= +
= ⋅ − − −

 (4.17) 
We thereby define a system of AN  simultaneous state equations for mode AM . 
Based on these node activation potentials, we derive activation potentials for perceptual 
categories: 
 ( ) ( )
j i
t i t j
u c
A c A u
∈
= ∑  (4.18) 
That is, the activation potential of a category is the sum of the activation potentials of its 
nodes.  If ( ) 1t iA c ε≥ − , then we say that category ic  has fired and the slice outputs this 
category as its perception.  At this point, the activation potentials for all nodes are reset to 
zero.  Assuming we do not implement a refractory period, the node is free to await its 
next input.  In practice, we set 410ε −=  to account for numerical rounding errors during 
our simulation.   
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4.3.4.1 Hebbian Activations 
Finally, we note an important variation on this model by allowing activation potentials to 
spread among nodes in different slices.  In this way, we can incorporate Hebbian 
influence directly into activation potentials and thereby reduce the temporal thresholds 
for perceptual events. 
For ( )t BA M , BM 's activation potentials at time t, let: 
 ( )( )( ) 1 2( ) { , ,..., }A t B aS E f A M e e e= Φ =  (4.19) 
be the activation set projected onto mode AM  from BM  via (4.11).  We define the 
Hebbian activation potential ( )t iH u  induced on node iu  at time t:  
 1( ) ( )Bt i W i
b
H u t eδη= ⋅  (4.20) 
where bη  is defined with respect to BM .  This allows AM  to directly incorporate BM 's 
activation potentials into its own, yielding new state space equations for each iu : 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
t i
t i
Bt i
W i
b
dA u D t H u L t
dt
dA u D t t e L t
dt
κ
κ δη
= + +
= + ⋅ +


 (4.21) 
We fully expand (4.21) to show the contribution of ( )t BA M , the activation potentials in 
BM : 
( )( )( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )Bt i W A t B
b i
dA u D t t E f A M L t
dt
κ δη
⎡ ⎤= + ⋅ Φ +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
  (4.22) 
The system defined by (4.22) reduces the effective temporal thresholds in perceptual 
systems by spreading activation potentials between their nodes.  We vary κ  between 0 
and 1 to adjust this cross-modal sensory acceleration, in proportion to the observed 
agreement between slices.  Cross-modal perception is known to significantly improve 
upon unimodal response times in humans (Hershenson 1962, Frens 1995, Calvert et al. 
2000); this is captured by our model here. 
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4.4 Summary 
In this chapter, we have introduced a new family of models called influence networks, 
which incorporate temporal dynamics into a perceptual framework.  These networks fuse 
together information from the outside world, innate perceptual structure, and intersensory 
influence to increase perceptual accuracy within slices.  The cross-modal aspect of this is 
illustrated in Figure 4.8, where auditory formant data influences the visual perception of 
lip contours by inducing a Hebbian gradient on it.  This has the effect of “moving” the 
visual sensation to be in closer accord with the auditory perception. 
Influence networks incorporate several basic biological phenomena into a computational 
model, including: cross-modal influence; dynamic adjustment of sensory and temporal 
thresholds; cross-modal substitution; and bistability.  We will show in Chapter 6 that 
while these are fundamental perceptual features in biological systems, they largely tend 
to be absent in artificial ones.  Influence networks are a step toward creating more 
capable artificial perceptual systems by providing them with a more realistic sensorial 
framework.  Figure 4.9 illustrates how an influence network can be incorporated into a 
Lip contour
data
Formant
data
heed (i)
had (æ)
had (æ)
 
Figure 4.8 -- Cross-modal activations in an influence network.  The auditory perception in formant space 
on top increases activations in the lip contour space on the bottom.   This example is unusual because it 
shows an auditory modality influencing a visual one, which is biologically realistic but unusual in an 
artificial perceptual system.  The effect of this influence is that the visual perception is modified due to an 
induced Hebbian gradient.  Shading here corresponds to activation potential levels. 
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preexisting artificial perceptual system to enable a new type of cross-modal influence, 
designed to increase overall perceptual consistency. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9– Adding an influence network to two preexisting systems.  We start in (a) with two pipelined 
networks that independently compute separate functions.  In (b), we incorporate an influence network into 
this architecture that interconnects the functional components of the pipelines and enables them to 
dynamically modify their percepts. 
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Chapter 5  
Sensorimotor Learning 
Up to this point, we have been concerned with learning to recognize events in the world.  
We now turn to the complementary problem of learning to generate events in the world.  
That these two problems are interrelated is well established – animal behaviors are 
frequently learned through observation, particularly in vertebrates (Bloedel et al. 1996).  
In this chapter, we will propose a computational architecture for acquiring intentional 
motor control guided by sensory perception.  Our approach addresses two basic 
questions: 
1) What is the role of perceptual grounding in learning motor activity?  In other 
words, how does the categorization of sensory events assist in the acquisition of 
voluntary motor behaviors? 
2) Can motor systems internally reuse perceptual mechanisms?  Specifically, we 
examine the possibility that the perceptual framework presented in Chapter 3 can 
be applied to learning motor coordination.  This is the most important issue 
addressed in this chapter, because it generalizes to suggest how higher level 
cognitive structures may be iteratively bootstrapped off lower level perceptual 
inputs.  In doing so, it suggests a framework for realizing the embodied cognition 
approaches of Brooks (1991a), Lakoff (1987), and Mataric (1997). 
Towards answering these questions, we present a computational architecture for 
sensorimotor learning, where an animal (or a machine) acquires control over its motor 
systems by observing the effects of its own actions.  Sensory feedback can both initially 
guide juvenile development and then subsequently refine adult motor activity.  This type 
of self-supervised learning is thought to be among the most powerful developmental 
mechanisms available both to natural creatures (Thorndike 1898, Piaget 1971, Hall and 
Moschovakis 2004) and to artificial ones (Weiner 1948, Maes and Brooks 1990). 
  122 
Our approach is to reapply the framework in Chapter 3.  We will treat the motor 
component of sensorimotor learning as if it were a perceptual problem.  This is surprising 
because one might suppose that motor activity is fundamentally different than perception.  
However, we take the perspective that motor control can be seen as perception 
backwards.  We imagine that – in a notion reminiscent of a Cartesian theater – an animal 
can "watch" the activity in its own motor cortex, as if it were a privileged form of 
internal perception.  Then for any motor act, there are two associated perceptions – the 
internal one describing the generation of the act and the external one describing the self-
observation of the act.  The perceptual grounding framework described in Chapter 3 can 
then cross-modally ground these internal and external perceptions with respect to one 
another.  The insight behind this approach is that a system can develop motor control by 
learning to generate the events it has previously acquired through perceptual grounding. 
A benefit of this framework is that it can learn imitation, a fundamental form of 
biological behavioral learning (Byrne and Russon 1998, Meltzoff and Prinz 2002).  In 
imitative behaviors – sometimes known as mimicry – an animal acquires the ability to 
reproduce some aspect of another's activity, constrained by the capabilities and dynamics 
of its own sensory and motor systems.  This is widespread in the animal kingdom (Galef 
1988) and is thought to be among the primary enablers for creating self-supervised 
intelligent machines (Schaal 1999, Dautenhahn and Nehaniv 2002). 
We will demonstrate sensorimotor learning in this framework with an artificial system 
that learns to sing like a zebra finch.  Our system first listens to the song of an adult finch; 
it cross-modal clusters this input to learn songemes, primitive units of bird song that we 
propose as an avian equivalent of phonemes.  It then uses a vocalization synthesizer to 
generate its own nascent birdsong, guided by random exploratory motor behavior.  The 
motor parameters describing this exploratory vocal behavior are fed into motor slices – as 
if they corresponded to external perceptual inputs.  By simultaneously listening to itself 
sing, the system organizes these motor slices by cross-modally clustering them with 
respect to the previously learned songeme slices.  During this process, the fact that the 
motor data were derived internally from innate exploratory behaviors, rather than from 
external perceptual events, is irrelevant.  By treating the motor data as if they were 
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derived perceptually, the system thereby learns to reproduce the same sounds to which it 
was previously exposed.  This approach is modeled on the dynamics of how male 
juvenile finches learn birdsong from their fathers (Tchernichovski et al. 2004, Fee et al. 
2004).   
The model presented here is inspired by sensorimotor learning in animals, and it shares a 
number of features with several prominent approaches to modeling biological 
sensorimotor integration (e.g., Massone and Bizzi 1990, Stein and Meredith 1994, 
Wolpert et al. 1995).  However, it is intended as an abstract computational model; as 
such, it does not approach the richness or complexity inherent in biological sensorimotor 
systems.  Our goal in this chapter is to demonstrate that motor learning can be 
accomplished through iterative perceptual grounding.  In other words, we show that 
perceptual and motor learning are unexpectedly similar processes and can be achieved 
within a common mathematical framework.  This surprising result also suggests an 
approach to grounding higher level cognitive development, by iteratively reapplying this 
technique of internal perception.  We discuss these issues below and will examine them 
again in Chapter 6. 
 
5.1 A Sensorimotor Architecture 
We begin by examining abstract models of innate sensory and motor processing in 
isolation.  Initially, the isolated sensory system simply categorizes the different events to 
which it is exposed, using cross-modal clustering.  One may view this as an unsupervised 
learning phase, in which perceptual categories are acquired through passive observation.  
Subsequently, the isolated motor system generates innately specified behaviors using an 
open-loop control system (Prochazka 1993).  In other words, it receives no initial 
feedback.  To enable sensorimotor learning, we must close this loop by interconnecting 
these isolated systems. 
For this purpose, we will reuse the perceptual machinery of Chapter 3.  Specifically, we 
introduce the notion of internal perception, which allows a system to watch the 
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generation of its internal motor parameters as if they were coming from the outside 
world.  By treating the motor parameters as perceptual inputs, they can be cross-modally 
clustered, regardless of their internal origins.  The system thereby learns to generate 
events it has previously learned how to recognize, by associating motor parameters with 
their observed effects. 
 
5.1.1 A Model of Sensory Perception 
Our framework begins with the model of afferent sensory perception outlined in Figure 
5.1, which schematically diagrams an abstract computational sensory cortex.  In this 
model, external events in the world impinge upon sensory organs.  These receptors in 
turn generate perceptual inputs, which feed into specialized perceptual processing 
channels.  A primary outcome of this processing is the extraction of descriptive features 
(e.g., Muller and Leppelsack 1985, Hubel 1995), which capture abstracted sensory detail.  
This process occurs in parallel within multiple sensory pathways, as illustrated in Figure 
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Figure 5.1 – An abstract model of sensory processing in our framework.  A schematic view is shown on 
the left, which is expanded upon in the example of the right.  Events in the world are detected by sensory 
organs, here labeled A and V, representing auditory and visual receptors.  These are fed into processing 
pipelines shown here by the composition of functional units.  The features extracted from these pipelines 
are fed into slices, which are then cross-modally clustered with respect to one another.  We discuss this 
model further in the text. 
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5.1 on the right.  This hypothetical example shows auditory and visual receptors that 
provide inputs to their respective perceptual pathways.  These channels extract features 
from their perceptual input streams, which are fed into the slices displayed on top.  These 
slices are then cross-modally clustered with respect to one another, as described in 
Chapter 3.   
Later in the thesis, we reexamine the structure of these sensory pipelines.  In biological 
systems, sensory channels are highly interconnected and display complex temporal 
dynamics; we will modify our perceptual model to reflect that.  In Chapter 6, we examine 
the biological implausibility of assuming independence between perceptual channels.  
However, the sensorimotor learning in this chapter assumes only that slices can be cross-
modally clustered, an assumption which remains valid in the subsequent elaborations 
later in this thesis. 
 
5.1.2 A Simple Model of Innate Motor Activity 
We now present an abstract model of innate efferent motor activity, which is sometimes 
called reflexive behavior.  It is well established that young animals engage in a range of 
involuntary motor activities; much of this appears to facilitate the acquisition of cognitive 
and motor functions, leading to the development of voluntary, intentional behaviors 
(Pierce and Cheney 2003, Chapter 3).  Behavioral learning is therefore not a passive 
phenomenon; instead, it is often guided by phylogenetically "programmed" activities that 
have been specifically selected to satisfy the idiosyncratic developmental requirements of 
an individual species (Tinbergen 1951).  
An abstract model describing the generation of innate efferent motor activity is shown in 
Figure 5.2.  In a sense, this model is the reverse of the one displayed in Figure 5.1.  
Instead of the outside world generating events, we assume an innate generative 
mechanism stimulates a motor control center.  This in turn evokes coordinated activity in 
a muscle or effector system, leading to the generation of an external event in the world.   
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In our model, the innate specification of developmental behaviors is represented by a 
joint probability distribution over a set of parameters governing motor activity.  This is 
motivated by Keele and Summers (1976), where a motor program is described by a 
descriptive parameterization.  Alternatively, one could assume the existence of a set of 
deterministic motor schemas, corresponding to predetermined patterns of activity (Arbib 
1985).  From the perspective of our model, this distinction makes little difference; we 
simply assume some mechanism (or set thereof) is responsible for producing the innate 
behaviors that will eventually generate feedback for sensorimotor learning. 
To give a clearer sense of this process, we examine the diagram on the right in Figure 5.2.  
This presents an example of human vocal articulation, motivated by (Rubin et al. 1981).  
Although we will focus primarily on avian vocalization later in this chapter, first 
examining human articulation has strong intuitive and didactic appeal, and it sets the 
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Figure 5.2 – An abstract model of innate motor activity.  A schematic view is shown on the left, which is 
expanded upon in the example on the right.  On the bottom right is a model of human vocal articulation.  
This is parameterized by articulator positions at the lips (L), tongue tip (T), jaw (J), tongue center (C), 
velum (V), and hyoid (H).  Motor control corresponds to a set of state equations on the left governing the 
constrained movement of these articulators over some time period.  Parameters describing this movement 
are selected from some assumed innate distribution on the top right.  The selection of parameters in this 
model is based on (Rubin et al. 1981). 
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stage for discussing birdsong generation below.  In this example, a set of parameters are 
selected from some innate distribution InnateD ; these parameters describe the trajectories 
of six primary human vocal articulators, as illustrated in the figure.  The selection of 
parameters thereby corresponds to a primitive speech act.  The actual movements of the 
articulators during a speech act are modeled by a set of partial differential equations, 
determined by the biomechanical constraints on the musculoskeletal apparatus of the 
human vocal tract.  In other words, these equations model the physical characteristics and 
limitations of human vocal production independently of what is being said.  Together, the 
parameters and the state equations lead to the generation of a speech act.  In this domain, 
learning how to produce meaningful sounds corresponds to selecting parameters that 
appropriately generate them, given the physical and dynamic constraints of human 
vocalization. 
 
5.1.3 An Integrated Architecture 
Towards sensorimotor learning, we now interconnect these isolated sensory and motor 
systems.  To do this, we introduce the notion of internal perception, which allows a 
system to "watch" the generation of its internal motor parameters as if they were coming 
from the outside world.  Thus, we will create motor slices that are populated with 
behavioral data, in exactly the same way we created perceptual slices, which were 
populated with sensory data.  The resulting slices do not "know" if their data were 
generated internally or externally, and for the purposes of cross-modal clustering, it 
makes no difference.  We can thereby learn motor categories that correspond to 
previously acquired perceptual categories.   
In our model, internal perception occurs through the addition of a Cartesian theater 
(Dennett 1991), so named because it provides a platform for internal observation.  
Pursuing this philosophical metaphor a bit further,  the homunculus in our theater will be 
replaced by cross-modal clustering.  As we saw in Chapter 3, this is an unsupervised 
learning technique.  We may therefore employ the notion of a Cartesian theater without 
engendering the associated dualistic criticisms of Ryle (1941) or Dennett (1991).  In fact, 
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we will argue that internal perception is a useful framework for higher level cognitive 
bootstrapping, where cross-modal clustering replaces a homunculus and any notions of 
"intentionality" (Dennett and Haugeland 1991) are attributed to innate phylogenetic 
structures and tendencies.  In other words, we will keep the theater but eliminate the 
metaphysical audience. 
Our integrated sensorimotor framework is shown in Figure 3.  We briefly outline this 
architecture and then examine the stages of sensorimotor learning in detail below.  In the 
above diagram, we see the independent sensory and motor components described above 
on the left and right respectively.  In addition, there is now a Cartesian theater (G), which 
receives inputs corresponding to innate exploratory behaviors generated by (D).  These 
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Figure 5.3 – An integrated sensory motor framework.  We connect the isolated sensory and motor systems 
with the addition of a Cartesian theater (G), which receives data via (1), corresponding to innate 
exploratory behaviors generated in (D).  These data are fed into motor slices (H) via (2).  These exploratory 
behaviors also trigger motor activity via the efferent pathways in (E) and (F).  Most importantly, the system 
is able to perceive its own actions, as shown by (3).  These inputs feed into the afferent sensory system, 
where features are extracted and fed into perceptual slices (C).  We thereby learn the Hebbian linkages 
between the codebook clusters in perceptual slices (C) and motor slices (H), which describe the generation 
of these perceptions.  In the final step, we cross-modally cluster the motor slices (H) with respect to the 
perceptual slices (C); we thereby learn the motor categories that generate previously acquired sensory 
categories learned when the system was perceptually grounded. 
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internally produced data are fed to motor slices (H), which are thereby populated with 
behavioral rather than perceptual data.  These data are also simultaneously fed into a 
motor control system (E), which lead to the generation of perceivable events in the 
external world.   
Most importantly, the system observes its own actions.  Innately generated events 
impinge upon the sensory organs and are fed into the sensory apparatus on the left.  
Features extracted from these data are fed into sensory slices (C).  This process thereby 
creates Hebbian linkages between the sensory slices (C) and the motor slices (D).   
We point out that slices are what may be deemed agnostic data structures – they neither 
"know" nor "care" what type of data they contain.  We can therefore cross-modally 
cluster the motor slices (D), based on the categories acquired during the perceptual 
grounding of the sensory slices (C).  Note, that this is a one-way process.  In other words, 
we fix the sensory categories and only cluster the motor data.  We thereby learn motor 
categories that correspond to previously acquired perceptual categories.  We discuss 
relaxing this one-way restriction below, to allow increasing motor sophistication to assist 
in restructuring perceptual categories.  This type of perceptual refinement as a 
consequence of fine motor development has been observed in humans, particularly in 
musicians (e.g., Ohnishi et al. 2001). 
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Figure 5.4 – Developmental stages in our model.  i) The juvenile acquires perceptual structures from its 
parent.  ii)  Motor acts are observed internally through a Cartesian Theater.  iii)  The effects of motor acts 
are observed externally through perceptual channels.  iv)  Motor slices are cross-modally clustered with 
respect to perceptual slices.  The juvenile thereby learns how to generate the events it learned in stage (i).  
v)  Random exploratory behaviors are disconnected and motor slices take over the generation of motor 
activity.  The juvenile is now able to intentionally generate the sensory events acquired from its parent.  
vi)  Internal perception can be used subsequently in non-juveniles to refine motor control.  
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5.2 Stages of Sensorimotor Development 
We now examine the developmental stages of our framework, as illustrated in Figure 5.4.  
Note that one may introduce any number of complexities into these stages, a few of 
which we examine below.  However, we sidestep a number of issues relevant to any 
developmental model that do not uniquely distinguish our approach.  For example, we 
make no commitment to the role of innate vs. learned knowledge (e.g., Chomsky 1957, 
Meltzoff and Moore 1977, Fodor 1983) and believe we can incorporate either 
perspective.  The primary goal here is to outline how our model computationally learns 
imitative behaviors, towards examining the acquisition of birdsong in the next section.  
We therefore avoid a number of important albeit orthogonal topics, some of which we 
will examine in Chapter 6.  
 
5.2.1 Parental Training 
In the first stage of our model, we assume the system corresponds to a neonate.  Its 
sensory processing channels are sufficiently developed to extract features from perceptual 
inputs, provided by its parents, other animals (particularly conspecifics), or directly from 
the environment.  The goal of the system at this point is to collect sufficient data to begin 
cross-modal clustering and thereby become perceptually grounded.  Let us consider the 
outcome of this grounding process, as illustrated in Figure 5.5.  Here, a set of four 
different events in the world has been acquired using the framework of Chapter 3.  The 
goal then is for the system to learn how to generate these events by itself. 
We note that perceptually grounding may involve a gradual progression rather than a 
sudden transition.  Within a single modality, some categories may be easier to learn than 
others, due to their inherent structures, availability of training data, degree of perceptual 
redundancy, individual variations, etc.  In contrast, some perceptual features may be 
higher-level aggregates of simpler ones.  As such, their acquisition depends upon that of 
their components, which themselves may be differentially acquired.  For example. 
phonological development in children proceeds in a number of well-defined, 
interconnected stages that constructively build upon each other (Vihman 1996).  During 
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this lengthy process, children need constant exposure to language, during which they 
extract features corresponding to their current state of development.  More generally, a 
juvenile may undergo multiple stages of perceptual grounding, during which it acquires 
increasingly abstract knowledge from its tutors or environment.   
Although we assume that slices are initially unstructured, i.e., tabula rasa, it is certainly 
possible to incorporate innate pre-partitioning of slices into our framework.  Also, our 
model does not specify how perceptual features are selected in the first place.  We 
assume this is specified genetically in the biological world and programmatically in the 
artificial world. 
 
5.2.2 Internal and External Self-Observation 
The second and third stages of our model correspond to a system's observation of its own 
innate, exploratory motor activity.  Although reflexive behaviors are phylogenetically 
selected in animals to satisfy their individual motor requirements (Tinbergen 1951), in 
artificial systems, we must specify how these innate behaviors are generated.  While it 
 
Figure 5.5 – A hypothetical sensory system that has learned four events in the world.  These are acquired 
through cross-modal clustering, using the framework in the previous chapter.  For simplicity, only a single 
sensory mode is illustrated here. 
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may often be reasonable to design exploratory behaviors that are predetermined to satisfy 
a set of motor goals, we examine a generic strategy here.  Our goal is simply to explore a 
motor space and in doing so, simultaneously observe the effects internally through the 
Cartesian theater and externally through normal perceptual channels. 
Consider, for example, the problem of generating pairs of exploratory parameters (x,y) in 
a hypothetical motor system.  We have found it useful to select these parameters and 
thereby explore motor spaces according to an Archimedean spiral.  We could therefore 
 
Figure 5.6 – Internal perception of exploratory motor behavior corresponding to an Archimedean spiral.  
These data correspond to the parameters used to generate motor activity. 
 
Figure 5.7 – External perception of exploratory motor behavior.  This slice perceives the events generated 
by the motor activity described by Figure 5.6.  These data correspond to perceptual features describing 
sensory observations. 
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specify that the parameter values are drawn from a distribution described by 
1 2cos( )x α θ α θ= ⋅  and 1 2sin( )y α θ α θ= ⋅ .  In this case, the internal perception of this motor 
activity might be represented by the slice in Figure 5.6. 
Note that the slice representing the external perception of this motor activity may "look" 
entirely different than the motor slice representing its generation.  In other words, there is 
no reason to expect any direct correspondence or isomorphism between motor and 
perceptual slices.  The motor parameters indirectly generate perceptual events through an 
effector system, which may be non-linear, have discontinuities, or display complex 
dynamics or artifacts. 
We see this phenomenon in the slice in Figure 5.7, which visualizes perception of the 
motor activity described by Figure 5.6.  For the purpose of this example, we generated a 
non-bijective mapping between the motor parameters and the perceptual features of 
events they generate in order to illustrate the degree to which corresponding motor and 
perceptual slices may appear incongruous.  Thus, even though these two slices may 
represent the same set of percepts abstractly, they should not be expected to bear any 
superficial resemblance to each other.  This was also the case with the solely perceptual 
slices in Chapter 3; however, one might have assumed that a stronger correspondence 
would exist here due to the generative coupling between the slices, which is not the case. 
 
5.2.3 Cross-Modal Clustering 
The fourth stage of our model allows us to learn the correspondences between motor and 
perceptual slices.  Figure 5.8 shows the interconnection of the three slices introduced 
above.  On the bottom left in (A), we see the categories acquired during perceptual 
grounding, as shown in Figure 5.5.  Using these, the system can categorize external 
observations of its own activities as shown in (B); this corresponds to the cross-modal 
clustering of the slice in Figure 5.7.  It can then subsequently use these classifications to 
categorize internally observed motor behaviors, which were responsible for generating 
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this activity to begin with.  This is show in (C) and corresponds to the cross-modal 
clustering of the slice in Figure 5.6.  
Although the discussion here presumes these steps happen sequentially, i.e., the are three 
"rounds" of cross-modally clustering represented in Figure 5.8, taking us from stages (A) 
through (C), it is possible to imagine them overlapping.  In other words, motor learning 
may co-occur with perceptual grounding and one may propose a continuum between 
these two temporal alternatives.  Particularly in systems that have limited access to 
training inputs, self-supplementing these data by generating them independently, as 
perceptual capabilities are differentially acquired, may help to overcome a paucity in 
external stimulation.  This may be additionally helpful in determining ambiguous subsets 
of perceptual and motor space, which were discussed in the previous chapter. 
A) Perceptual Grounding
from Parent
C) Internal Self
Observation
B) External Self
Obseration
Innate Motor Activity
 
Figure 5.8 – Stages of cross-modal clustering.  Starting from the acquisition of perceivable events in (A), 
we learn to classify the effects of our own behaviors in terms of these events in (B).  Finally, we can then 
relate this back to the innate motor activity generating our actions, as in (C).   There are thereby three 
stages of cross-modal clustering in this model. 
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5.2.4 Voluntary Motor Control 
The fifth stage of our model replaces innate, exploratory behavior with voluntary, 
intentional motor control.  Figure 5.9 displays the bottom two slices of Figure 5.8, where 
the motor map on the right is now clustered according to the perceptions it externally 
generates – by way of some effector system – in the sensory map on the left.  
Significantly, the system is now capable of generating the events to which it was exposed 
during parental training. 
As we saw in Chapter 4, motor and sensory events do not happen instantaneously in time.  
They are not discrete, discontinuous phenomena.  Thus, rather than select individual 
points in a motor map to trigger behaviors, it is far more plausible to imagine a system 
"moving" through a motor map during a time period corresponding to sustained activity.  
We previously examined how to move through sensory maps to avoid perceptual 
ambiguity.  We note, however, that one may also wish to incorporate other types of 
constraints into motor systems, for example, to minimize energy or maximize stability. 
 
Sensory Map Motor Map
Effector SystemExternal World
 
Figure 5.9 – Acquisition of voluntary motor control.  Regions in the motor map on the right are now 
labeled with the perceptual events they generate in the sensory map on the right. 
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5.3 Learning Birdsong 
We now propose to use the framework in the previous section for self-supervised 
learning of birdsong.  Our presentation will focus on song learning in the zebra finch, a 
popular species for studying oscine songbird vocal production.  We begin with a brief 
introduction to this species, focusing on the structure of its song and the developmental 
stages of its acquisition.  Towards building a computational model, we next introduce the 
notion of songemes, primitive units of birdsong that we propose as avian equivalents of 
phonemes.  Finally, we present a system that learns to imitate an adult zebra finch in a 
developmentally realistic way, modeled on the dynamics of how male juvenile finches 
learn birdsong from their fathers (Tchernichovski et al. 2004, Fee et al. 2004).   
Our system first listens to an adult male finch and uses cross-modal clustering to learn the 
songemes comprising the song of its "father."  It then uses an articulatory synthesizer to 
generate its own nascent birdsong, guided by random exploratory motor behavior.  By 
listening to itself sing, the system organizes the motor maps generating its vocalizations 
by cross-modally clustering them with respect to the previously learned songeme maps of 
its parent.  In this way, it learns to generate the same sounds to which it was previously 
exposed.   
We are indebted to Ofer Tchernichovski (2005, 2006) for providing the adult zebra finch 
song recordings used to train our system.  We are also grateful to Heather Williams for 
making available a generationally-indexed birdsong library, which provided an additional 
source of inputs using during initial testing (Williams 1997, 2006).  Other sources of 
birdsong files are cited individually below. 
 
5.3.1 Introduction to the Zebra Finch 
The zebra finch is an extremely popular species for researching birdsong acquisition.  
(For surveys on birdsong learning, see Brenowitz et al. 1997 and Ziegler and Marler 
2004, and Nottebohm 2005).  In part, this is due to the ease of maintaining and breeding 
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the species in captivity and its rapid sexual maturity.  However, there are two additional 
characteristics of zebra finches that make them particularly attractive for study.   
The first of these is the noisy spectral quality of their songs, which are distinct from the 
whistled, tonal characteristics of most other songbirds, such as sparrows or canaries.  We 
can see this harmonic complexity in Figure 5.11, which displays spectrograms of songs 
from several oscine species, along with a human vocalization for reference.  It is 
hypothesized that spectral complexity of a zebra finch's song reflects its physical prowess 
and aids in sexual selection (Kroodsma and Byers 1991).  The complexity of their 
vocalizations, along with a range of behavioral and neurological similarities, has 
prompted many researchers to propose studying song learning in zebra finches as a model 
for understanding speech development in humans (Marler 1970, Nottebohm 1972, Doupe 
and Kuhl 1999, Brainard and Doupe 2002, Goldstein et al. 2003).  Perhaps supporting 
this notion, it has been determined that human FOXP2, the first gene linked to speech and 
vocal production, has a protein sequence that is 98% identical to the same gene in the 
zebra finch (Haesler et al. 2004, see also Webb and Zhang 2005). 
 
 
Figure 5.10 – An adult male zebra finch (Taeniopygia guttata).  Zebra finches are small, unusually social 
songbirds that grow to approximately 10cm (4 inches) tall.  They are extremely popular both as pets and as 
research subjects for studying neural, physiological, evolutionary, social, and developmental aspects of 
birdsong acquisition.   
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Figure 5.11 – Spectrograms of songs from five different species.  These include: i) a zebra finch; ii) an 
evening grosbeak; iii) a blue jay; iv) a northern mockingbird; and v) the author singing "Do Re Mi" to 
provide a reference with human vocalization.  Notice the complex harmonic structure of the zebra finch's 
song compared to those of the other birds.  Song in (i) provided by (Tchernichovski 2006).  Songs in (ii)-
(iv) were obtained from the U.S. National Park Service (2005).  Note that the frequency ranges are different 
in each of these spectrograms. 
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The second characteristic that makes zebra finches popular models for song learning is 
the well-defined developmental process through which their song is acquired (Slater et al. 
1988).  Fledglings of both sexes begin learning their father's song early in life.  
Approximately one month after hatching, male juveniles begin producing nascent, 
squeaky sounds and then proceed through a series of stages of vocal refinement 
(Immelmann 1969, Tchernichovski and Mitra 2002).  The goal of this process for a zebra 
finch is to learn to approximately reproduce its father's song, accompanied by 
idiosyncratic, individual variations unique to each bird.  Therefore, a son sounds similar 
but not identical to his father.  At 90 days of age, a bird's song crystallizes as it 
simultaneously reaches sexual maturity, and its song template remains unchanged for the 
remainder of its life (Doupe and Kuhl 1999).  Thus, an adult male zebra finch adheres to 
a single song motif, where each vocalization is constructed from a fixed set of acquired 
components.  We note that as with many other oscine songbird species, females zebra 
finches do not sing.  Instead, they make simple vocalizations known as distance calls, 
through which birds of both sexes are able to individually recognize one another (Miller 
1979, Vignal et al. 2004). 
The juvenile development of song generation is heavily guided by auditory feedback 
(Konishi 1965).  In fact, as a bird begins to vocalize, it no longer requires exposure to its 
tutor's song but instead, it must be able to hear itself sing.  Adult birds also need feedback 
to maintain their singing ability (Nordeen and Nordeen 1992).  Thus, even though adult 
males cannot learn new songs, they require auditory feedback to maintain the neural song 
patterns acquired as juveniles (Brainard and Doupe 2000). 
How juveniles learn from auditory feedback is unknown.  Marler (1997) outlines three 
models of sensorimotor-based song development.  These range from fully open, 
instructive tutoring to the assumption of innate neural templates for highly constrained, 
conspecific song patterns.  He argues for an intermediate approach, incorporating song 
memorization into a phylogenetically constrained framework that has been selected to 
facilitate rapid learning within an individual species. 
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5.3.2 Songemes 
We now introduce the notion of songemes, primitive units of birdsong that we propose as 
avian equivalents of phonemes.  Marler (1997, p508) notes that although "it is the subject 
of score of studies of song learning and its neural basis, … little effort has been directed 
to descriptive studies of zebra finch song structure."  In the research literature, birdsong 
is generally divided into components known as syllables, which are continuous sounds 
bounded by silent intervals (e.g., Williams and Staples 1992, Ölveczky et al. 2005).  It is 
not, however, generally broken down into smaller units.  The goal of this section is to 
define primitive units we call songemes, which we argue correspond more closely to 
basic elements of physiological song production. 
Before proceeding, we briefly discuss the multitaper spectral analysis methods (Thomson 
1982)  that were introduced into the analysis of birdsong by (Tchernichovski et al. 2000). 
Traditional spectrograms show the power at different frequency components of a signal 
over time, as in the top of Figure 5.12.  Multitaper methods compute spectrograms while 
simultaneously providing estimates of spectral derivatives.  That is, rather than only 
measuring power, they also measure instantaneous changes in power, and as such, 
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Figure 5.12 – Comparing a spectrogram to a spectral derivative display for the song of a zebra finch.  A 
spectrogram for a zebra finch song is displayed on top.  The spectral derivative of that song is shown on the 
bottom and provides much clearer visual detail.  It also provides a framework for subsequent harmonic 
analysis.  
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perform a sort of edge detection on the spectrogram, making contours easier to detect 
(see the bottom of Figure 5.12).  They also provide a framework for harmonic analysis 
(ibid, Tchernichovski and Mitra 2004).  In the rest of this chapter, we use spectral 
derivatives in place of spectrograms for examining acoustic analyses of birdsongs. 
Returning to our discussion of syllables in bird song, let us consider the song displayed in 
Figure 5.13.  On the top of the figure, we have partitioned the song according to the 
traditional syllabic breakdown, as determined by the intervals of silence.  On the bottom, 
we have partitioned the song into songemes, which captures the fine structure in the song.  
The songeme partitioning is computed by finding the peaks in the smoothed 
log(power) of the signal between 860 and 8600Hz, corresponding to the expected 
vocalization range of a zebra finch.  The smoothing is done with a low-pass Savitzky-
Golay filter, using a 2nd order polynomial over a window corresponding to approximately 
40msec.  The songeme boundaries are determined by finding the local minima adjacent to 
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Figure 5.13 – Breaking a birdsong down into constituent songemes.  On the top, the song is displayed 
divided into seven syllables.  The 22 derived songemes, defined via peaks of the song's smoothed 
log(power), are shown on the bottom.  The peaks are indicated by the dotted vertical yellow lines.  The blue 
lines indicate songeme boundaries, determined by locally adjacent minima.  We note the long vocalization 
at the end of the song corresponds to a distance call. 
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these peaks, and  the boundaries are shared between songemes when they are temporally 
adjacent.  We examine the partitioning of an individual complex syllable into seven 
songemes in Figure 5.14.  This example supports our belief that the widespread syllabic 
approach to studying birdsong is a poor model for capturing its internal complexity. 
We have used this technique to automatically extract approximately 10,000 songemes 
from wav files recorded from two different zebra finches provided by (Tchernichovski 
2005, 2006).   Of these, we heuristically rejected any songeme of duration less than 10 
msecs, which eliminated approximately 1000 of them.  Many of these are due to non-
verbal sounds, e.g., from a bird moving in its cage or other background noises, that are 
audible on the recordings. 
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Figure 5.14 – Partitioning a single syllable into songemes.  This figure displays the segment of birdsong in 
Figure 5.13 between 520 and 875 msecs.  The single syllable shown on top has been automatically 
partitioned into seven songemes on the bottom, which correspond more closely to the changes in 
vocalization during this interval.  This example supports our belief that the widespread syllabic approach to 
studying birdsong is a poor model for capturing its internal complexity. 
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Figure 5.15 – Feature extraction for a zebra finch song partitioned into songemes.  The solid line within each 
songeme shows the mean value for the corresponding feature within it.  These values are cross-modally clustered 
to learn the structure of the birdsong.  The dotted line within each songeme shows the actual feature data, which is 
smoothed with a low-pass Savitzky-Golay filter.  The feature values have been normalized to fit within each plot.  
We note this is the same song as shown in Figure 5.13 
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We note several other efforts at separating complex animal sounds into primitive 
components.  Kogan and Margoliash (1997) used dynamic time warping and hidden 
Markov models (HMMs) to derive simple units of birdsong for testing automated 
recognition of birds.  Mellinger and Clark (1993) used HMMS for detecting and 
identifying bowhead whales, and Clemins and Johnson (2003) used HMMs for 
recognizing vocalizations in African elephants.   
 
5.3.3 Birdsong Analysis 
We extracted streams of acoustic features from our birdsong sound files using a 
customized version of the Sound Analysis For Matlab software (Saar 2005).  The 
extracted features include: 1) amplitude modulation; 2) frequency modulation; 3) 
entropy; 4) amplitude; 5) mean frequency; 6) pitch goodness; 7) pitch; and 8) pitch 
weight as shown in Figure 5.15.  We note the song in this figure is the one shown Figure 
5.13. 
For each songeme, we average the values of the features within it to obtain a compact 
acoustic description.  These average values are shown by the solid horizontal lines within 
each songeme in Figure 5.15a.  The dotted lines within each songeme display the actual 
feature values, which have been smoothed as described above.  The average feature 
values for approximately 9,000 songemes, derived from our training sound files, were fed 
into as assembly of interconnected slices, to be discussed below.    
We see two of the outputs of this clustering in Figure 5.16.  Among the most interesting 
of our technical results, we can interpret the upper slice as demonstrating the system has 
learned there are three different types of vocalizations: 1) the blue region corresponds to 
noisy sounds perhaps generated by chaotic activity in the avian syringeal sound 
generator.  This is similar to chaotic (e.g., fricative) speech in humans;  2)  the green 
region corresponds to pure tones, such as whistles; and 3) the orange region corresponds 
to harmonic sounds, such as the in the distance call.  We note the relative scarcity of pure 
tones in zebra finch song, as reflected by the sparsity of data in the green region. 
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Figure 5.16 -- Cross-modally clustered zebra finch slices.  We can interpret the upper slice as 
demonstrating the system has learned there are three different types of vocalizations: 1) the blue region 
corresponds to noisy sounds, perhaps generated by chaotic activity in the avian syringeal sound generator.  
This is similar to aspirated speech in humans;  2)  the green region corresponds to pure tones, such as 
whistles; and 3) the orange region corresponds to harmonic sounds, such as in the distance call.  The lower 
slice shows the system has learned the pitch structure for seven different component vocalizations. 
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The slice at the bottom of Figure 5.16 demonstrates that the system has acquired the pitch 
structure of its parent’s birdsong, corresponding with seven different base “notes,” out of 
which songemes are constructed by varying other acoustic features such as harmonic 
complexity and frequency modulation. 
A view of all the slices used for birdsong learning is illustrated in Figure 5.17.  The low-
level features, such as those in Figure 5.15, supplied data to these slices, which manually 
selected and interconnected.  Although these types of interconnections are likely 
phylogenetically determined in nature, a more sophisticated artificial system might 
 
 
Figure 5.17 – Slices for birdsong learning.  On the bottom, one dimensional slices feed songeme feature 
values into the two dimensional slices on the top.  The colored lines represent learned Hebbian linkages.  
The slices are then cross-modally clustered to learn songeme categories.  This perceptually grounds the 
system with respect to its "parent's" song.  Detailed views of two of these slices are contained in Figure 
5.16.  See the text for additional details of this architecture. 
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employ techniques such as (Bartlett 2001) to automatically select interconnections 
between acoustic features based on independent component analysis.   However, given 
our task here is to demonstrate acquisition of sensorimotor control using perceptual 
mechanisms, the precise details of feature selection and interconnection were not of great 
concern.  Nonetheless, it should be acknowledged that a fair amount of manual effort 
went into architecting the birdsong learner illustrated in Figure 5.17, which then was 
cross-modally clustered based on the input song of its parent, as described in §5.2.1. 
 
5.3.4 Articulatory Synthesis  
To implement the motor component of this system, we created a naive articulatory 
synthesizer for generating birdsong, based on the additive synthesizer in the Common 
Lisp Music System (Taube 1989) and translated into Matlab by (Strum 2001).  The motor 
parameters in our model correspond to: (1) syringeal excitation; (2) pitch; (3) power; and 
(4) temporal, frequency and amplitude envelopes corresponding to simple models of 
avian vocalization.  In our implementation, chaotic syringeal excitation is realized by 
phase and amplitude perturbations of a vocalization's harmonic components.  We note 
that this does not correspond with a biologically realistic syringeal mechanism, which 
would be complicated to model accurately.  However, our goal here is not to model 
birdsong with perfect accuracy but rather to demonstrate self-supervised sensorimotor 
learning within our framework.  Making the synthesizer sounds generally realistic was 
sufficient for our purposes, as we discuss below.   
We refer to the nascent activity of the system as babbling.  Some examples of 
increasingly complex babbling are shown in Figure 5.18.  These demonstrate the system's 
acquisition of harmonic complexity in response to auditory feedback and comparison 
with its parent’s song.   The initial babbling corresponds to uninformed, innate motor 
behavior as described above.  As the system simultaneously listened to its own outputs 
while “watching” the internal generation of motor activity, it was able to determine which 
regions of its motor maps were responsible for providing harmonic complexity matching 
its parents through cross-modal clustering, as described in §5.2.3.   
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The increase in complexity is due to continued refinement of the system’s motor maps.  
In other words, as it explored its motor capabilities more completely, it was able to 
classify codebook regions in its motor maps to learn which generated harmonically 
complex outputs.  We manually implemented the strategy that our system select different 
aspects of its parent song to independently master, which reflect the actual strategies 
taken by zebra finches in the wild (Liu et al. 2004), who sequentially focus on different 
features of their song, rather than try to master the parent’s song in its entirely.  A 
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Figure 5.18 – The temporal evolution of bird babbling in our system.  This figure illustrates the acquisition 
of harmonic complexity due to auditory feedback.  See the text for explanatory commentary. 
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presumable benefit of this approach is that it reduces search space complexity 
enormously by isolating and focusing on individual acoustic features, thereby permits 
gradual song acquisition and differential acquisition in case other male siblings are also 
in the midst of their own learning.  Thus, this strategy also prevents co-located siblings 
from confusing one another.  For example, two brothers raised together will select 
(presumably) non-conflicting developmental paths, where one may focus on the temporal 
aspects of its song while the other focuses on pitch, even though they are both essentially 
learning the same song.  Our system was designed to focus on individual songemes, in 
essence acquiring the "notes" of its parent's song.  As this is a much lower level treatment 
than is typically given in the oscine developmental literature, which focuses on song 
syllables, it is difficult to evaluate its developmental realism.  Nonetheless, for an 
artificial system, it seems quite adequate. 
Our strategy was to learn mimicry of each acoustic feature in terms of the articulator’s 
model, which formed the structure of our motor slices.  For each acquired songeme, we 
selected the combination of articulations which maximized our approximation of it.  We 
note that given the constraints of our articulator, certain acoustic features of the parent 
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Figure 5.19 – Birdsong mimicry.  On the top is a sample of the zebra finch song used as the "parent" for 
our system.  On the bottom is the system's learned imitation, where the acquired songemes have been fit to 
the template of the parent’s song and smoothed. 
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birdsong were not possible to reproduce well.  In particular, the harmonic complexity 
associated with chaotic syringeal excitation, a common phenomenon in zebra finch song, 
could only roughly be approximated by our articulatory model.   However, the human ear 
seems far more sensitive to pitch accuracy, which we were able to capture quite well, and 
tends to be less sensitive to reduced acoustic entropy. 
 
5.3.5  Results 
This experiment was in essence empirical.  Our goal was to demonstrate that our 
framework could perform self-supervised sensorimotor learning, using the zebra finch as 
a testbed.  Although the acquired song sounds recognizably like the parent bird’s to 
human ears, does it sounds like a bird to another bird?  In other words, it is unclear how 
to evaluate this mimicry.  We note that human auditory range overlaps well with that of 
the zebra finch, and as mentioned above, the FOXP2 gene thought to be responsible for 
vocal production is remarkably similar between the two species.  Nonetheless, one should 
assume that auditory feature extraction and subsequent processing in the zebra finch is 
uniquely tuned to its auditory requirements, which are surely quite different than our 
own.   
Perhaps the best way to evaluate this work would be to use it to train a fledgling and see 
if it acquires song.  In other words, use our system as a parent.1  This is a fascinating 
possibility which we are currently investigating.  However, it is important to keep in 
mind that the goal of this chapter is to present an architecture for sensorimotor learning in 
artificial systems; songbirds are a well-studied model for this type of acquisition, and as 
such, they are helpful guideposts for examining this problem.  Nonetheless, our goal is 
proposing architecture for more sophisticated computational systems rather than precisely 
imitating the song of a particular bird. 
 
                                                 
1 It has been suggested by Chris Atkeson that we attempt mating our system with a female zebra finch, but 
that would presumably void our computer’s warrantee.   
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5.4 Summary 
This chapter has demonstrated that the cross-modal clustering framework presented in 
Chapter 3 can be recursively reapplied to acquiring self-supervised sensorimotor control.  
We have developed architecture for this type of learning using an internal Cartesian 
theater to correlate the generation of motor activity with its perceived effects through 
cross-modal clustering.  This is possible because slices neither know nor care whether 
they represent sensory or motor data.  It is thus straightforward to seamlessly move 
between the two during clustering. 
We demonstrated this approach with a system that learns birdsong, following the 
developmental stages of a fledgling zebra finch.  This works suggests a number of other 
possible applications for learning motor control through observation, among the most 
common forms of learning in the animal world.    
The benefits of self-supervised learning for artificial sensorimotor systems are enormous 
because engineered approaches tend to be ad hoc and error prone; additionally, in 
sensorimotor learning we generally have no adequate models to specify the desired 
input/output behaviors for our systems.  As we mentioned in Chapter 1, the notion of 
programming by example is nowhere truer than in the developmental mimicry 
widespread in animal kingdom, and this chapter is a significant step in that direction for 
providing that capability to artificial sensorimotor systems. 
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Chapter 6  
Biological and Perceptual Connections 
The chapter connects the computational framework introduced in this thesis to a modern 
understanding of perception in biological systems.  In doing so, we motivate the approach 
taken here and simultaneously suggest how this work may reciprocally contribute 
towards a better computational understanding of biological perception.  We begin by 
examining the interaction between sensory systems during the course of ordinary 
perception. 
 
6.1 Sensory Background 
Who would question that our senses are distinct?  We see, we feel, we hear, we smell, 
and we taste, and these are qualitatively such different experiences that there is no room 
for confusion among them. Even those affected with the peculiar syndrome synesthesia, 
in which real perceptions in one sense are accompanied by illusory ones in another, never 
lose awareness of the distinctiveness of the senses involved.  Consider the woman 
described in (Cytowic 2002), for whom a particular taste always induced the sensation of 
 
Figure 6.1 - Cross-modal matching: a subject is asked to use haptic (e.g., tactile) cues to select an object 
matching a visual stimulus.  From (Stein and Meredith 1993). 
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a specific, corresponding geometric object in her left hand.  A strange occurrence indeed, 
but nonetheless, the tasting and touching – however illusory – were never confused; they 
were never merged into a sensation the rest of us could not comprehend, as would be the 
case, for example, had the subject said something tasted octagonal.  Even among those 
affected by synesthesia, sensory perceptions remain extremely well defined. 
Given that our senses appear so unitary, how then does the brain coordinate and combine 
information from different sensory modalities?  This has become known as the binding 
problem (see Wolfe and Cave 2000 for a review), and the classical assumption has been 
to assume that the sensory streams are abstracted, merged, and integrated in the cortex, at 
the highest levels of brain functioning.  This hypothesis assumed a cognitive 
developmental process in which children slowly developed high-level mappings between 
innately distinct modalities through their interactions with the world.   
We may examine this assumption in context of the most frequently studied of 
intersensory phenomena, cross-modal matching, which is determining that perceptions in 
two different sensory modalities could have the same source.  Figure 6.1 shows a 
standard experimental matching task, in which a subject is asked to use tactile cues to 
select an object matching a visual stimulus.  The actual mechanisms that make cross-
modal matching possible are unknown, but clearly, sufficient correspondences between 
the modalities must exist to enable making this type of equivalency judgment.  Whatever 
form these correspondences take – whether through topographic maps, amodal perceptual 
interlinguas, or other representations – is according to Piaget (1954), among many others, 
developed slowly through experience.  Only when the involved senses have developed to 
the point of descriptional (i.e., representational) parity, can these interrelations develop 
and cross-modal matching thereby take place.  
This position directly traces back to Helmholtz (1884) and even earlier, to Berkeley 
(1709) and Locke (1690), who believed that neonatal senses are congenitally separate and 
interrelated only through experience.  According to this viewpoint, the interrelation does 
not diminish the distinctiveness of the senses themselves, it merely accounts for 
correspondences among them based on perceived co-occurrences.  This was seemingly a 
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very intuitive foundational assumption for studying perception.  Unlike so much of the 
rest of human cognition, we can be introspective about how we perceive the world.  Are 
not our sensory systems innately designed to bring themselves to our attention? 
 
6.2 Intersensory Perception 
Unfortunately for this introspective approach to perception, an overwhelming body of 
evidence has been gathered in the past half century demonstrating that perceptions 
themselves emerge as the integrated products of a surprising diversity of components.  
(For surveys, see Stein and Meredith 1993, Lewkowicz and Lickliter 1994, Rock 1997, 
Shimojo and Shams 2001, Calvert et al. 2004, and Spence and Driver 2004.)  Our 
auditory, olfactory, proprioceptive, somatosensory, vestibular, and visual systems 
influence one another in complex interactive processes rarely subject to conscious 
introspection.  In fact, the results can often be completely counterintuitive. Perception is 
such a fundamental component of our experience that we seldom give its mechanisms 
any direct attention.  It is the perceptions produced by these mechanisms that draw our 
attention, not the mechanisms themselves, and we are ill equipped to examine the 
mechanisms directly without the aid of clever, sometimes even serendipitous, 
experimentation.  In Gibson's (1950) view, perceivers are aware of the world, not their 
own perceptions.2   
For example, let us consider the well-known work of McGurk and MacDonald (1976), 
who studied how infants perceive speech during different periods of development.  In 
preparing an experiment to determine how infants reconcile conflicting information in 
different sensory modalities, they had a lab technician dub the audio syllable /ba/ onto a 
video of someone saying the syllable /ga/.  Much to their surprise, upon viewing the 
dubbed video, they repeatedly and distinctly heard the syllable /da/ (alternatively, some 
hear /tha/), corresponding neither to the actual audio nor video sensory input.  Initial 
                                                 
2 One may contrast this with Russell's (1913) criticism of "materialistic monism," in which he argues that 
abstract, self-aware mental models are an essential component of perception.  This distinction, in the guise 
of the Physical Symbol System Hypothesis (Miller, Galanter, and Pribram 1960, Newell and Simon 1976), 
has been the subject of intense scrutiny within the artificial intelligence community (e.g., Johnson-Laird 
1983, Brooks 1990a). 
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assumptions that this was due to an error on the part of the technician were easily 
discounted simply by shutting their eyes while watching the video; immediately, the 
sound changed to a /ba/.  This surprising fused perception, subsequently verified in 
numerous redesigned experiments and now known as the McGurk effect, is robust and 
persists even when subjects are aware of it. 
The McGurk effect is among the most convincing demonstration of the intersensory 
nature of face-to-face spoken language and the undeniable ability of one modality to 
radically change perception in another.  It has been one of many components leading to 
the reexamination of the introspective approach to perception.  Although it may appear 
reasonable to relegate intersensory processing to the cortex for the reasoning (as opposed 
to perceptual) processes involved in the cross modal matching experiments described 
above, it becomes far more implausible in cases where different senses impinge upon 
each other in ways that locally change the perceptions in the sensory apparatus 
themselves.   
One might object that the McGurk effect is pathological – it describes a perceptual 
phenomenon outside of ordinary experience.  Only within controlled, laboratory 
conditions do we expect to have such grossly conflicting sensory inputs; obviously, were 
these signals to co-occur naturally in the real world, we would not call them conflicting.  
We can refute this objection both because the real world is filled with ambiguous, 
sometimes directly conflicting, perceptual events, and because the McGurk effect is by 
no means the only example of its kind.  There is a large and growing body of evidence 
that the type of direct perceptual influence illustrated by the McGurk effect is 
commonplace in much of ordinary human and more generally animal perception, and it 
 
 
Figure 6.2 - The McGurk Effect.  Disparate auditory and visual inputs can create perceptions corresponding 
to neither.  Picture is from (Haskins 2005). 
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strongly makes the case that our perceptual streams are far more interwoven than 
conscious experience tends to make us aware.  In this, the McGurk effect is unusual in 
that the conflicting audio and visual inputs create perceptions corresponding to neither 
actual input.  More typically, sensory systems influence (e.g., enhance, degrade, change) 
perceptions in one another and at times, substitute for each other as well, by transferring 
perceptual information across modalities (Calvert et al. 2004). 
An example of one sense enhancing another occurs all the time in noisy environments.  
The sight of someone’s moving lips in an environment with significant background noise 
makes it easier to understand what the speaker is saying; visual cues – e.g., the sight of 
lips – can alter the signal-to-noise ratio of an auditory stimulus by 15-20 decibels (Sumby 
and Pollack 1954).  Tied in with audio source separation, this phenomenon is commonly 
known as the cocktail party effect (Cherry 1953).  We see, therefore, that a decrease in 
auditory acuity can be offset by increased reliance on visual input.  In fact, it has long 
been known that watching the movement of a speaker’s lips helps people understand 
what is being said: Juan Pablo Bonet wrote in his 1620 classic “Simplification of Sounds 
and the Act of Teaching the Deaf to Speak,” (cited in Bender 1981, p41):  
“For the deaf to understand what is said to them by the motions of the lips 
there is no teaching necessary; indeed to attempt to teach them it would be a 
very imperfect thing ...to enable the deaf-mute to understand by the lips alone, 
as it is well known many of them have done, cannot be performed by 
teaching, but only by great attention on their part…” 
Although the neural substrate behind this interaction is unknown, it has been determined 
that just the sight of moving lips – without any audio component – modifies activity in 
the auditory cortex (Sams et al. 1991, Calvert et al. 1997).  Furthermore, psycholinguistic 
evidence has long supported the belief that lip-read and heard speech share a degree of 
common processing, notwithstanding the obvious differences in their sensory channels 
(Dodd et al. 1984).   
Examples of senses substituting for one another are commonplace, as when auditory and 
tactile cues replace visual ones in the dark; this is familiar to anyone who has walked 
through a dark room with outstretched, waving arms and hyper-attentive ears.  A far more 
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interesting example is seen in a phenomenon known as the “facial vision” of the blind.  In 
locating objects, blind people often have the impression of a slight touch on their 
forehead, cheeks, and sometimes chest, as though being touched by a fine veil or cobweb 
(James 1890, Kohler 1967).  Consider this quote contained in James (1890, p.204), from 
a blind author of the time: 
“Whether within a house or in the open air, whether walking or standing still, 
I can tell, although quite blind, when I am opposite an object, and can 
perceive whether it be tall or short, slender or bulky.  I can also detect whether 
it be a solitary object or a continuous fence; whether it be a close fence or 
composed of open rails, and often whether it be a wooden fence, a brick or 
stone wall, or a quick-set hedge. …The sense of hearing has nothing to do 
with it, as when snow lies thickly on the ground objects are more distinct, 
although the footfall cannot be heard.  I seem to perceive objects through the 
skin on my face, and to have the impressions immediately transmitted to the 
brain.” 
 
The explanation for this extraordinary perceptory capability had long been a subject of 
fanciful debate.  James demonstrated, by stopping up the ears of blind subjects with 
putty, that audition was behind this sense, which is now known to be caused by intensity, 
direction, and frequency shifts of reflected sounds (Cotzin and Dallenbach 1950, Hoshino 
and Kuroiwa 2001).  The auditory input is so successfully represented haptically in the 
case of facial vision that the perceiver himself cannot identify the source of his 
perceptions. 
There is no doubt that we constantly make use of intersensory cues during perception and 
in directing our attention, and when deprived of these cues, through artificially contrived 
or naturally occurring circumstances, can display marked degradation in what seem to us 
conceptually and functionally isolated sensory systems.  The breadth of these interactions 
and the range of influences they demonstrate have been so surprising that they have 
called for radically new approaches to understanding how our individual perceptual 
systems work, how the brain merges their perceptions, and why these two questions are 
inseparable. 
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6.3 The Relevance 
Why should this reexamination of sensory independence concern us?  We believe the 
answer stems from the fact that the early assumption of perceptual isolation underlies 
nearly all modern interactive systems – it remains the primary architectural metaphor for 
multimodal integration.  The unfortunate consequence of this has been making 
integration a post-perceptual process, which assembles and integrates sensory input after 
the fact, in a mechanism separate from perception itself.  Modern psychophysical, 
neuroanatomical, evolutionary, and phenomenological evidence paints a very different 
picture of how animals, including humans, merge their senses; the notion that the senses 
are processed in isolation is highly implausible.  Much of this evidence also undermines 
classical symbol-processing models of perception (e.g., Fodor and Pylyshyn 1998), where 
cognitivist assumptions can obscure rather than illuminate the subtle intersensory 
perceptual mechanisms we are interested in here.   
 
6.3.1 Perception in Pipelines 
Computational approaches to perception have traditionally been bottom-up, feeding raw 
perceptual inputs into abstraction pipelines, as show in Figure 6.3.  In these frameworks, 
a pipeline is constructed through functional composition of increasingly high-level 
feature detectors.  This approach is apparent in some of the earliest work in 
computational object recognition (Horn 1970, Binford 1971, Agin 1972).  It is also 
explicitly reflected in the perceptual theories described by Marr (1976, 1982), Minsky 
(1987), and Ullman (1998), as well as in the subsumption architecture of Brooks (1986) 
for sensorimotor control.3 
Early approaches to artificial perception focused exclusively on modeling aspects of 
individual modalities in isolation, although the potential for more complex multimodal 
interactions drew the imaginations of early researchers (Turing 1950, Selfridge 1955).  
Among the first efforts to create a user interface that combined two independent 
                                                 
3 Note that both Ullman and Brooks make extensive use of top-down feedback to govern their bottom-up 
processing. 
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perceptual channels was that of Bolt (1980).  His "Put-that-there" system (Figure 6.4) 
enabled users to interact with projected maps by speaking and pointing simultaneously.  
Bolt's system resolved spoken deictic references involving identity ("that") and location 
("there") by visually observing the pointing gestures that accompanied them.  Deictic 
gesture resolution has subsequently become a very popular application for multimodal 
user-interface development (e.g., Oviatt et al. 2003, Kumar et al. 2004). 
Another significant application combining separate modalities is lip-reading, which has  
become perhaps the most studied problem in the computational multimodal literature 
(e.g., Mase and Pentland 1990, Massaro et al. 1993, Brooke and Scott 1994, Bregler and 
Konig 1994, Benoît 1995, Hennecke et al. 1996, Bangalore and Johnston 2000, Huang et 
al. 2003, Potamianos et al. 2004).  This is due both to the historic prominence of 
automatic speech recognition in computational perception and more importantly, to the 
inherent difficulty of recognizing unconstrained speech.  We note that the robotics 
community was perhaps the first to realize that combining multiple sensory channels 
could increase overall perceptual reliability (Nilson 1984, Flynn 1985, Brooks 1986).  
However, in these systems, sensors would substitute for one another depending upon 
context; in other words, one sensor would be used at a time and a robot would 
dynamically switch between them.  Speechreading systems were the first multimodal 
 
 
Figure 6.3 – Unimodal processing pathways.  Individual modalities are processed in specialized pipelines.  
The visual pathway on the left uses 3-dimensional depth and color maps to find candidate regions for 
locating faces.  (Modeled after Darrell et al. 1999.)  The auditory pathway on the right performs speech 
recognition.  (Modeled after Jelinek 1997.)  Notice in this example that higher-level syntactic constraints 
can feed back into the lower-level morphological and phonetic analyses. 
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approaches that sought to increase perceptual accuracy by simultaneously combining 
information from complementary sensory channels.  This is in contrast with the more 
typical goal of multimodal user-interface design, which is to make human-computer 
interaction more natural for people by providing additional input modalities such as 
pointing or context-awareness (Dey et al. 2001).   
In recent years, a wide range of multimodal research areas has emerged, many of which 
were inspired by Weiser's (1991, 1994) notion of ubiquitous computing.  These include 
intelligent environments (Coen 1999, Vanderheiden et al. 2005), wearable computing 
(Starner 1999), physiological monitoring (Intille et al. 2003, Sung and Pentland 2005), 
ambient intelligence (Remagnino et al. 2005), multimodal design (Adler and Davis 
2004), and affective computing (Picard 1997).   Additionally, we note that roboticists 
have a long tradition of combining multimodal perception with sensorimotor control (see 
the references above, along with Brooks et al. 1998, Thrun et al. 2005). 
 
 
 
                                  
 
 
Figure 6.4 – An early multimodal user-interface.  The "Put-that-there" system combined speech processing 
and visual gesture recognition to resolve spoken deictic references to a projected map.  From (Bolt 1980). 
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6.3.2 Classical Architectures 
Surprisingly, even though all of the above applications address a diverse assortment of 
computational problems, their implementations have similar – sometimes almost identical 
– architectures.  Namely, they share a common framework where sensory inputs are 
individually processed in isolated, specialized pathways (Figure 1.2).  Each perceptual 
pipeline then outputs an abstract description of what it sees, hears, senses, etc.  This 
description captures detail sufficient for higher-level manipulation of perceptions, while 
omitting the actual signal data and intermediate analytic representations.  Typically, the 
perceptual subsystems are independently developed and trained on unimodal data; in 
other words, each system is designed to work in isolation.  They are then interconnected 
through some fusive mechanism that combines temporally proximal, abstract unimodal 
inputs into some integrated event model.   
The integration itself may be effected in many different ways.  These include: 
multilayered neural networks (Waibel et al. 1995); hidden Markov models (Stork and 
Hennecke 1996); coupled hidden Markov models (Nefian et al. 2002); dynamic Bayesian 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5 – Classical post-perceptual integration in multimodal systems.  Here, auditory (A) and visual 
(V) inputs pass through specialized unimodal processing pathways and are combined via an integration 
mechanism, which creates multimodal perceptions by extracting and reconciling data from the individual 
channels.  Integration can happen earlier (a) or later (b).  Hybrid architectures are also common.  In (c), 
multiple pathways process the visual input and are pre-integrated before the final integration step; for 
example, the output of this preintegration step could be spatial localization derived solely through visual 
input.  This diagram is modeled after (Stork and Hennecke 1996). 
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networks (Wang et al. 2005); unification logics (Cohen et al. 1997); Harmony theory 
(Smolensky 1986); posterior probabilities (Wu et al. 1999); fuzzy logic (Massaro 1998); 
maximally informative joint subspaces (Fisher et al. 2001); recurrent mixture models 
(Hsu and Ray 1999); subsumption architectures (Brooks 1986); agent hierarchies 
(Minsky 1986); partially observable Markov decision processes (Lopez et al 2003); 
layered topographic maps (Coen 2001); and various ad hoc techniques, which tend to be 
the most popular (e.g., Bobick et al. 1998).  The integrated events themselves have 
specialized representations, which may be multimodal, in that they explicitly represent 
information gathered from separate modalities, or they may be amodal, in that they 
represent features not tied to any specific perceptual channel.  For example, intensity is an 
amodal feature, because it can be measured independently of any sensory system, 
whereas deictic references are inherently multimodal, because they consist of co-
occurrences of two distinct modal cues, namely, of speech and gesture.  The output of the 
integration process, whether amodal or multimodal, is then fed into some higher-level 
interpretative mechanism – the architectural equivalent of a cortex.  
 
6.3.3 What's Missing Here? 
This post-perceptual approach to integration is commonplace in engineered systems.  It 
suffers, however, from a number of serious flaws: 
1) As we saw earlier in this chapter, the evidence is strongly against animals 
perceiving this way.  Perceptual modalities interact constantly during ordinary 
perception, and even unimodal perception has strong multimodal components.  
That is not to say that all perception must be multimodal.  Nonetheless, symbiotic 
interactions between sensory systems go a long way toward explaining why 
perception is so robust in biological systems, in marked contrast with their 
engineered counterparts.  Because the individual components of multimodal 
systems in these architectures tend to be independently designed, they are both 
representationally and algorithmically incompatible with one another.  Therefore, 
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it is often extraordinarily difficult to enable information sharing among them after 
the fact.  We return to this point below. 
2) Integration in these models happens too late.  Integration occurs after each system 
has already “decided” what it has perceived, when it is too late for intersensory 
influence to affect the individual concurrent perceptions.  This is due to the 
information loss from both vector quantization and the explicit abstraction 
fundamental to the pipeline design. 
3) Biological sensory systems are perceptually impoverished – they are incapable of 
simultaneously detecting all sensible events to which they are exposed.  Instead, 
they exhibit attentive focusing, which narrows their windows of sensory 
awareness and thereby increases sensory discrimination.  This prevents seemingly 
chaotic composite signals from impinging upon the sensory cortex, and this 
mechanism is thought to be responsible for the coherence in our generation of 
perceptual scenes.  However, it simultaneously requires that something guides this 
focus.  For example, saccadic behavior in the eye enables perception of a large 
image, overcoming the retina's narrow foveal limits.  However, without highly 
informed sampling, key details may be missed simply because they are never 
observed.  Many of our perceptual channels have similar attentive mechanisms 
(Naeaetaenen et al. 2001), of which we are generally not consciously aware.   
Importantly for us, the cues which guide attentive focusing are frequently 
generated cross-modally (Driver et al. 2005). The role of attentive focusing in 
eliminating extraneous sensory detail appears to be a basic component of robust 
animal perception.  Representational and algorithmic incompatibilities make this 
type of cross-modal influence implausible in many engineered systems. 
4) The independence between sensory components in classical architectures 
precludes mutual bootstrapping, such as with the cross-modal clustering of 
Chapter 3.  Since these systems tend to be developed separately and connected 
only at their outputs, there is no possibility of perceptually grounding them based 
on naturally occurring temporal correspondences, to which they may remain 
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totally oblivious.  Furthermore, the derivation of common perceptual categories 
provided by cross-modal clustering would help alleviate the representational 
incompatibility raised above in (1).  Preventing this common grounding simply 
exacerbates the problem. 
We note that early integration (Figure 6.5a) would seem to bypass perceptual isolation by 
combining sensory streams at a low-level feature (or sometimes, even signal) level.  It 
does so, however, at the cost of losing the domain structuring, high-level feature 
extraction, and dimensional reduction explicitly provided by the abstraction-based, 
pipeline architectures that are ubiquitous in encephalized species.  Early integration has 
shown much promise with problems amenable to information theoretic and statistical 
approaches where there is little available domain knowledge.  However, the majority of 
multisensory problems of interest in this thesis do not appear to fit into this category.  
When combining sensory information, structured domain knowledge, as described by 
Wertheimer (1923), Chomsky and Halle (1968), and Marr (1982) along with many others 
– and as implied by the Ugly Duckling Theorem (Watanabe 1985) – is essential for 
reducing the size of perceptual search spaces.  It is doubtful that a wide range of 
interesting sensory phenomena can be detected without it, particularly given the roles of 
context and expectation in perceptual interpretation, even in relatively simple tasks 
(Bruner and Postman 1949), and the computational intractability of directly describing 
complex perceptual phenomena in terms of raw sensory input or low level features.  
Early integration generally also precludes the possibility of top-down processing models, 
such as with the visual sequence seeking approach in (Ullman 1996) or in various 
approaches to auditory scene analysis (e.g., Slaney 1995).   
The approach taken in this thesis is not motivated by the idea that computational systems 
should use biologically-inspired mechanisms simply for the sake of doing so.  Rather, 
there are two justifications for the path taken here: (1) the perceptual phenomena we are 
interested in computationally understanding are complex amalgams of mutually 
interacting sensory input streams – they are not end-state combinations of unimodal 
abstractions or features.  Therefore, they cannot be accurately represented or described by 
mechanisms that make this assumption; and (2) biological systems use low-level sensory 
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integration to handle a vast array of perceptual ambiguity and "errors."  In designing 
robust artificial perceptual systems, it would be a poor design to ignore Nature’s schema 
for interpretative stabilization.  This is all the more so given the relatively fragility and 
high degree of error in our best computational methods for processing unimodal data 
streams.  We believe that the current approach to building multimodal interfaces is an 
artifact of how people like to build symbol processing systems and not at all well-suited 
to dealing with the cross-modal interdependencies of perceptual understanding.  
Perception does not seem to be entirely amenable to the clear-cut abstraction barriers that 
computer scientists find so valuable for solving other problems, and approaching it as if it 
were has lead to the fragility of current multimodal systems. 
Modern multimodal systems tend towards being inflexible and unpredictable and require 
structured, typically scripted, interactions.  Each of these interactions is subject to what 
may be deemed the weakest link effect, in which every modality must receive input just 
so, i.e., exactly as expected, in order for the overall system to function.  The addition of 
new modalities tends to weaken, rather than strengthen interactive systems, as additional 
inputs simply offer new opportunities for interpretive errors and combinatorially increase 
the complexity of fusing perceptions.  From a biological perspective, this is exactly the 
opposite of what one should expect.  Additional modalities should strengthen perceptual 
systems by capitalizing on the inherent multimodal nature of events in the real world and 
the mutual reinforcement between interconnected sensory channels.  Modern multimodal 
systems suffer an unfortunate fate predicted by von Neumann (1956), where adding 
additional components reduces a system’s inherent stability. 
Research on perceptual computing has focused almost entirely on unimodal perception: 
the isolated analysis of auditory, linguistic, visual, haptic, and to a lesser degree biometric 
data.  It seems to put the proverbial cart before the horse to ponder how information from 
different modalities can be merged while the perceptory mechanisms in the sensory 
channels are themselves largely unknown.  Is it not paradoxical to suggest we should or 
even could study integration without thoroughly understanding the individual systems to 
be integrated?  Nonetheless, that is the course taken here.  We argue that while trying to 
understand the processing performed within individual sensory channels, we must 
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simultaneously ask how their intermediary results and final products are merged into an 
integrated perceptual system.  We believe that because perceptual systems within a given 
species coevolved to interoperate, compatibility pressures existed on their choices of 
internal representations and processing mechanisms.  In other words, to explain the types 
of intersensory influences that have been discovered experimentally, disparate perceptual 
mechanisms must have some degree of overall representational and algorithmic 
compatibility that makes this influence possible.   
Our approach is gestalt, not only from a Gibsonian (1986) perspective, but also because 
there are few, if any, known examples of complex unimodal sensory systems evolving in 
isolation.  Even the relatively simple perceptual mechanisms in paramecium (Stein and 
Meredith 1994, Chapter 2) and sponges (Mackie and Singla 1983) have substantial cross-
sensory interactions.  It seems that perceptual interoperation is a prerequisite for the 
development of complex perceptual systems.  Thus, rather than study any single 
perceptual system in depth – the traditional approach – we prefer to study them in 
breadth, by elucidating and analyzing interactions between different sensory systems.  
We believe these interactions make possible the co-evolution that leads to complex 
perceptual mechanisms, without which, they would not otherwise arise.  This approach is 
similar in spirit to the work of (Atkeson et al. 2000, Brooks et al. 1998, Cheng and 
Kuniyoshi 2000, Ferrell 1996, and Sandini et al. 1997).  Although they are primarily 
concerned with motor coordination, there is a common biological inspiration and long-
term goal to use knowledge of human and animal neurophysiology to design more 
sophisticated artificial systems. 
 
6.4 Our Direct Motivation 
 
The examples for our discussion of multimodal interactions will be drawn from a 
previous research project known as the Intelligent Room, as described in (Coen 1998, 
1999).  The Intelligent Room provided a framework for examining fundamental issues in 
multimodal integration – most importantly for this thesis: how can independently 
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designed perceptual systems be made to work together?  This question proved 
surprisingly difficult to answer.  To see why, we now examine two simple multimodal 
interactions that were implemented in the room.  Much of this section previously 
appeared in (Coen 2001). 
The Intelligent Room had multiple perceptual user interfaces to connect with some of the 
ordinary human-level events going on within it.  The goal of the room was to support 
people engaged in everyday, traditionally non-computational activity in both work and 
leisure contexts.  The room contained nine video cameras, three of which it could actively 
steer, several microphones, and a large number of computer-interfaced devices.  Its 
computational infrastructure (Coen et al. 1999), consisting of over 120 software agents 
running on a network of ten workstations, was housed in an adjacent laboratory to 
enhance the room’s appeal as a naturally interactive space. 
Before exploring how novel intersensory influences might have been incorporated into a 
system such as the Intelligent Room, we first examine a traditional and explicit 
multimodal interaction, with the resolution of a deictic reference, e.g., use of a word such 
as this in referring to a member of some class of objects.  Suppose, for example, someone 
inside the room said, “Computer, dim this lamp.”  The room used its ability to track its 
occupants, in conjunction with a map of its own layout, to dim the lamp closest to the 
speaker when the verbal command was uttered.  This kind of interaction was 
implemented with a simple, post-perceptual integration mechanism that reconciled 
location information obtained from the person tracker with the output of a speech 
recognition system.  Here, multimodal integration of positional and speech information 
allowed straightforward disambiguation of the deictic lamp reference.  Given the 
simplicity of this example, it seems far from obvious that a more complex integration 
mechanism might have been called for.  To motivate a more involved treatment, we start 
by examining some of the problems with current approaches to perceptual computing. 
Despite many recent and significant advances, computer vision and speech 
understanding, along with many other perceptual research areas (Picard 1997, 
Oviatt 2002) are still infant sciences.  The non-trivial perceptual components of 
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multimodal systems are therefore never perfect and are subject to a wide variety of failure 
modes.  For example, the Intelligent Room sometimes "lost" people while visually 
tracking them, due to occlusion, coincidental color matches between fore and background 
objects, unfavorable lighting conditions, etc.  Perceptual components can also dictate sets 
of environmental conditions that are required for proper operation.  For vision systems, 
these may include assumptions about brightness levels, object size, image backgrounds, 
scene complexity, pose, etc.  Although the particular failure modes of computational 
perceptual systems varies with them individually, one may assume that under a wide 
variety of conditions any one of them may temporarily stop working as desired.  How 
these systems manifest this undesired operation is itself highly idiosyncratic.  Some may 
simply provide no information, for example, a speech recognition system confused by a 
foreign accent.  Far more troublesome are those that continue to operate as if nothing 
were amiss but simply provide incorrect data, such as a vision-based tracking system that 
mistakes a floor lamp for a person and reports that he is standing remarkably still.   
Unimodal systems also suffer from what might be deemed perceptual impoverishment.  
They implement single, highly specific perceptual capabilities, such as locating people 
within a room, using individual (or far less often, a small number of) recognition 
paradigms, such as looking for their faces.  They are oblivious to phenomena outside of 
their perceptual scope, even if these phenomena are indicative of events or conditions 
they are intended to recognize.   
That perceptual systems have a variety of failure modes is not confined to their artificial 
instantiations.  Biological systems also display a wide range of pathological conditions, 
many of which are so engrained that they are difficult to notice.  These include 
limitations in innate sensory capability, as with visual blind spots on the human retina, 
and limited resources while processing sensory input, as with our linguistic difficultly 
understanding nested embedded clauses (Miller and Chomsky 1963).  Cross-modal 
perceptual mechanisms have evolved to cope both with innate physiological limitations 
and specific environmental constraints.  Stein and Meredith (1994) argue for the 
evolutionary advantages of overlapping and reinforcing sensory abilities; they reduce 
dependence on specific environmental conditions and reliance on unique perceptual 
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pathways and thereby provide clear survival advantages.   The facial vision of the blind 
discussed earlier is an extreme example of this kind of reinforcement.  Generally, the 
influences are more subtle, never bringing themselves to our attention, but demonstrably 
a fundamental component of perception nonetheless. 
Given their role in biological systems, one might assume cross-modal influences could 
provide similar benefit in artificial systems such as an Intelligent Room.  How then 
should we go about incorporating them?  Answering this question is a two-step process.  
Because the Intelligent Room was an engineered as opposed to an evolved system, we 
would first needed to explicitly find potential synergies between its modalities that could 
have been exploited.  Ideally, these influences would be learned, an approach the 
influence network model enables, but here we examine how this would be done in the 
absence of a such a model, where the synergies must be identified manually.  Once 
identified, these synergies must then somehow be incorporated (i.e., reverse engineered) 
into the overall system.  At the time, this emerged as the primary obstacle to integrating 
cross-modal influences into the Intelligent Room and more generally, into other types of 
engineered interactive systems.  Reverse-engineering intersensory influences into 
systems not designed with them in mind can be convoluted at best and impossible at 
worst. 
 
6.4.1 Two Examples of Cross-Modal Influence 
To examine these issues in more detail, we start with the following empirical and 
complementary observations: 
1) People tend to talk about objects they are near. (Figure 6.6a)  
2) People tend to be near objects they talk about.  (Figure 6.6b) 
 
These heuristics reflect a relationship between a person’s location and what that person is 
referring to when he speaks; knowing something about one of them provides some degree 
of information about the other.  For example, someone walking up to a video display of a 
map is potentially likely to speak about the map, as in Figure 6a; here, person location 
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data can inform a speech model.  Conversely, someone who speaks about a displayed 
map is likely to be in a position to see it, as illustrated in Figure 6b; here, speech data can 
inform a location model.  Of course, it is easy to imagine situations where these heuristics 
are wrong.  Nonetheless, in our experience they are empirically valid, so how could we 
have incorporated influences based on them into a system such as an Intelligent Room?   
Mechanistically, we might imagine the person tracking system exchanging information 
with the speech recognition system.  For example, the tracking system might provide 
hints to the speech recognition system to preferentially expect utterances involving 
objects the person is near, such as a displayed map.  Conversely, we could also imagine 
that the speech recognition system would send hints to the person tracking system to be 
especially observant looking for someone in indicated sections of the room, based on 
what that person is referring to in his speech. 
a) 
Map
 
 
b) 
Map
 
 
 
Figure 6.6a (top) – People talk about objects they are near.  Someone approaching a projected display 
showing a map, for example, is more likely to make a geographical utterance.  Here, location information 
can augment speech recognition. 
 
Figure 6.6b (bottom) – People are near objects they talk about.  Someone speaking about the contents of a 
video display is likely to be located somewhere (delineated by the triangle) from which the display is 
viewable.  Here, speech information can augment person tracking. 
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This seems reasonable until we try to build a system that works this way.  There are both 
representational and algorithmic stumbling blocks that make this conceptually 
straightforward cross-modal information sharing difficult to implement.  These are due 
not only to post-perceptual architectural integration, but also to how the perceptual are 
themselves typically created for use in post-perceptual systems.  We first examine issues 
of representational compatibility, the interlingua used to represent shared information, 
and then address how the systems could incorporate hints they receive in this interlingua 
into their algorithmic models.   
Consider a person tracking system that provides the coordinates of people within a room 
in real-time, relative to some real-world origin; the system outputs the actual locations of 
the room’s occupants.  We will refer to the tracking system in the Intelligent Room as a 
representative example of other such systems (e.g., Wren et al. 1997, Gross et al. 2000).  
Its only inputs were stereo video cameras and its sole output were sets of (x,y,z) tuples 
representing occupants’ centroid head coordinates, which were generated at 20Hz.  
Contrast this with the room’s speech recognition system, which was based upon the Java 
Speech API (Sun 2001) using IBM’s ViaVoice platform and was typical of similar 
hidden Markov model based spoken language systems (Jelinek 1997).  Its inputs were 
audio voice signals and a formal linguistic model of expected utterances, which were 
represented as probabilistically weighted context free grammars.  Its outputs were sets of 
parse trees representing what was heard, along with the system’s confidence levels that 
the spoken utterances were interpreted correctly.  
How then should these two systems have exchanged information?  It does not seem 
plausible from an engineering perspective, whether in natural or artificial systems, to 
have provided each modality with access to the internal representations of the other.   
Thus, we do not expect that a tracking system would know anything about linguistic 
models nor we do expect the language system would be skilled in spatial reasoning and 
representation.  Even were we to suppose the speech recognition system could somehow 
represent spatial coordinates, the example in Figure 6b above involves regions of space, 
not isolated point coordinates.  From an external point of view, it is not obvious how the 
tracking system internally represents regions, presuming it even has that capability in the 
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first place.  The complementary example of how the tracking system might refer to 
classes of linguistic utterances is similarly convoluted. 
Unfortunately, even were this interlingua problem easily solved and the subsystems had a 
common language for representing information, the way perceptual subsystems are 
generally implemented would make incorporation of cross-modal data difficult or 
impossible.  For example, in the case of a person tracking system, the real-world body 
coordinates are generated via three-dimensional spatial reconstruction based on 
correspondences between sets of image coordinates.  The common techniques for 
computing the reconstructed coordinates, such as neural networks or fit polynomials, are 
in a sense closed – once the appropriate coordinate transform has been learned, there is 
generally no way to bias the transformation in favor of particular points or spatial 
regions.  Thus, there is no way to incorporate the influence, even if the systems had a 
common way of encoding it.  Here again, the complementary situation with influencing 
speech recognition from a tracking system can be similarly intractable.  For example, not 
all linguistic recognition models support dynamic, preferential weightings for classes of 
commonly themed utterances.  So, even if the tracking system could somehow 
communicate what the speech recognition system should expect to hear, the speech 
recognition system might not be able to do anything useful with this information. 
We see that not only are the individual modal representations incompatible, the 
perceptual algorithms (i.e., the computations that occur in the sensory pipelines) are 
incompatible as well.  This comes as no surprise given that these systems were 
engineered primarily for unimodal applications.  Unlike natural perceptual systems 
within an individual species, artificial perceptual systems do not co-evolve, and therefore, 
have had no evolutionary pressure to force representational and algorithmic 
compatibility.  These engineered systems are intended to be data sources feeding into 
other systems, such as the ones performing multimodal integration, that are intended to 
be data sinks.  There is no reason to expect that these perceptual subsystems would or 
even could directly interoperate. 
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6.5 Speculation on an Intersensory Model 
For disparate perceptual systems to interact, there must be some agreement – implicit or 
explicit – as to how they represent and process perceptual data.  The goal of this section 
is to motivate and briefly outline a model of intersensory perception that formalizes this 
notion of “agreement.”  The intent of the model is to allow us: (1) to formalize an 
understanding of cross-modal phenomena; and (2) to design artificial systems that exploit 
intersensory phenomena to increase the scope of their perceptual capabilities.  It provides 
the theoretical framework for evaluating influence networks and other approaches to 
intersensory integration, by describing essential phenomena that any integration scheme 
must somehow address.  In this sense, it also provides for the development of a 
competency test for the influence network approach described above.    
During the past century, research in intersensory processing has proceeded along two 
main avenues.  The first has been the design of experimental scenarios that reveal what 
are usually hidden cross-modal influences at the behavioral, and with adult humans, 
sometimes the conscious level.  The second has been based on intrusive physiologic 
examinations in animals that elucidate the cellular (in primitive organisms) and the 
neurological (in encephalized species) substrates of intersensory function.  Thus, a wide 
range of phenomenological cross-modal interactions has been described and some of the 
physiology behind them has been identified.  What has not been addressed in a general 
framework are the processes enabling intersensory influence and their implications to our 
understanding of the individual senses themselves. 
This chapter started by examining evidence that our senses are more interdependent than 
they seem on the surface.  Contrary to the understanding arrived at by introspection,  
perceptions are the products of complex interactions between our sensory channels.  
What, however, are the contents of these channels?  Returning to a question we asked in 
Chapter 1, how exactly should we understand what a sense is?  The common notion 
might be that a sense is the perceptual ability to interpret impressions received via a 
single sensory organ.  For example, vision is the ability to interpret waves of light 
impacting upon the retinas.  Viewed this way, each sense is defined by a wide gamut of 
sensitivities and abilities tied to a particular biological organ.  This view, however, is 
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misleading.  It appears instead that each sense is composed of a multitude of capabilities, 
some of which may be absent in particular individuals (e.g., loss of color perception or 
depth sensitivity in visual perception) and many of which operate independently.  The 
most persuasive case studies are drawn from experiments with the blind; even though 
they cannot see, their eyes can still respond to visual cues.  For example, people with 
cerebral cortex injuries rendering them perceptually blind are able to direct their eyes 
towards spots of light, even though they cannot consciously see these spots and think 
they are simply guessing (Poppel et al. 1981).  Their loss of visual perception has not 
hindered other unconscious visual processes, which have also been demonstrated in the 
normally sighted (Wolfe 1983).   
The blind can even experience visual cross-modal phenomena.  For example, a 
congenitally blind child has been shown to have convergence of the eyes in response to 
approaching sounds (Butterworth 1981), even though this convergence has no practical 
benefit.  The existence of independent visual processes has led to a more complex view 
of visual perception and makes it difficult to view vision as a monolithic capability; it 
seems instead to be an assortment of somewhat independent processes that have a single 
sensory organ, the eye, in common.  For this reason, although the modes (i.e., perceptual 
primitives) in multimodal perception are generally understood to correspond to different 
gross senses, e.g., vision, audition, proprioception, etc., we have found a finer grained 
definition more useful, in which the different perceptual capabilities of each sensory 
organ are treated as the individual modes, rather than taking the abstract function of that 
organ as a whole.  Aside from providing a clearer engineering viewpoint, this perspective 
allows us to make explicit what we will call the cross-modal influences between different 
perceptual pathways that start from the same sensory organ and would traditionally be 
considered to be within a single modality.   
Given this minimalist view of unimodal perception, we now outline the three types of 
cross-modal influence to be covered by the model.  This type of categorization has not 
been made in the multisensory literature, but it is well motivated by both 
phenomenological and neurological data.  Although the influences listed below appear to 
cover a variety of different phenomena, we will argue their primary distinction is 
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temporal and a single mechanism could account for many such influences within an 
artificial system.  Our categories of cross-modal influence are cueing, mutual influence, 
and resolution: 
 
1. Cueing occurs when a sensory system is biased in some way before a perceptual event 
due to cross-modal influences.  The most studied form of cueing is priming (Meyer and 
Schvaneveldt 1971), which is an increase in the speed or accuracy of a perceptual 
decision task, based on previous exposure to some of its content.  Although not 
necessarily intersensory, many priming experiments are conducted cross-modally.4    
Cueing is distinguished from priming because cueing removes any notion of perceptual 
correctness – influences that simply bias perceptual interpretation are included – and 
because cueing covers inhibitory, not just excitatory, influences.  Thus, accommodation 
experiments (Kohler 1964, Blake et al. 1981), in which prolonged or repeated exposures 
to sensory stimuli lead to modification in baseline perceptual responses, are also 
examples of cueing.  Kohler’s work is perhaps the best known example of these 
experiments, in which subjects gradually acclimate to the effects of wearing distortive 
spectacles, e.g., ones in which the left halves of the lens are blue and right halves are 
yellow.  Cueing is important for artificial perceptual systems because they rarely have 
any notion of how what they should expect to perceive changes over time and with 
contextual circumstances.   
 
2. Mutual influence occurs when a set of modalities interact in a dynamic feedback process 
during percept formation.  A wide range of interactions, particularly between the 
vestibular, visual, auditory, and proprioceptive systems have been studied, many of these 
investigated in depth because of the unusual effects of gravity on perception to pilots and 
astronauts.  For example, during high acceleration takeoffs, pilots can experience the 
sensation that their body is tilted backwards and their instrument panel is rising too 
quickly (Graybiel 1952).  They must learn to ignore these perceptions, because reacting 
to them could be life threatening.  In influences that have a visual component, it is not 
uncommon for the visual input to dominate the joint perceptual interpretation (Warren at 
al. 1981), as with the “ventriloquism effect” (Howard and Templeton 1966), where a 
                                                 
4 A mechanism accounting for priming, spreading activation (Collins and Loftus 1975, Collins and 
Quillian 1969), has been very influential in the development of the theory of semantic networks (e.g., 
Fahlman 1979) and in later perceptual theories, such as sequence seeking (Ullman 1996). 
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ventriloquist’s voice appears to emanate from a dummy’s mouth because its lips are 
moving rather than his.  However, the dominant modality in mutual influence is generally 
the one perceived most strongly (Welch and Warren 1986), and circumstances can 
uniquely exaggerate any modality to the point of perceptual dominance.   The McGurk 
effect discussed earlier is an unusual example of mutual influence where neither involved 
modality is dominant.  Evidence for mutual influence interactions has been found 
neurologically; in the thalamus, superior colliculus, and cerebral cortex, neurons respond 
to and integrate multisensory information in a time frame of 10s of milliseconds 
following stimulus presentation.  Therefore, components of multisensory processing 
occur long before perceptual and cognitive effects even begin (Meredith 2001).  Mutual 
influence is important for artificial perceptual systems because it allows unimodal 
systems to overcome perceptual impoverishment by supplementing their sensory input 
with indicative cross-modal data. 
 
3. Resolution occurs when a potentially ambiguous sensory input is crosschecked among 
parallel sensory input streams and potentially changed after percept formation.  
Resolution influences are reflexive and reactionary, as in those demonstrated in 
nociception (i.e., pain response) in rodents (Stein and Dixon 1978, Aury et al. 1991).   
Resolution influences specifically do not involve ratiocination; they are confined to 
perceptual channels and are therefore unconscious and automatic.  There is no direct 
awareness of the influence itself and it is not subject to willful control.  Many post-
perceptual intersensory influences do not meet these criteria, including explicit memory 
tests (Jacoby 1983) and cross-modal matching, and will not be considered here.  
Resolution is important for artificial perceptual systems because it can increase or 
decrease confidence in perceptions based on cross-modal agreement or conflict.  Modern 
interactive systems rarely have any way to self-validate their own operation or to adjust 
internal mechanisms (e.g., threshold values) without external supervision.  Biological 
systems have self-supervised plasticity, which provides a dynamic, adaptive fluidity 
unknown in artificial perception. 
 
How might these influences be effected in a perceptual system?  Even though the 
perceptual channels are themselves highly specialized, we argue that the mechanisms 
behind intersensory influence can be amodal to a far greater extent – there is less of a 
need for them to be dedicated to specific perceptual modes.  This position at first glance 
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is also hard to support.  Mechanistic specialization is so commonplace in biological 
systems, one can make the case that general-purpose, non-specific mechanisms need 
justification more so than do ad hoc ones (Gazzaniga 2000, Chomsky 2000).  Why then 
suppose there is an amodal component to intersensory influence?   
This question is somewhat misleading.  The brain, does, in fact, use amodal codings in 
perception, the most well known of these being the spatial representations in the sensory 
and motor maps of the superior colliculus, discussed in more detail below.  The superior 
colliculus is the only known region of the brain where auditory information is represented 
spatially, as opposed to tonotopically, and one may argue that the extraordinary 
specialization in this case is actually in the neurological mechanisms that determine 
spatial localization based on interaural time delays.  This elaborate calculation allows 
representation of auditory information in the superior colliculus’ common, amodal 
coordinate system.  It is precisely the mechanistic perceptual specialization here that 
allows a general-purpose, amodal system, such as the superior colliculus to exist. This 
can be seen identically with other specialized perceptory capabilities unique to given 
species that provide spatial localization, such as echolocation (bats), whisker 
displacement (rats and mice), acute audition (owls), infrared detection (rattlesnakes), and 
electroreception (fish) (Stein and Meredith, Chapter 6).  Perceptions in each of these 
animals are represented in common, amodal coordinate systems and support the view that 
perceptual specialization in no way precludes the existence of amodal representations. 
One may also more tentatively propose strong evolutionary advantages to amodal 
intersensory perception.  It allows incorporation of newly evolved or modified perceptual 
capabilities without requiring the development of specialized mechanisms that enable 
their participation in an intersensory perceptual system.  More generally, were the 
mechanisms for intersensory influence between each pair of modalities uniquely 
specified, there would be 2( )O n  of them required for a set of n modalities.  General-
purpose amodal mechanisms for effecting cross-modal influence would simplify this 
integration problem.  For this reason, one can take the position that regardless of how 
Nature proceeds, from an engineering perspective, the benefit provided by amodally 
effected intersensory influence is clear.  A general purpose mechanism for incorporating 
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individual sensory components into integrated, artificial perceptual systems would be 
very useful when building them.  This raises the question, however, of how does Nature 
proceed?  What is known about neural substrates of intersensory influence? 
Consider the effect of touching someone and having his eyes turn to determine the source 
of the stimulus.  This is an example of cross-modal influence – the position of the touch 
determines the foveation of the eyes – but it is different from the interaction described in 
the McGurk effect above.  The touch scenario leads to behavioral effects that center the 
stimulus with respect to the body and peripheral sensory organs.  In contrast, the McGurk 
effect is an example of sensory influence solely within perceptual channels and has no 
behavioral component.  Is this difference important?   
Motor influences – i.e., ones that cause attentive and orientation behaviors – are by far 
the more understood of the two.  The primary neurological substrate behind them is the 
superior colliculus (or optic tectum in non-mammalian vertebrates), a small region of the 
brain that produces signals that cross-modally orient peripheral sensory organs based on 
sensory input.  The superior colliculus contains layered, topographic sensory and motor 
maps that share a common rostral-caudal vs. medial-lateral coordinate system.  The maps 
so far elucidated are in register; that is, co-located positions in the real world – in the 
sensory case representing derived locations of perceptual inputs and in the motor case 
representing peripheral sensory organ motor coordinates that focus on those regions – are 
essentially vertically overlapping.  The actual mechanisms that use these maps to effect 
intersensory motor influence are currently unknown – variants on spreading vertical 
activation are suspected – but there is little doubt the maps’ organization is a fundamental 
component of that mechanism. 
Far less is known neurologically about semantic influences – i.e., ones that have internal 
effects confined to perceptual channels.  The superior colliculus itself has been directly 
approachable from a research perspective because the brain has dedicated inner space, 
namely, the tissue of the topographic maps, to representing the outer space of the real-
world.  The representation is both isomorphic and perspicacious and has made the 
superior colliculus uniquely amenable to study.  The perceptual, as opposed to spatial, 
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representations of the senses are far more elusive because they are specialized to the 
individual modalities and the organs that perceive them.  For example, the auditory 
system is organized at both the thalamic and cortical levels according to sound frequency 
whereas the retina organizes visual input spatiotopically (in retinocentric coordinates) and 
maintains this representation into the visual cortex.   
Although many of their neuroanatomical interconnections have been elucidated, how 
these systems actually share non-spatial perceptual information during intersensory 
influence is unknown.  The approach in this thesis has been to introduce the slice data 
structure in Chapter 3, which was inspired by the role of cortical topographic maps in 
equivalently organizing both sensory and motor information in animals.  Slices are 
inherently amodal and independent of the features they represent.  This, for example, 
enables them to freely share information between sensory and motor systems in learning 
birdsong, without requiring the development of new formalisms or representations.  
By treating slices as state spaces, we can model activations in these maps that correspond 
to dynamic sensory and motor processes.  This allows us to incorporate the temporal 
intersensory influences described above.  For example, in our model, cueing corresponds 
to pre-activation of a region within one slice through the prior activation of another.  
Mutual influence corresponds to two slices cooperatively cross-activating each another 
while they are in the midst of perceiving.  These temporal interactions also allow us to 
use lower dimensional representations for modeling sensory and motor data because they 
in essence trade space (or dimensionality) for time.  In other words, our data need not be 
completely separable if we can find can find ways of avoiding ambiguity during the 
temporal window of percept formation.  Thus, we believe that cross-modal influence not 
only provides perceptual stability, it makes sensory systems more computationally 
efficient in doing so. 
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6.6 Summary 
This chapter has examined the connections between the computational framework 
presented in this thesis and perception in biological systems.  Our goal was to motivate 
our approach and to provide a context for evaluating related work in multimodal 
integration.  We also examined the representational and algorithmic challenges in 
engineering biologically realistic perceptual systems.  These systems do not co-evolve 
and may be grossly incompatible with one another, even when external relationships 
between their perceptions are readily apparent.   Finally, we speculated on a number of 
theoretical issues in intersensory perception and examined how the work in this thesis 
addresses them. 
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Chapter 7  
Conclusions 
The primary contribution of this thesis has been to identify how artificial systems can use 
cross-modal correspondences to learn without supervision.  Building systems that 
develop by interacting with the world around them has been a dream of artificial 
intelligence researchers since the days of Turing, and this thesis marks a step forward 
towards that goal. This work has also demonstrated that a biologically-inspired approach 
can help answer what are historically difficult computational problems, for example, how 
to cluster non-parametric data corresponding to an unknown number of categories and 
how to learn motor control through self-observation.   
We have also identified cross-modal cooperation as a central problem in theoretical and 
applied artificial intelligence.  In doing so, we have introduced three key formalisms: 
1. Slices, which represent and share information amodally between different 
subsystems.  They can be used to model sensory and motor data and have wide 
applications for modeling static and dynamic inputs. 
2. Cross-modal clustering, which learns categories in slices without supervision, based 
on how they co-occur with other slices. 
3. Influence networks, which spread influence among different slices and provide 
perceptual and interpretative stability. 
We demonstrated the power of cross-modal cooperation and clustering by learning the 
vowel structure of American English, simply by watching and listening to someone 
speak.  This is the first self-supervised computational approach to this problem of which 
we are aware.  We further demonstrated that this framework can equivalently be applied 
to sensorimotor learning, by acquiring birdsong according to the developmental stages of 
a juvenile zebra finch.  In this, we have shown that this work can be applied recursively 
to learn higher-level knowledge.  In the example given in Chapter 5, we recursively 
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grounded motor control in self-acquired sensory categories, thereby demonstrating 
afferent and efferent equivalence in sensorimotor learning, which in itself is a very 
surprising result.  It further suggests how to carry this work forward towards more 
complex, higher-level learning tasks, as we discuss below. 
 
7.1 Future Work 
Our immediate plans are to apply the birdsong learning framework in Chapter 5 towards 
learning human babbling and the entire phonetic set of American English.  Early 
protolinguistic behavior in humans is not a well studied nor understood phenomenon.  
We intend to create a system that learns to babble at the level of an eight month old child, 
in a developmentally realistic way.  We believe examining the earliest intellectual 
development in people provides a path to understanding fundamental issues in knowledge 
acquisition and to building a new generation of intelligent machines.  Along these lines, 
we plan to extend this work to hierarchical clustering and address issues in concept 
formation based on perceptual grounding.  We would particularly like to apply the ideas 
of Lakoff (1987) for grounding internal mental activity using external, real world 
metaphors and observations, which is a basic feature of human cognition. 
We would also like to embed this framework in a robotic platform or an interactive 
environment, to provide a real-time environment for visual and motor development. 
We are also interested in non-perceptual applications of the work presented here.  The 
mathematical framework in this thesis can be applied to problems with similar structures.  
For example, by treating the messages passed between human or software agents as 
perceptual events, we can categorize both the messages and the agents passing them.  
This has applications both in software engineering and in understanding cells of 
interacting people.  It also is applicable to learning how to detect events within 
distributed sensor networks.  This work also has applications in separating non-ergodic 
Markov chains into their ergodic components, which has applications in probability 
theory and statistical physics. 
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Appendix 1 
Glossary 
 
Amodal – Not relating to any particular sense directly.  For example, intensity is amodal, because 
different senses can have their inputs described as being intense, whereas purple is not an 
amodal attribute because it applies only to visual inputs. 
 
Artificial perceptual system – A computational system that perceives real-world phenomena.  
For example, speech recognition and computer vision systems are examples of artificial 
perceptual systems. 
 
Cross-Modal – Any phenomenon that involves information being shared between seemingly 
disparate perceptual channels.  In this thesis, these channels may fall within the same 
gross modality, such as vision, as long as different modes are involved. 
 
Intersensory – Used interchangeably with cross-modal. 
 
Modality – A sense or perceptory capability, such as touch, vision, etc.  Generally refers to an 
entire class of such capabilities, such as the vision modality, which is comprised of a 
range of individual visual capabilities, such as color sensitivity, peripheral vision, motion 
detection, etc., all of which share a common sensory organ. 
 
Mode – A highly specific sense or perceptory capability.  Unlike modality, modes refer to the 
specific capabilities of particular senses, e.g., the sweetness mode of taste or the color 
sensitivity mode of vision, etc.  This definition is elaborated upon in §1.5. 
 
Multimodal – A perceptory phenomenon involving multiple modes simultaneously.  For 
example, hand clapping is multimodal, because it can be both seen and heard.  For that 
matter, most real-world events are multimodal, because they generate multiple types of 
energy simultaneously to which different sensory channels are receptive.  Also used to 
describe artificial perceptual systems that are sensitive to multiple modalities; these are 
typically called multimodal systems. 
 
Sense – In this thesis, a sense is used equivalently with a mode, as defined above.  In other words, 
a sense refers to a highly specific perceptual capability. 
 
System – A computer system unless context indicates biological. 
 
Unimodal – A perceptory phenomenon or quality involving only a single modality.  For example, 
speech recognition systems are generally considered unimodal, because they only 
perceive spoken language inputs.  The designation can be confusing, however, because 
many unimodal systems have traditional graphical user interfaces (GUI) that provide 
inputs outside of their perceptual channel.  They are nonetheless still deemed unimodal, 
because GUI inputs are non-perceptual. 
 
 
